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Abstract
This thesis develops several tools and techniques using ideas from information theory, optimization,
and online learning, and applies them to a number of highly related fundamental problems in complexity
theory, pseudorandomness theory, and cryptography.
First, we give a new, more constructive proof of von Neumann’s Min-Max Theorem for two-player
zero-sum game, extending previous work of Freund and Schapire (Games and Economic Behavior ‘99). The
resulting Uniform Min-Max Theorem enables a number of applications in cryptography and complexity
theory, often yielding uniform security versions of results that were previously only proved for nonuniform
security (due to use of the non-constructive Min-Max Theorem), and often with optimal parameters.
We then develop several applications of the Uniform Min-Max Theorem, including: Regularity Theo-
rems that provide eﬃcient simulation of distributions within any suﬃciently nice convex set; an improved
version of the Weak Regularity Lemma for graphs; a simple and more modular uniform version of the
Hardcore Theorem for boolean circuits; Dense Model Theorems for uniform algorithms; and impossibil-
ity of constructing Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments (SNARGs) via black-box reductions under uniform
hardness assumptions.
Next, we provide a new characterization of computational Shannon-entropy, in terms of the hardness
of sampling a distribution. Given any joint distribution (X;B) where B takes values in a polynomial-
sized set, we show that (X;B) is computationally indistinguishable to some joint distribution (X;C) with
Hsh(CjX)  Hsh(BjX) + , if and only if there is no poly-sized circuit S such that the KL divergence
from B to S(X) is smaller than . We then use this characterization to show that if f is a one-way
function, then (f(Un); Un) has “next-bit pseudoentropy” at least n + logn, establishing a conjecture of
Haitner, Reingold, and Vadhan (STOC ‘10). Plugging this into the construction of Haitner et al., this yields
a simpler construction of pseudorandom generators from one-way functions. With an additional idea, we
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also show how to improve the seed length of the pseudorandom generator to ~O(n3), compared to ~O(n4) in
the construction of Haitner et al. In addition, this characterization establishes a connection to prediction
markets based on market scoring rules.
We also provide a new characterization of pseudo-avg-min-entropy, generalizing the Hardcore Theorem
to polynomial-sized (rather than binary) alphabets. The Uniform Min-Max Theorem is used to obtain
uniform versions of both characterizations.
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Introduction
Information theory and optimization theory have proved to be extremely useful in
many ﬁelds of theoretical computer science. For example, much of modern cryptography
and pseudorandomness theory was founded on (generalizations of) information-theoretic
notions; machine learning has beneﬁtted tremendously from tools in optimization. In this
work, we bring together concepts and techniques from information theory, optimization, and
online learning in the context of complexity theory, pseudorandomness, and cryptography.
1.1 A Uniform Min-Max Theorem and Applications
Von Neumann’s Min-Max Theorem (equivalent to Linear Programming Duality and the
ﬁnite-dimensional Hahn-Banach Theorem) is a fundamental result about zero-sum games
between 2 players. It tells us that if for every Player 1 strategy (which can be randomized)
Player 2 can respond accordingly to achieve a payoﬀ of at least k, then Player 2 has a
universal strategy (which is randomized) that guarantees such payoﬀ regardless of Player
1’s strategy. The Min-Max Theorem has proved to be an extremely useful tool in theoreti-
cal computer science. In cryptography and complexity theory, it gives rise to a number of
1
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results such as Impagliazzo’s Hardcore Theorem [Imp], equivalence of diﬀerent notions of
computational entropy [BSW], the Dense Model Theorem [RTTV], leakage-resilient cryp-
tography [DP2, FR], eﬃcient simulation of high entropy distributions [TTV], impossibil-
ity of constructing succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs) via black-box reductions
[GW], cryptographic studies of forecast testing [FV, CLP1], and simpler construction of
pseudorandom generators from one-way functions [VZ1].
A limitation of the Min-Max Theorem is that it is non-constructive; it only asserts
the existence of such universal strategy for Player 2, but does not say how it can be found
(algorithmically). In a typical result in cryptography or complexity, where the statement
is of the form “hardness of A” implies “hardness of B,” the proof is often a “reduction,”
constructing an adversary for A from an adversary for B. This is the case for most of the
aforementioned cryptographic applications, where the Min-Max Theorem is applied during
the construction of the adversary for A. Consequently, non-constructivity of the Min-Max
Theorem means we can only nonuniformly construct an adversary for A. In other words,
such results must make the stronger assumption that A is hard even for nonuniform boolean
circuits, and not just uniform algorithms.
In Chapter 2 we give a new, more constructive proof of the Min-Max Theorem, using
techniques from optimization and online learning [HW], and extending previous work of
Freund and Schapire [FS]. The resulting Uniform Min-Max Theorem, when used in place of
the Min-Max Theorem, can often yield a uniform construction of an adversary for B. With
the Uniform Min-Max Theorem, we are thus able to prove uniform versions of some of the
aforementioned results (where hardness is with respect to uniform algorithms), throughout
Chapter 3, 4 and 6.
Remark. The statement of a uniform result is often incomparable to the statement of
the corresponding nonuniform result, whose assumption and conclusion are both stronger
2
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(i.e. hardness for boolean circuits). However, a uniform result often can also be stated as
a uniform “reduction” that works for both uniform and nonuniform settings. In this sense,
our uniform results in Chapter 3, 4 and 6 are stronger than the known nonuniform results,
but for simplicity we choose not to state them in that way.
Regularity Theorems for Distributions Restricted to a Convex Set. In Chapter
2 we also apply the Uniform Min-Max Theorem to show a generalization and quantitative
improvement to the “Regularity Theorem” of Trevisan, Tulsiani, and Vadhan [TTV], which
(informally) says that any high min-entropy distribution X is indistinguishable from some
high min-entropy, low complexity distribution Y . The result of [TTV] is itself a quantitative
improvement of regularity and “decomposition” theorems in additive combinatorics [GT,
TZ]. It is shown in [TTV] that such results can be used to deduce the Dense Model
Theorem [TZ, RTTV, Gow], Impagliazzo’s Hardcore Theorem [Imp], and other results,
by replacing any unknown distribution X with an “equivalent” distribution Y that can
be eﬃciently analyzed and manipulated. Among applications of our Regularity Theorems
are an improved and optimal Weak Regularity Lemma for graphs of density o(1), and a
strengthening of a recent result of Jetchev and Pietrzak [JP].
Uniform Hardcore Theorem. Impagliazzo’s Hardcore Theorem ([Imp] and later strength-
ened in [KS, Hol1, BHK]) is a fundamental result in complexity theory that says if a boolean
function f is somewhat hard on average, then there must be a subset of inputs (the hard-
core) on which f is extremely hard, and outside of which f is easy. There are two approaches
to proving the theorem. One is constructive [Imp, KS, Hol1, BHK] and leads to a Uniform
Hardcore Theorem where hardness of f is measured against uniform algorithms, rather
than nonuniform boolean circuits, and has several important applications in cryptography
[KS, Hol1, Hol2, HHR1, HRV]. However, the existing proofs either do not achieve all of the
3
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optimal parameters simultaneously for a Uniform Hardcore Theorem, or when they do they
tend to be somewhat ad hoc. Another approach due to Nisan [Imp] (and strengthened in
[Hol1]) uses the (non-constructive) Min-Max Theorem and has the advantage of simplicity,
but is restricted to the nonuniform measure of hardness.
In Chapter 3, Section 3.1, we show that by replacing the use of Min-Max Theorem
in the proof of Nisan [Imp] or Holenstein [Hol1] with our Uniform Min-Max Theorem, we
obtain a new proof of the Uniform Hardcore Theorem with the advantages of (i) optimal
hardcore density; (ii) optimal complexity blow-up; and (iii) modularity and simplicity.
Uniform Dense Model Theorem. A celebrated result of Green and Tao [GT] shows
that there exist arbitrarily long arithmetic progressions of prime numbers. A key new
component of their proof is the Dense Model Theorem which, in the generalized form of Tao
and Ziegler [TZ], says if X is a pseudorandom distribution and D is a distribution dense in
X, then D is indistinguishable to a distributionM that is dense in the uniform distribution.
Using the Min-Max Theorem, Reingold et al. [RTTV] provided another proof of Dense
Model Theorem where the indistinguishability and complexity blow-ups are polynomial
(rather than exponential); a similar proof was given by Gowers [Gow]. The polynomial
blow-ups are crucial for applications in leakage-resilient cryptography [DP2, DP1, FOR],
and for connections to computational diﬀerential privacy [MPRV]. In Chapter 3, Section
3.2, as another application of the Uniform Min-Max Theorem, we show how to obtain a
Dense Model Theorem where the distinguishers are eﬃcient (uniform) algorithms, with
polynomial blow-ups in running time and indistinguishability.
Characterizations of Computational Entropy. In Chapter 4 we give new charac-
terizations of notions of computational randomness, whose proof in the nonuniform set-
ting involves the Min-Max Theorem. Our characterization of “computational average min-
4
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entropy” (known as “pseudo-avg-min-entropy”) is a generalization of the Hardcore Theorem
to larger alphabets. Our characterization of computational conditional entropy (known as
“conditional pseudoentropy”) leads to simpler constructions of pseudorandom generators
from arbitrary one-way functions in Chapter 5 (building on the work of Haitner, Reingold,
and Vadhan [HRV]). Using the Uniform Min-Max Theorem, we proved our characteriza-
tions in the uniform setting. For computational conditional entropy, the uniform result
gives rise to (simpler) pseudorandom generator from arbitrary one-way functions that are
secure against uniform algorithms.
Impossibility of Black-Box Construction of Succinct Non-Interactive Argument.
A result of Gentry and Wichs [GW] shows that there is no black-box construction of succinct
non-interactive arguments (SNARGs) from any natural cryptographic assumption. Their
result relies on the (mild) assumption that there exist hard subset membership problems,
which is equivalent to the existence of subexponentially hard one-way functions. One lim-
itation is that they need to assume nonuniformly secure one-way functions, in part due to
their use of the non-constructive Min-Max theorem in Lemma 3.1 of [GW].
In Chapter 6, we show how to obtain the analogous result in the uniform setting by using
the Uniform Min-Max Theorem. We show that, assuming that there exist subexponentially
hard one-way functions that are secure against uniform algorithms, there is no construction
of SNARGs whose security can be reduced in a black-box way to a cryptographic assumption
against uniform algorithms (unless the assumption is already false).
Unlike some of the previous applications, Gentry and Wich’s proof (for the nonuni-
form setting) relies on nonuniformity even outside the use of the Min-Max Theorem. A
considerable amount of extra work is needed for us to remove these uses of nonuniformity.
5
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1.2 Characterizing Computational Entropy and Applications
Computational analogues of information-theoretic notions have given rise to some of
the most interesting phenomena in cryptography and pseudorandomness theory. For exam-
ple, indistinguishability [GM2], which is the computational analogue of statistical distance,
enabled bypassing Shannon’s impossibility results on perfectly secure encryption [Sha], and
provided the basis for the computational theory of pseudorandomness [BM, Yao2]. In-
formally, two distributions X and Y are said to be indistinguishable if for all eﬃcient
randomized algorithms P , the probabilities that P (X) = 1 and P (Y ) = 1 diﬀer negligibly
(where the probability is over X, Y , and coins of P ).
Computational analogues of entropy were introduced by Yao [Yao2] and Håstad, Im-
pagliazzo, Levin, and Luby [HILL]. The Håstad et al. notions, known as pseudoentropy and
pseudo-min-entropy, were key to their fundamental result establishing the equivalence of
pseudorandom generators and one-way functions, and have also now become a basic concept
in complexity theory and cryptography. A distribution X is said to have pseudoentropy at
least k if there exists a distribution Y indistinguishable from X such that Y has entropy1 at
least k. Analogously, a distribution X is said to have pseudo-min-entropy at least k if there
exists a distribution Y indistinguishable from X such that Y has min-entropy2 at least k.
Conditional versions of the Håstad et al. notions are known as conditional pseudoentropy
[HRV] and pseudo-avg-min-entropy [HLR], respectively. Pseudo-avg-min-entropy, in the
special case involving only a binary alphabet, is equivalent to “hardcore distributions” intro-
duced by Impagliazzo [Imp] (see the discussion on Impagliazzo’s Hardcore Theorem above).
Conditional pseudoentropy was introduced by Haitner, Reingold, and Vadhan [HRV] to
give a simpler and more eﬃcient construction of pseudorandom generators from one-way
1The (Shannon) entropy of a distribution X is deﬁned to be Hsh(X) = Ex X [log(1/Pr[X = x])] :
2The min-entropy of a distribution X is deﬁned to be Hsh(X) = minx [log(1/Pr[X = x])] :
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functions.
In Chapter 4, we give new characterizations of pseudo-avg-min-entropy, pseudoentropy,
and conditional pseudoentropy in terms of certain (diﬀerent) notions of “hardness” for dis-
tributions, using concepts and techniques from information theory, optimization, and pseu-
dorandomness theory. Our characterizations of pseudo-avg-min-entropy and conditional
pseudoentropy are as follows:
Theorem 1.1 (Characterizing pseudo-avg-min-entropy, informal). Let (X;B) be a polynomial-
time samplable joint distribution where B takes values in a polynomial-sized set. Then B has
pseudo-avg-min-entropy at least k given X if and only if there is no probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm S such that Pr[S(X) = B]  2 k.
Theorem 1.2 (Characterizing conditional pseudoentropy, informal). Let (X;B) be a joint
distribution where B takes values in a polynomial-sized set. Then B has pseudoentropy at
least Hsh(BjX)+3 given X if and only if there is no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
S such that the KL divergence4 from (X;B) to (X;S(X)) is at most .
We note that the characterization of pseudo-avg-min-entropy is a generalization of
the Hardcore Theorem to polynomial-sized (rather than binary) alphabets. Some of our
techniques are rather generic, and can be used to deduce a meta theorem characterizing a
class of computational entropy notions (in which pseudoentropy is a special case).
In addition, using the Uniform Min-Max Theorem, we obtain uniform versions of the
these characterizations, namely with respect to probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms S.
In Chapter 5, we study how to further simplify and improve the construction of pseu-
dorandom generators from arbitrary one-way functions, building on the recent work of
3Hsh(BjX) denotes the conditional entropy of B given X.
4KL divergence is a common notion of “distance” between distributions.
7
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Haitner, Reingold, and Vadhan [HRV]. In particular, we apply the characterization of
conditional pseudoentropy to show that all one-way functions directly contain “next-bit
pseudoentropy,” establishing a conjecture of Haitner, Reingold, and Vadhan. This yields
a further simpliﬁed construction of pseudorandom generators from arbitrary one-way func-
tions. In addition, we will explore how to further improve the eﬃciency of the pseudorandom
generator from the previous state-of-the-art ~O(n4) to ~O(n3).
In Chapter 7, we introduce the notion of algorithmic prediction markets based on
market scoring rules, and prove lower bounds using our characterizations of conditional
pseudoentropy.
1.3 Preliminaries
For more background on information theory, including the deﬁnitions and proofs of
their basic properties stated in this section, see [CT].
1.3.1 Notations and Conventions
For a natural number n, [n] denotes the set f1; : : : ; ng, Un denotes the uniform distri-
bution on binary strings of length n. For a ﬁnite set , U denotes the uniform distribution
on . For a distribution X, supp(X) denotes the support of X, x  X and x  X mean
that x is a random sample drawn from distribution X. We write Avgaib as a shorthand
for the average over all i 2 fa; : : : ; bg. Conv() denotes the convex hull. Where there is no
ambiguity, a symbol may be used to denote both a function and a variable, e.g. g = g(n);
in such case we write g() to denote the function. All logs are base 2.
When we say n is a security parameter and K = K(n) (e.g. when talking about uniform
algorithms), what we mean is that there is a sequence of objects (which can be numbers,
distributions, etc) K(1);K(2); : : : , and K is used as a shorthand for K(n) wherever n has
8
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been quantiﬁed (explicitly or implicitly).
For a joint distribution (X;C), we write C(ajx) to denote the conditional probability
Pr[C = ajX = x], whenever X is clear from the context. For a function P :  ! R0
where  is a ﬁnite set, we write P to denote the distribution C where Pr[C = a] =
P (a)/
P
a2 P (a). For a distribution X that is clear from context and a function P :
supp(X)   ! R0, we write P to denote the distribution C jointly distributed with
X, where C(ajx) = P (x; a)/Pa2 P (x; a) for each x 2 supp(X). In particular, if P is
[0; 1]-valued then P is called a measure:
Deﬁnition 1.3 (Measure and conditional measure). For a distribution C, a function P :
supp(C)! [0; 1] is said to be a measure for C if C = P .
For a joint distribution (X;C), a function P : supp(X)  supp(C) ! [0; 1] is a condi-
tional measure for CjX if (X;C) = (X;P ).
1.3.2 Entropies, Divergences, and Projection
Deﬁnition 1.4 (Entropy). For a distribution X, the (Shannon) entropy of X is
Hsh(X) = E
x X

log 1Pr[X = x]

:
For  = 2; 3; : : : , the Renyi entropy of X of order  is
H(X) = log
1P
x2supp(X) Pr[X = x]
1/( 1) ;
and the min-entropy of X is
H1(X) = lim
!+1H(X) = minx2supp(X)

log 1Pr[X = x]

:
Deﬁnition 1.5. For a joint distribution (X;B), the conditional (Shannon) entropy of B
given X (or, conditional (Shannon) entropy of B when X is clear from the context) is
Hsh(BjX) = E
x X
[Hsh(BjX=x)] :
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Proposition 1.6 (Chain rule for Shannon entropy). Hsh(X;B) = Hsh(X) +Hsh(BjX).
Bregman divergence is a notion of distance between distributions:5
Deﬁnition 1.7 (Bregman divergence). Let  be any ﬁnite set, andH : fdistributions on g !
R0 be any strictly concave function that is diﬀerentiable in the interior of the simplex in
jj-space. Let A and B be distributions on . The Bregman divergence associated with H
from A to B is deﬁned to be
DH(A k B) = H(B) H(A)  hrH(B); B  Ai
whererH(B) is the gradient vector, and we view B A as the diﬀerence between probability
vectors.
For hrH(B); B  Ai, if H(B) is not diﬀerentiable w.r.t. Pr[B = a] for some a 2 ,
then by convention:
 If Pr[A = a] > Pr[B = a] = 0, then DH(A k B) = +1;
 If Pr[A = a] = Pr[B = a] = 0, then it contributes zero to the inner product.
While Bregman divergence is not a metric (it is not symmetric and does not satisfy
the triangle inequality), it does satisfy nonnegativity, and equals zero if and only if the
distributions are identical:
Proposition 1.8 (Nonnegativity of Bregman divergence). For all distributions A and B,
DH(A k B)  0. Moreover, DH(A k B) = 0 if and only if A = B.
A canonical example of Bregman divergence is the KL divergence, with H being the
Shannon entropy function Hsh.
5In fact Bregman divergence can be deﬁned between elements in an arbitrary convex subset of Rn, rather
than the unit simplex. However, the more restricted deﬁnition suﬃces for our purpose.
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Deﬁnition 1.9 (KL divergence and conditional KL divergence). The Bregman divergence
associated with Shannon entropy is known as the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence. For
distributions A and B, it is easily veriﬁed that the KL divergence from A to B equals
KL(A k B) = DH(A k B) = E
a A

log Pr[A = a]Pr[B = a]

;
or conventionally +1 if supp(A) 6 supp(B).
For joint distributions (X;A) and (Y;B), the conditional KL divergence from AjX to
BjY is deﬁned to be
KL((AjX) k (BjY )) = E
(x;a) (X;A)

log Pr[A = ajX = x]Pr[B = ajY = x]

= E
x X
[KL(AjX=x k BY=x)] :
Intuitively, the KL divergence from distribution A to distribution B measures how
dense A is within B, on average (with zero divergence representing maximum density, i.e.
A = B, and large divergence meaning that A is concentrated in a small portion of B). Like
Shannon entropy, KL divergence has a chain rule:
Proposition 1.10 (Chain rule for KL divergence). KL(X;A k Y;B) = KL(X k Y ) +
KL((AjX) k (BjY )).
Like other distance measures between distributions, applying any (deterministic) func-
tion never increases the KL divergence:
Proposition 1.11 (Entropy-like property of KL divergence). KL(g(A)jjg(B))  KL(AjjB)
for any function g.6
Next we deﬁne KL projection, which can be seen as the analogue of Euclidean projection
that minimizes KL divergence rather than Euclidean distance:
6This is in fact equivalent to the log-sum inequality [CT]. For a more direct proof, see [GV].
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Deﬁnition 1.12 (KL projection). Let X be a distribution on , and V be a non-empty
closed convex set of distributions on . Y  2 V is called a KL projection of X on V if
Y  = argmin
Y 2V
KL(Y k X):
A nice property of KL projection is the following geometric structure (see [CT], Chap
11, Section 6):
Theorem 1.13 (Pythagorean Theorem). Let V be a non-empty closed convex set of distri-
butions on . Let Y  be a KL projection of X on V. Then for all Y 2 V,
KL(Y k Y ) +KL(Y  k X)  KL(Y k X):
In particular,
KL(Y k Y )  KL(Y k X):
Assuming KL(Y  k X) is ﬁnite, then the Pythagorean Theorem implies that the KL
projection is unique:
Proposition 1.14. The KL projection is unique.
Proof. Suppose Y  and Y are both KL projections of X on V. Then by the Pythagorean
Theorem (Theorem 1.13) KL(Y k Y ) = 0, which implies Y = Y  by Proposition 1.8.
Finding the exact KL projection is often computationally infeasible, so we consider
approximate KL projection:
Deﬁnition 1.15 (Approximate KL projection). We say Y  is a -approximate KL projec-
tion of X on V, if Y  2 V and for all Y 2 V,
KL(Y k Y )  KL(Y k X) + :
In particular, by the Pythagorean Theorem (Theorem 1.13) Y 0 is a -approximate KL
projection of X if KL(Y k Y 0)  KL(Y k Y ) +  for all Y 2 V, where Y  is the (exact)
KL projection of X.
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1.3.3 Indistinguishability
(Computational) indistinguishability is the computational analogue of two distributions
being statistically close (i.e. small total variation distance), by considering a restricted class
of statistical tests W rather than all statistical tests:
Deﬁnition 1.16 ((Computational) indistinguishability). Let W be any set of functions
W : ! [0; 1], for some ﬁnite set . Two distributionsX and Y on  are -indistinguishable
by W if for all W 2 W,
jE[W (X)]  E[W (Y )]j < :
E[W (X)]   E[W (Y )] is said to be the distinguishing advantage of W , and W is an -
distinguisher between X and Y if its distinguishing advantage is at least .
WhenW is closed under “negation” i.e.W 2 W () 1 W 2 W, -indistinguishability
can be equivalently stated without taking absolute value:
E[W (X)]  E[W (Y )] < :
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Uniform Min-Max Theorem and
Regularity Theorems
Von Neumann’s Min-Max Theorem (which is equivalent to Linear Programming Dual-
ity and the ﬁnite-dimensional Hahn-Banach Theorem) has proved to be an extremely useful
tool in theoretical computer science, giving rise to a number of results in cryptography and
complexity theory. In this chapter we give a new, more constructive proof of the Min-Max
Theorem (extending previous work of Freund and Schapire [FS]), and use the resulting
Uniform Min-Max Theorem to deduce new Regularity Theorems for distributions. These
results will be applied throughout Chapter 3, 4 and 6 to obtain new “uniform” results in
cryptography and complexity theory.
2.1 Introduction
Consider a zero-sum game between two players where for every mixed strategy V for
Player 1 (as a distribution over his strategy space V), Player 2 has a response W 2 W that
guarantees E [f(V;W )]  0, where f (payoﬀ) can be an arbitrary function. The Min-Max
14
Chapter 2: Uniform Min-Max Theorem and Regularity Theorems
Theorem says that there must exist a Player 2’s mixed strategy W  (as a distribution over
his strategy spaceW) that guarantees E [f(V;W )]  0 for all strategies V 2 V of Player 1.
The Min-Max Theorem gives rise to a number of results in cryptography and complex-
ity theory such as Impagliazzo’s Hardcore Theorem [Imp], equivalence of diﬀerent notions of
computational entropy [BSW], the Dense Model Theorem [RTTV], leakage-resilient cryp-
tography [DP2, FR], eﬃcient simulation of high entropy distributions [TTV], impossibil-
ity of constructing succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs) via black-box reductions
[GW], cryptographic studies of forecast testing [FV, CLP1], and simple construction of
pseudorandom generators from one-way functions [VZ1]. In a typical application like these,
Player 1 chooses V from a convex set V of distributions over f0; 1gn, and Player 2 chooses
W from a set W of (possibly randomized) boolean functions f0; 1gn ! f0; 1g and receives
expected payoﬀ E[f(V;W )] where f(V;W ) = E[W (V )], i.e. the expected output of W when
input is drawn from the distribution V . For example, V contains all high entropy distribu-
tions over f0; 1gn and W contains all boolean functions of small circuit size.
A limitation of the Min-Max Theorem is that it is highly non-constructive; it only
asserts the existence of the optimal strategy W  but does not say how it can be found
(algorithmically). Consequently, applications of the Min-Max Theorem only give rise to
results about nonuniform boolean circuits, rather than uniform algorithms (e.g. we set
cryptographic protocols based on nonuniform hardness rather than uniform hardness as-
sumptions).
To overcome this, we consider the natural algorithmic task of constructing such an
optimal strategy W  for Player 2, assuming f is eﬃciently computable. When the sizes of
strategy spaces V andW are small (e.g. polynomial) this can be done by linear programming,
for which eﬃcient algorithms are well-known. However, applications in cryptography and
complexity theory such as ones just mentioned involve exponentially large strategy spaces,
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and an optimal strategy W  cannot be found in polynomial time in general. Thus we also
require that, given any mixed strategy V for Player 1, not only does there exist a strategy
W 2 W for Player 2 with E [f(V;W )]  0, but such response W can be obtained eﬃciently
by an oracle (or an eﬃcient uniform algorithm).
Assuming such an oracle, Freund and Schapire [FS] show how to ﬁnd an approximately
optimal W  for Player 2 in polynomial time and by making O((log jVj)/2) adaptive oracle
queries, using the idea of multiplicative weight updates. However, their algorithm still falls
short in some of aforementioned applications where V is a set of distributions over f0; 1gn,
and thus V can have doubly-exponentially many vertices. For example, consider the set of
distributions on f0; 1gn of min-entropy at least k; the vertices of V are uniform distributions
on a subset of size 2k, and there are
 
2n
2k

such subsets.
In this chapter, we present a Uniform Min-Max Theorem that eﬃciently ﬁnds an ap-
proximately optimal strategy W  for Player 2, given an oracle that for any of Player 1’s
mixed strategy V 2 V returns some Player 2’s strategy that guarantees reasonable payoﬀ,
even when V is a (suﬃciently nice) set of distributions over f0; 1gn. Our theorem is in-
spired by the proof of Uniform Hardcore Theorem of Barak, Hardt, and Kale [BHK]. Like
[BHK], the underlying algorithm uses “relative entropy (KL) projections” together with
multiplicative weight updates (a technique originally due to Herbster and Warmuth [HW]).
Our contribution is providing the right abstraction: formulating this algorithm as providing
a Uniform Min-Max Theorem.
An advantage of our formulation of a Uniform Min-Max Theorem is that it is more
modular, and not speciﬁc to the Hardcore Theorem. Consequently, it immediately enables
a number of applications, including (but not limited to) deriving uniform versions of many
of the aforementioned results, where we now deal with algorithms rather than nonuniform
boolean circuits. Even for the Hardcore Theorem, where the uniform version was already
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known [Hol1, BHK], there are advantages to deducing it using the Uniform Min-Max The-
orem. Furthermore, even in nonuniform settings, replacing the use of standard Min-Max
Theorem with the Uniform Min-Max Theorem can often yield improved, optimal parame-
ters.
Regularity Theorems for Distributions Restricted to a Convex Set. We then
apply the Uniform Min-Max Theorem to show a generalization and quantitative improve-
ment to the “Regularity Theorem” of Trevisan, Tulsiani, and Vadhan [TTV] which (infor-
mally) says that any high min-entropy distribution X is indistinguishable from some high
min-entropy, low complexity distribution Y . The result of [TTV] is itself a quantitative im-
provement of regularity and “decomposition” theorems in additive combinatorics [GT, TZ].
It is shown in [TTV] that such results can be used to deduce the Dense Model Theorem
[TZ, RTTV, Gow], Impagliazzo’s Hardcore Theorem [Imp], and other results, by replacing
any unknown distribution X with an “equivalent” distribution Y that can be eﬃciently
analyzed and manipulated.
Our result is more general than [TTV] in the sense that we are no longer restricted
to distributions of high min-entropy. We show that for any suﬃciently nice convex set of
distributions V, every distribution X 2 V is indistinguishable from some distribution Y 2 V
where Y has “low complexity”, for various notions of complexity and indistinguishability. In
the case of min-entropy distributions, we obtain a high min-entropy Y with lower complexity
than [TTV]. This also yields an improved and optimal Weak Regularity Lemma for graphs
of density o(1) (Section 2.3.2).
Average-case versions of our Regularity Theorems can be used to deduce “low com-
plexity” versions of a technical lemma of [GW]. We note that our average-case Regularity
Theorem for circuit complexity is a strengthening of a recent result of Jetchev and Pietrzak
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[JP], with a simpler proof. The low circuit complexity version of the [GW] lemma (with
slightly weaker parameters) was initially proved by Jetchev and Pietrzak [JP], and an inter-
active extension was proved by Chung, Lui, and Pass [CLP2] for applications in the context
of distributional zero-knowledge.
2.2 A Uniform Min-Max Theorem
Consider a zero-sum game between two players, where the space of pure strategies for
Player 1 is a V = [N ], the space of pure strategies for Player 2 is W, and the payoﬀ to
Player 2 is deﬁned to be f(V;W ) for some function f : V  W ! [0; 1]. Von Neumann’s
Min-Max Theorem says that
min
V 2Conv(V)
max
W2W E
[f(V;W )] = max
W2Conv(W)
min
V 2V E[f(V;W )]:
Equivalently, if for every mixed strategy V 2 Conv(V) for Player 1, Player 2 has a response
W 2 W that guarantees E [f(V;W )]  p, then there must exist a Player 2’s mixed strategy
W  2 Conv(W) that guarantees E [f(V;W )]  p for all strategies V 2 V of Player 1:
Theorem 2.1 (Min-Max Theorem). Consider a two-player zero-sum game where V and
W are the ﬁnite sets of pure strategies for Player 1 and Player 2 (resp.), and the payoﬀ to
Player 2 is deﬁned to be f(V;W ) for some function f : V W ! [0; 1].
Suppose for all Player 1’s mixed strategies V 2 Conv(V) there exists a Player 2 “re-
sponse” strategy W 2 W with expected payoﬀ E[f(V;W )]  p. Then there exists some
W  2 Conv(W) such that E[f(V;W )]  p for all V 2 V.
A natural algorithmic task is to ﬁnd such optimal mixed strategy W . This is easy
(and well-known) in the nonuniform setting, where we want to compute W  by a small
circuit, assuming Player 2 responses can be computed by a small circuit:
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Theorem 2.2 (Nonuniform Min-Max Theorem). Consider a two-player zero-sum game
where the sets of pure strategies for Player 1 and Player 2 are V = [N ] and W, and the
payoﬀ to Player 2 is deﬁned to be f(V;W ) for some function f : V W ! [0; 1].
Suppose for all Player 1’s mixed strategies V 2 Conv(V) there exists a Player 2 “re-
sponse” strategy W 2 W with expected payoﬀ E[f(V;W )]  p. Then for every  > 0, there
exists some W  2 Conv(W) such that E[f(V;W )]  p    for all V 2 V, and W  is the
uniform distribution over a multiset of S = O(logN/2) elements of W.
Proof. By the Min-Max Theorem there is a mixed strategyW 2 Conv(W) with an expected
payoﬀ of E[f(V;W )]  p for all V 2 V. Take S random samples from W and let W  be
uniformly distributed over these S samples. By a Chernoﬀ bound, for each V 2 V w.p. at
least 1   2 
(S2) we have E[f(V;W )]  E[f(V;W )]     p   . The result follows by a
union bound.
Note that W  has small circuit size because W  can be computed by picking a random
element of the small S element multiset; if W contain circuits of size at most t, then W 
has circuit size O(S  t). Also note that it implies the standard Min-Max Theorem by taking
! 0.
In many applications (including the Hardcore Theorem), the game must be set up such
that the set of pure strategies for Player 1 is a convex set V of distributions over [N ], with
the expected payoﬀ still deﬁned to be E [f(V;W )] for some function f : [N ] W ! [0; 1].
For example, V contains all the high entropy distributions over [N ]. The Min-Max Theorem
still holds for such generalized settings. And the Nonuniform Min-Max Theorem holds as
well (with the same proof as before):
Theorem 2.3 (Nonuniform Min-Max Theorem (generalized)). Consider a two-player zero-
sum game where the sets of pure strategies for Player 1 and Player 2 are V  fdistributions over [N ]g
19
Chapter 2: Uniform Min-Max Theorem and Regularity Theorems
and W, and the expected payoﬀ to Player 2 is deﬁned to be E [f(V;W )] for some function
f : [N ]W ! [0; 1].
Suppose for all Player 1’s mixed strategies V 2 Conv(V) there exists a Player 2 “re-
sponse” strategy W 2 W with expected payoﬀ E[f(V;W )]  p. Then for every  > 0,
there exists some W  2 Conv(W) such that E[f(V;W )]  p   , and W  is the uniform
distribution over a multiset of S = O(logN/2) elements of W.
This version of the Nonuniform Min-Max Theorem is implicit in Nisan’s proof of the
Hardcore Theorem [Imp], and has been used often since then.
A more ambitious goal to ﬁnd such optimal mixed strategyW  by a uniform algorithm.
We now present a Uniform Min-Max Theorem that eﬃciently ﬁnds an approximately op-
timal strategy W  2 Conv(W) for Player 2, given an oracle which, when fed any of Player
1’s mixed strategies V 2 Conv(V), returns a strategy for Player 2 that guarantees good
expected payoﬀ. Our algorithm is inspired by the proof of Uniform Hardcore Theorem of
Barak, Hardt, and Kale [BHK]. Like [BHK], our algorithm uses “relative entropy (KL) pro-
jections” together with multiplicative weight updates (a technique originally due to Herbster
and Warmuth [HW]).
Theorem 2.4 (A Uniform Min-Max Theorem). Consider a two-player zero-sum game
where the sets of pure strategies for Player 1 and Player 2 are V  fdistributions over [N ]g
and W, and the expected payoﬀ to Player 2 is deﬁned to be E [f(V;W )] for some function
f : [N ] W ! [0; 1]. Then for every 0 <   1 and S, Algorithm 2.1 (Finding Universal
Strategy) always outputs a mixed strategy W  for Player 2 such that
E[f(V;W )]  Avg
1iS
E[f(V (i);W (i))] O()
for all Player 1 strategies V 2 V where KL(V k V1)  S  2. (This holds regardless of the
arbitrary choice of W (i) and V (i+1) in the algorithm.)
20
Chapter 2: Uniform Min-Max Theorem and Regularity Theorems
In particular, taking S  (logN  minV 2V Hsh(V )) /2 where we set V (1) = U[N ] 2
Conv(V) yields that for all V 2 V,
E[f(V;W )]  Avg
1iS
E[f(V (i);W (i))] O():
Arbitrarily choose an initial strategy V (1) 2 Conv(V) for Player 1
for i 1 to S do
Obtain an arbitrary strategy W (i) 2 W for Player 2, in response to V (i)
Weight Update:
Let V (i)0 be such that Pr[V (i)0 = x] / e f(x;W (i))/2k  Pr[V (i) = x]
Projection:
V (i+1)  an arbitrary 2-approximate KL projection of V (i)0 on Conv(V)
end
Let W  be the mixed strategy for Player 2 uniform over W (1); : : : ;W (S)
return W  Algorithm 2.1: Finding Universal Strategy
By taking each W (i) to be a response to V (i) s.t. E[f(V (i);W (i))]  p, Theorem
2.4 implies the Nonuniform Min-Max Theorem (Theorem 2.3) with an improved S =
(logN  minV 2V Hsh(V )) /2. Such setting of S is shown to be tight in N and  when
V is set of all distributions [FS], and when V is the set of all -dense distributions, for any
 [LTW, Zha]. Even in nonuniform settings, it is often better to use the Uniform Min-Max
Theorem (where the multiset W (1); : : : ;W (S) is constructed adaptively) rather than The-
orem 2.3 (where the multiset W (1); : : : ;W (S) is constructed probabilistically); see Section
3.1 and 3.2 for discussions in more concrete settings.
Note that the number of iterations is at most logN/2, so we can hope for running time
poly(logN; 1/). However, Algorithm 2.1 is only an “algorithm template.” To implement it
21
Chapter 2: Uniform Min-Max Theorem and Regularity Theorems
eﬃciently in particular applications, we need to specify:
1. An compact representation of the mixed strategies V (i) (the full pmf consists of N
numbers, whereas we want running time poly(logN; 1/)).
2. An eﬃcient algorithm to obtain a good responseW (i) 2 W in response to a (compactly
described) mixed strategy V (i). Typically this comes from our assumption/hypothesis
in a given application.
3. An eﬃcient algorithm to perform weight update and projection onto Conv(V) for the
compact representation of mixed strategies.
We do not present an abstract formulation of these requirements, since it will be rather
complex to capture all of the applications. For example, in the application in Section 2.3
we are able to obtain a good response W (i) for V (i) only when V (i) is constructed by an
eﬃcient uniform algorithm.
Proof of Theorem 2.4. Consider any V 2 V such that KL(V k V1)  S  2. We show in
Lemma A.1 that
KL(V k V (i)) KL(V k V (i)0)  (log e)

E[f(V (i);W (i))]  E[f(V;W (i))]  

:
Since V (i+1) is an 2-approximate KL projection of V (i)0 on Conv(V), by deﬁnition we have
KL(V k V (i+1))  KL(V k V (i)0) + 2: Therefore
KL(V k V (i)) KL(V k V (i+1))  (log e)

E[f(V (i);W (i))]  E[f(V;W (i))]  

  2:
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Summing over i = 1; : : : ; S and telescoping, we obtain
KL(V k V (1)) KL(V k V (S+1))
 (log e)
SX
i=1

E[f(V (i);W (i))]  E[f(V;W (i))]  

  S2
= (log e)S
 
Avg
1iS
E[f(V (i);W (i))]  E[f(V;W )]  
!
  S2:
Since KL(V k V (S+1))  0 and KL(V k V1)  S  2, rearranging yields
Avg
1iS
E[f(V (i);W (i))]  E[f(V;W )]  KL(V k V
(1)) + S2
(log e)S +  = O():
Next, we describe an average case variant, where the set V of strategies for Player 1 is
a set of distributions of the form (X;C) where C may vary, but the marginal distribution
of X is ﬁxed. This is convenient for a number of applications (e.g. Chapter 4 and 6) that
involve distinguishers on such joint distributions (X;C).
Theorem 2.5 (Uniform Min-Max Theorem – Average Case). Let V be a subset of dis-
tributions over [N ]  [q] of the form (X;C) where C may vary, but the marginal distri-
bution of X is ﬁxed. That is, for every (X;C), (X 0; C 0) 2 V and every x 2 [N ] we haveP
c Pr[(X;C) = (x; c)] =
P
c Pr[(X 0; C 0) = (x; c)].
Consider a two-player zero-sum game where the sets of pure strategies for Player 1 and
Player 2 are V and W, and the expected payoﬀ to Player 2 is deﬁned to be E [f((X;C);W )]
for some function f : [N ]  [q] W ! [0; 1]. Then for every 0 <   1 and S, Algorithm
2.2 (Finding Universal Strategy – Average Case) always outputs a mixed strategy W  for
Player 2 such that
E[f((X;C);W )]  Avg
1iS
E[f((X;C(i));W (i))] O()
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for all Player 1 strategies (X;C) 2 V where KL(X;C k X;C(1))  S  2. (This holds
regardless of the arbitrary choice of W (i) and C(i+1) in the algorithm.)
In particular, taking S   log q  min(X;C)2V Hsh(CjX) /2 where we set (X;C(1)) =
(X;U[q]) 2 Conv(V) (U[q] being independent of X) yields that for all (X;C) 2 V,
E[f((X;C);W )]  Avg
1iS
E[f((X;C(i));W (i))] O():
Arbitrarily choose an initial strategy (X;C(1)) 2 Conv(V) for Player 1
for i 1 to S do
Obtain an arbitrary strategy W (i) 2 W for Player 2, in response to
(X;C(i))
Weight Update:
Let C(i)0 be such that 8x; a,
Pr[C(i)0 = ajX = x] / e f(x;a;W (i))/2k  Pr[C(i) = ajX = x]
Projection:
(X;C(i+1)) an arbitrary 2-approximate KL projection of (X;C(i)0)
on Conv(V)
end
Let W  be the mixed strategy for Player 2 uniform over W (1); : : : ;W (S)
return W 
Algorithm 2.2: Finding Universal Strategy – Average Case
Proof. Note that Algorithm 2.2 is the same as Algorithm 2.1, except for the diﬀerence
that here we update C(i) instead of V (i). We show that the combined eﬀect of the update
and KL projection steps is identical in the two algorithms. Note that we can write V (i)0
as (X(i)0 ; gi(X(i)0)) for the randomized function gi where Pr[gi(x) = a] / ef(x;a;W (i))/2k 
Pr[C(i) = ajX = x] for every x and a. For the same function gi, we have (X; gi(X)) =
(X;C(i)
0
). Thus, we can apply the following lemma.
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Lemma 2.6. Let X 0 be a distribution on [N ] with supp(X 0)  supp(X 0), and let g : [N ]!
[q] be a randomized function. Then the KL projection of (X 0; g(X 0)) on Conv(V) equals the
KL projection of (X; g(X)) on Conv(V).
Proof. Consider any (X;C) 2 Conv(V). We have
KL(X;C k X 0; g(X 0))
= KL(X k X 0) +KL((CjX) k (g(X 0)jX 0)) (by the chain rule for KL divergence)
= KL(X k X 0) +KL((CjX) k (g(X)jX)) (by deﬁnition of conditional KL divergence)
= KL(X k X 0) +KL(X;C k X; g(X)): (by the chain rule for KL divergence)
Thus the KL projections are the same.
2.3 Regularity Theorems for Distributions Restricted to a
Convex Set
Another application of the Uniform Min-Max Theorem is to give a generalization and
quantitative improvement to the “Regularity Theorem” of Trevisan, Tulsiani, and Vadhan
[TTV] which (informally) says that any high min-entropy distribution X is indistinguish-
able from some high min-entropy, low complexity distribution Y . The result of [TTV] is
itself a quantitative improvement of regularity and “decomposition” theorems in additive
combinatorics [GT, TZ]. It is shown in [TTV] that such results can be used to deduce
the Dense Model Theorem [TZ, RTTV, Gow], Impagliazzo’s Hardcore Theorem [Imp], and
other results, by replacing any unknown distribution X with an “equivalent” distribution
Y that can be eﬃciently analyzed and manipulated, thus translating the problem to a sim-
pler one. It also implies the Weak Regularity Lemma in graph theory [FK], mostly by a
translation of notation.
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Our result is more general than [TTV] in the sense that we are no longer restricted
to distributions of high min-entropy. We show that for any suﬃciently nice convex set
of distributions V, every distribution X 2 V is indistinguishable from some distribution
Y 2 V where Y has “low complexity”. In the case of min-entropy distributions, we obtain a
high min-entropy Y with lower complexity than [TTV]. This also yields an improved and
optimal Weak Regularity Lemma for graphs of density o(1) (Section 2.3.2).
This section is divided into three parts, each proving results for a diﬀerent notions of
“complexity”: Section 2.3.1 for information-theoretic notion of complexity, Section 2.3.3 for
circuit complexity, and Section 2.3.4 for time complexity of uniform algorithms.
In addition, using the Uniform Min-Max Theorem – Average Case (Theorem 2.5) we
obtain average-case variants, which can be used to deduce “low complexity” versions of a
technical lemma of [GW]. We note that a special case of the average-case variant for circuits
is a strengthening of a recent result of Jetchev and Pietrzak [JP], with a simpler proof. The
low circuit complexity version of the [GW] lemma (with slightly weaker parameters) was
initially proved by Jetchev and Pietrzak [JP], and an interactive extension was proved
by Chung, Lui, and Pass [CLP2] for applications in the context of distributional zero-
knowledge.
2.3.1 Regularity Theorems for Feature Complexity
Let W be an arbitrary class of functions W :  ! [0; 1] for some ﬁnite set .
Two distributions X and Y on  are -indistinguishable by W if for every W 2 W,
jE[W (X)]  E[W (Y )]j < . For starters, we shall consider the setting where the com-
plexity of a distribution Y is purely information-theoretic: We say Y has feature complexity
at most m w.r.t. W if its mass function x 7! Pr[Y = x] is a function of W1(x); : : : ;Wm(x),
for some W1; : : : ;Wm 2 W. Notice that we can assume W to be closed under negation,
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i.e. if W 2 W then we can add 1 W to W without aﬀecting the meaning of complexity.
In order to obtain a low feature complexity approximation within a convex set V of
distributions on , we require V to be permutation-invariant. That is, for all permutations
 :  !  we have X 2 V () (X) 2 V. Permutation invariance is a natural condition;
for example, the set of high entropy distributions should be permutation-invariant for any
reasonable notion of entropy. However, for a ﬁxed distribution X0, f(X;C) : Hsh(CjX) 
k;X = X0g is not permutation-invariant in general. We will use the following properties of
a permutation-invariant convex set:
Lemma 2.7. Let V be a permutation-invariant nonempty convex set of distributions on .
Then
1. V contains the uniform distribution on .
2. Let X be a distribution on  having feature complexity at most m w.r.t. W. Then the
KL projection of X on V also has feature complexity at most m w.r.t. W.
Proof. 1. For any Y 2 V, the average of (Y ) over all permutations  is still in V (by
convexity and permutation-invariance), and is clearly the uniform distribution.
2. Let Y  denote the KL projection of X on V. For all x1; x2 2  where Pr[X = x1] =
Pr[X = x2], we must also have Pr[Y  = x1] = Pr[Y  = x2]; otherwise, swapping
Pr[Y  = x1] and Pr[Y  = x2] yields some cY  2 V (by permutation-invariance) that is
also a KL projection of X, violating the uniqueness of KL projection (Lemma 1.14).
Therefore Pr[Y  = x] is a function of Pr[X = x], and Y  has feature complexity at
most that of X.
We show that every distribution X 2 V is indistinguishable to some Y 2 V of low
feature complexity, as long as V is permutation-invariant:
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Theorem 2.8 (A Regularity Theorem for feature complexity). Let  be a ﬁnite set, W be
an arbitrary class of functions W :  ! [0; 1], V be a permutation-invariant convex set of
distributions on , and  > 0. Then for every distribution X 2 V there exists Y 2 V such
that
1. X and Y are O()-indistinguishable by W;
2. Y has feature complexity at most S = (log jj   Hsh(X))/2 w.r.t. W. That is, there
exist W1; : : : ;WS 2 W and a function  : [0; 1]S ! [0; 1] such that 8x,
Pr[Y = x] = (W1(x); : : : ;WS(x)):
Remark. The main theorem of [TTV] (when considering feature complexity) is equivalent
to Theorem 2.8 with V being ﬁxed to be the set of distributions of min-entropy at least
log jj  log(1/), and has a worse bound on the feature complexity of Y . For a distribution
X with H1(X) = log jj log(1/), [TTV] obtains a distribution Y with feature complexity
at most 1/22 such that Y is O()-indistinguishable to X and H1(Y )  H1(X), whereas
Theorem 2.8 obtains such Y with feature complexity at most log(1/)/2.
Theorem 2.8 is interesting even if we do not require the low complexity Y to lie in
V. As mentioned in [TTV] (and pointed out by Elad Verbin), it easily follows from a
Chernoﬀ bound and a union bound that the uniform distribution over certain O(log jWj /2)
elements of  (which may not lie in V) is -indistinguishable from X by W. However, for
large W the feature complexity of O(log jWj /2) is potentially much higher than S =
(log jj  Hsh(X))/2. Indeed, we do not use the fact that Y 2 V when deducing the Weak
Regularity Lemma of Frieze and Kannan [FK] from Theorem 2.8 (see Theorem 2.10 below);
as shown in [TTV], the argument of Frieze and Kannan can be used to obtain a weaker
variant of Theorem 2.8 where Y may not lie in V, and the bound on S is worse.
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Proof of Theorem 2.8. Suppose for contradiction that for every low feature complexity Y 2
V there is someW 2 W such that E [W (X)] E [W (Y )]  0 (recall that w.l.o.g.W is closed
under negation), where 0 = c   for a suﬃciently large constant c. Consider the zero-sum
game where Player 1 selects some distribution Y 2 V, Player 2 selects some W 2 W and
receives (expected) payoﬀ E[W (X)] E[W (Y )]. Consider Algorithm 2.1 (Finding Universal
Strategy) where we set the initial strategy V (1) for Player 1 to be the uniform distribution
on  (which lies in V, by Lemma 2.7) and number of iterations to be S. Note that in each
iteration the feature complexity of V (i) increases by at most one, due to the weight update
usingW (i), since KL projection on the permutation-invariant set V does not increase feature
complexity (Lemma 2.7). Hence by assumption, in each iteration there exists W (i) 2 W
such that E

W (i)(X)
 E W (i)(V (i))  0. By the Uniform Min-Max Theorem (Theorem
2.4), W  (the uniform distribution over W (1); : : : ;W (S)) satisﬁes
E [W (X)]  E [W (V )]  0  O() > 0
for all Player 1 strategies V 2 V such that Hsh(V )  Hsh(X). Taking V = X yields a
contradiction.
2.3.2 Improved Weak Regularity Lemma for Graphs of Density o(1)
An information-theoretic application of [TTV] is deducing the Weak Regularity Lemma
of Frieze and Kannan [FK]. Our Theorem 2.8, with the improved bound, implies a Weak
Regularity Lemma with parameters stronger than [FK] for graphs that are o(1)-dense. The
Weak Regularity Lemma says that any graph G = (V;E) is approximated within “cut-
distance”  by some edge-weighted graph G0 on the vertices f1; : : : ; tg, where t depends
only on  (i.e. independent of the size of G), and each vertex i corresponds to a block
Vi  V in a partition fV1; : : : ; Vtg of V . The edge weight of (i; j) in the approximator G0 is
deﬁned to be the edge density between Vi and Vj :
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Deﬁnition 2.9 (Edge density). The density of a directed graphG = (V;E) equals jEj / jV j2.
The edge density between two sets of vertices V1, V2 of G equals
dG(V1; V2) =
j(V1  V2) \ Ej
jV1  V2j :
Theorem 2.10 (A Weak Regularity Lemma). For every directed graph G = (V;E) of
density  = jEj / jV j2 > 0 and  > 0, there is a partition of V into t = exp(O(/)2 log(1/))
disjoint sets V1; : : : ; Vt, such that for all A, B  V ,j(AB) \ Ej  
X
i;j
jA \ Vij jB \ Vj j  dG(Vi; Vj)
 <   jV j2 :
Note that the only interesting setting of parameters is  > ,  > 1/ jV jO(1) (i.e. G has
average degree greater than 1), because if    then the trivial partition V1 = V would
work, and if  <   1/ jV jO(1) we could take t = jV j and use the trivial partition into single
vertices. As pointed out to us by Jacob Fox, the number of partitions exp(O(/)2 log(1/))
in Theorem 2.10 (as a function of  and ) is optimal up to a constant factor, which can be
shown by adapting a lower bound argument in [CF].
Theorem 2.10 is stronger than Frieze and Kannan [FK] when G has density  = o(1).
For example, when jV j = N and  = 2 = 1/poly(logN), Theorem 2.10 produces a partition
of size poly(logN), whereas [FK] only yields a trivial partition into more than N sets.
Proof of Theorem 2.10. We apply Theorem 2.8 with  = V  V , W = fST ; 1   ST :
S; T  V g (where ST denotes the characteristic function of ST ), V being the set of all
-dense distributions on , X = UE 2 V (the uniform distribution on E), and  = O(/).
By Theorem 2.8 there is some -dense distribution Y where:
1. Y has feature complexity at mostm = O((2 log jV j Hsh(UE))/2) = O((/)2 log(1/)).
That is, Pr[Y = e] = (S1T1(e); : : : ; SmTm(e)) for a function  and sets S1,T1, …,
Sm, Tm  V .
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2. UE and Y are -indistinguishable for W. That is, for every S, T  V ,
jE [ST (UE)]  E [ST (Y )]j < :
The fact that Y has feature complexity at most m yields a partition fV1; : : : ; Vtg,
t  22m, such that Pr[Y = e] has the same value for all e 2 Vi  Vj . (Speciﬁcally, the
partition is the overlay of S1; T1; : : : ; Sm; Tm, i.e. formed by taking the intersection of, for
each i, either Si or V   Si, and either Ti or V   Ti.)
Consider any A, B  V . Taking S = A, T = B in Item 2 yields 1jEj j(AB) \ Ej   E [AB(Y )]
 = jE [AB(UE)]  E [AB(Y )]j < :
Thus, by triangle inequality it suﬃces to show that 1jEj X
e2AB
weight(e)  E [AB(Y )]
 < :
To do so, we randomly generate a set eA as follows: For each i, w.p. jVi \Aj / jVij include
all elements of Vi in eA, otherwise include none of the elements in eA. Similarly generate
a random eB. Note that EY [AB(Y )] = E eA; eB;Y h eA eB(Y )i since within every Vi  Vj ,
Pr[Y = e] is constant for all e 2 Vi  Vj , and
1
jEj
X
e2AB
weight(e) = 1jEj
X
i;j
jVi \Aj  jVj \Bj  j(Vi  Vj) \ Ej
jVij  jVj j = EeA; eB;UE
h
 eA eB(UE)
i
by linearity of expectation. Taking S = eA, T = eB in Item 2 yields the required bound.
2.3.3 Regularity Theorems for Circuit Complexity
In this section, we extend the notion of complexity to be computational and consider
(boolean) circuit complexity. Let W be the set of functions having low circuit complexity.
Indeed, the highly constructive proof for Theorem 2.8 already provides a Y with low circuit
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complexity, as long as there exist approximate KL projections computed by small circuits.
Thus we require V to be KL-projectable:
Deﬁnition 2.11. Let V be a convex set of distributions on f0; 1gn. The -neighborhood of
V, denoted V, is the set of all distributions X on f0; 1gn such that for some Y 2 V and for
all x 2 f0; 1gn,
Pr[X = x] 2 [e 2; e2]  Pr[Y = x]:
V is said to be KL-projectable if for all  > 0, for every X 2 V there exists some Y 2 V
such that
1. Y is an 2-approximate KL projection of X on V;
2. If there is a size t circuit computing a measure M for X with outputs M(x) of bit-
length at most m, then there is a size t + poly(m; log(1/)) circuit M 0 computing a
measure for Y with outputs M 0(x) of bit-length at most m + polylog(1/). (Recall
that measures are [0; 1] bounded, unnormalized mass functions; see Deﬁnition 1.3.)
Many natural convex sets of distributions are KL-projectable. Examples include the
set of distributions with min-entropy at least k (Theorem A.3) and the set of distributions
with Shannon entropy at least k (Chapter 4 Theorem 4.52), for any k > 0.
We show that every distribution X 2 V is indistinguishable, by all small circuits, to
some Y 2 V that has low circuit complexity, as long as V is permutation-invariant and
KL-projectable:
Theorem 2.12 (A Regularity Theorem for circuit complexity). Let V be a KL-projectable
convex set of distributions on f0; 1gn that contains Un, t > 0, and  > 0. Then for every
distribution X 2 V there exists Y 2 V such that
1. X and Y are O()-indistinguishable by size t circuits;
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2. Y has low complexity: Y has a measure of circuit size t0 = S  t + poly(S; log(1/)),
for S = (n Hsh(X))/2.
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as Theorem 2.8. Suppose for contradiction that for
every low complexity Y 2 V there is some size t circuitW such that E [W (X)] E [W (Y )] 
0, where 0 = c   for a suﬃciently large constant c. We will apply Theorem 2.4 (Uniform
Min-Max Theorem), with
 V = V;
 W = f(deterministic) circuits of size tg;
 f(z;W ) = E[W (X)] W (z).
This corresponds to the two-player zero-sum game where Player 1 chooses some distribution
Y 2 V, and Player 2 chooses a t sized circuit W , with expected payoﬀ E[W (X)] E[W (Y )]
for Player 2. We implement Algorithm 2.1 (Finding Universal Strategy) with KL projection
on the set V as follows. Start with an initial distribution V (1) that is uniform on f0; 1gn
(which lies in V). In each of the S = (n Hsh(X))/2 iterations we represent the distribution
V (i) by a circuit M (i) computing a measure for V (i), where M (i)(x) has bit-length at most
i  polylog(1/). We implement the ith iteration as follows. For technical convenience we
assume that e  has bit-length at most log(1/) (if not, we replace  by some ~ = O() > 
such that e ~ has bit-length at most log(1/)).
1. Obtaining Player 2’s Response W (i): Suppose that we have constructed a ti  t0
sized circuit M (i) computing a measure for V (i), and M (i)(x) has bit-length at most
i  polylog(1/). By assumption, there is a size t circuit W (i) such that
E
h
W (i)(X)
i
  E
h
W (i)(V (i))
i
 0:
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2. Weight Update: We represent the resulting distribution V (i)0 by the circuitM (i)0(x) =
exp
    (1 W (i)(x)) M (i)(x) that computes a measure for V (i)0 . Since W (i)(x) 2
f0; 1g, exp     (1 W (i)(x)) has bit-length at most log(1/). M (i)(x) has bit-length
at most i polylog(1/), thus multiplication takes time i polylog(1/). Thus M (i)0 has
circuit size t0i = ti+t+ipolylog(1/), and bit-length at most ipolylog(1/)+log(1/).
3. KL Projection: By KL-projectability of V and the fact that V (i)0 2 V, we have a cir-
cuitM (i+1) computing a measure for V (i+1) of size ti+1 = t0i+poly(ipolylog(1/); log(1/)),
and M (i+1)(x) has bit-length at most i  polylog(1/) + log(1/) + polylog(1/) =(i+
1)  polylog(1/).
Note that t1 = O(1) and ti+1 = ti + t + poly(i  polylog(1/); log(1/)), thus ti  S  t +
poly(S; log(1/)) and the assumption that ti  t0 is satisﬁed for all i 2 [S]. By Theorem
2.4, W  (the uniform distribution over W (1); : : : ;W (S)) satisﬁes
E [W (X)]  E [W (V )]  0  O() > 0:
for all Player 1 strategies V 2 V such that Hsh(V )  Hsh(X). Taking V = X yields a
contradiction.
Remark. Most of our results in this section (Theorem 2.12, 2.14) hold not just for small
circuits, but for an arbitrary class of distinguishersW (like our Theorem 2.8) with a suitable
deﬁnition of “complexity w.r.t.W” (see [TTV] Theorem 1.1 for one such example). However,
we avoid stating results in greater generality since the appropriate deﬁnition of “complexity”
may vary depending on the choice of V (to account for the complexity of KL projections)
and the application.
The above theorem also has an average-case variant. To express nonuniform complex-
ity in the average-case setting, we consider conditional measures. Recall that for a joint
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distribution (X;C), a function M is a conditional measure for CjX if for all x 2 supp(X),
the function f(y) =M(x; y) is a measure for CjX=x.
Deﬁnition 2.13. Let V be a convex set of joint distributions (X;C) on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`
where X is ﬁxed and C may vary. The -neighborhood of V, denoted V, is the set of all
joint distributions (X;C) on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` such that for some (X;B) 2 V and for all
(x; a) 2 f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`,
Pr[C = ajX = x] 2 [e 2; e2]  Pr[B = ajX = x]:
V is said to be KL-projectable if for all  > 0, for every (X;C) 2 V there exists some
(X;B) 2 V such that
1. (X;B) is an 2-approximate KL projection of (X;C) on V;
2. If there is a size t circuit computing a conditional measure M for CjX with outputs
M(x; a) of bit-length at most m, then there is a size t+ poly(m; log(1/)) circuit M 0
computing a conditional measure for BjX with outputsM 0(x; a) of bit-length at most
m+ polylog(1/).
Many natural convex sets of such joint distributions are KL-projectable. Examples
include the set of all distributions (X;C) on f0; 1gnf0; 1g`, the set of distributions (X;C)
on f0; 1gnf0; 1gO(logn) with C having average min-entropy at least k given X (Chapter 4
Theorem 4.20), and the set of distributions (X;C) on f0; 1gnf0; 1gO(logn) with C having
conditional Shannon entropy at least k given X (Chapter 4 Theorem 4.52), for any k > 0.
Theorem 2.14 (A Regularity Theorem for circuit complexity – average case). Let V be a
KL-projectable set of joint distributions (X;C) on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` where X is ﬁxed and C
may vary, and V contains (X;U`). For every t > 0,  > 0, and joint distribution (X;B) 2 V,
there is a joint distribution (X;C) 2 V such that
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1. (X;B) and (X;C) are O()-indistinguishable by size t circuits;
2. C has low complexity given X: CjX has a conditional measure of circuit size t0 =
S  t+ poly(S; log(1/)), for S = (`  Hsh(CjX))/2. Moreover, if V equals the set of
all joint distributions (X;C) on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`, then t0 = S  t+ (S  log(1/))2.
Proof. The proof is identical to Theorem 2.12, except we use the UniformMin-Max Theorem
– Average Case (Theorem 2.5). If V equals the set of all joint distributions (X;C) on
f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`, the better bound on the complexity of CjX follows from the fact that we
do not need KL projections for such V.
With V being the set of all joint distributions (X;C) on f0; 1gnf0; 1g` (thus involving
no KL projections), Theorem 2.14 gives a slight strengthening of a recent result of Jetchev
and Pietrzak [JP], with a simpler proof. In [JP] they obtain an (X;C) where given x, CjX=x
is samplable by a circuit of size O
 
2`  `  (1/)2 log(1/)2  t. Theorem 2.14 provides an
(X;C) where given x, CjX=x can be sampled by a circuit of size O(2`  (`  (1/)2  t + (` 
(1/)2log(1/))2)) by computing M(x; y) for all y 2 f0; 1g` and sampling CjX=x using its
mass function.
Finally, we show an application of Theorem 2.14: deducing a technical lemma of [GW],
which says if X and U are indistinguishable then for any short B jointly distributed with X,
there is some C (the “auxilliary information”) jointly distributed with U such that (X;B)
and (U;C) are indistinguishable. Not only is our proof simpler, but also it guarantees that
C has low circuit complexity given U . This “low complexity” version (with slightly weaker
parameters) was initially proved by Jetchev and Pietrzak [JP], and an interactive extension
was proved by Chung, Lui, and Pass [CLP2] for applications in the context of distributional
zero-knowledge.
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Lemma 2.15 (Low circuit complexity version of [GW] Lemma 3.1). Let X and U be
distributions over f0; 1gn, and B be a distribution over f0; 1g` jointly distributed with X.
Suppose X and U are -indistinguishable by circuits of size t. Then there exists some
C 2 f0; 1g` jointly distributed with U such that:
1. (X;B) and (U;C) are 2-indistinguishable by circuits of size s = t/(2`  `  (1/)2)  ` 
((1/)log(1/))2.
2. C has low complexity given U : CjU has a conditional measure of circuit size ` (1/)2 
s+ (`  (1/)2log(1/))2.
Proof. We ﬁrst apply Theorem 2.14 to obtain a distribution (X;P (X)) such that (X;B) and
(X;P (X)) are -indistinguishable by size s circuits, where P is a randomized function, and
there is a size `(1/)2 s+(`(1/)2log(1/))2 circuitM computing a conditional measure for
P (X)jX. Thus P (x) can be sampled in time s0 = O

2` 

`  (1/)2  s+  `  (1/)2log(1/)2
by computing M(x; y) for all y 2 f0; 1g` and sampling P (x) from its mass function.
Let C = P (U). Since P is eﬃcient, indistinguishability of X and U implies that
(X;P (X)) and (U;P (U)) are -indistinguishable by circuits of size s. (Otherwise, given
an s-sized -distinguisher D for (X;P (X)) and (U;P (U)) we get an -distinguisher T (x) =
D(x; P (x)) for X and U , of circuit size O(s + s0)  t.) By triangle inequality, (X;B) and
(U;P (U)) = (U;C) must be 2-indistinguishable by circuits of size s.
2.3.4 Regularity Theorems for Time Complexity
In this section, we use the full strength of the Uniform Min-Max Theorem to obtain
a low complexity approximation where complexity is measured using uniform algorithms.
We prove a uniform analogue of Theorem 2.14 (i.e. the average-case setting), but for sim-
plicity we take V to be the set of all joint distributions (X;C) on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`, thus
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no KL-projection is needed. As an immediate corollary, we provide a “sampling” version
of it (Theorem 2.17), which is cleaner and convenient for several applications, but involves
exponential dependence on `.
Theorem 2.16 (A Regularity Theorem for time complexity – average case). Let n be a
security parameter, ` = `(n), t = t(n)  n,  = (n) > 0 all computable in poly(n) time.
Let (X;B) = (X;B)(n) be a joint distribution on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`. Let A be a t-time
randomized oracle algorithm. Then there is a t0 = poly(t; 1/)-time randomized algorithm
R such that w.p. 
(2/`) over M  R(1n) and W  AM (1n), if we interpret M as a
deterministic circuit computing a conditional measure for CjX and W as a randomized
circuit W : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! [0; 1], we have:
E[W (X;B)]  E[W (X;C)] < :
Proof. We will let R be an implementation of Algorithm 2.2 (Finding Universal Strategy –
Average Case), using A as a subroutine. We then show R satisﬁes the desired properties by
applying Theorem 2.5 (Uniform Min-Max Theorem – Average Case), with
 V being the set of all joint distributions (X;C) on f0; 1gnf0; 1g` (where the marginal
distribution of X is ﬁxed, and C may vary);
 W = frandomized circuits of size tg;
 f((x; y);W ) = E[W (X;B)]  E[W (x; y)].
This corresponds to the two-player zero-sum game where Player 1 selects a distribution
(X;C) 2 V, Player 2 selects a size t circuit W and receives expected payoﬀ E[W (X;B)]  
E[W (X;C)].
Our implementation of Algorithm 2.2 using A is as follows. We set the  in Algorithm
2.2 to be 0 = /c for a suﬃciently large constant c, and start with an initial distribution
38
Chapter 2: Uniform Min-Max Theorem and Regularity Theorems
(X;C(1)) = (X;U`) (where U` is independent ofX). In each of the S = O(`/2) iterations we
represent C(i) by a circuitM (i) computing a conditional measure for C(i)jX, i.e.M (i)(x; y) /
Pr[C(i) = yjX = x]. So we can take M (1)(x; y) = 1 for all x, y. We implement the ith
iteration as follows, with  = 1/3S:
1. Obtaining Player 2’s Response W (i): Suppose that we have constructed a ti-size
circuit M (i) where M (i)(x; y) has bit-length i  polylog(1/). There are two steps.
(a) We run AM(i)(1n) to obtain a t-size randomized circuit cW (i), and convert it into
a O(tm)-size deterministic circuit fW (i) by hardwiring m = O((1/2) log(1/))
samples of the coins of cW (i), so that w.p. at least 1  ,
E
hfW (i)(X;B)i  E hfW (i)(X;C(i))i  E hcW (i)(X;B)i  E hcW (i)(X;C(i))i  0:
(b) Our choice of W (i) is the following approximation to fW (i), so that exp( 0  (1 
W (i)(x; y))) can be computed precisely and eﬃciently. First, we use Newton’s
method to compute a polylog(1/)-bit approximation E(x; y) 2 (0; 1] of exp( 0 
(1 fW (i)(x; y))) within 02 error, in time O(tm)+polylog(1/). We deﬁne W (i)
to be such that exp( 0(1 W (i)(x; y))) = E(x; y). Thus
W (i)(x; y) fW (i)(x; y) 
0, and
E[W (i)(X;B)]  E[W (i)(X;C(i))]  E[fW (i)(X;B)]  E[fW (i)(X;C(i))]  20:
2. Weight Update: We represent the resulting distribution C(i+1) by the circuit
M (i+1)(x; y) = exp

 0  (1 W (i)(x; y))

M (i)(x; y)
computing a conditional measure for C(i+1)jX. Since exp   0  (1 W (i)(x; y)) =
E(x; y) has bit-length polylog(1/) and M (i)(x; y) has bit-length i polylog(1/), mul-
tiplication takes time i polylog(1/). ThusM (i+1) has circuit size ti+1 = ti+O(tm)+
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i  polylog(1/) and bit-length (i+1)  polylog(1/), and can be constructed in similar
time.
3. KL projection: Do nothing as Player 1 strategies can be arbitrary conditional dis-
tributions C(i)jX=x.
Now let R be the algorithm that chooses a random i [S], runs the above implementation
of Algorithm 2.2 for i   1 iterations to construct and output M (i). Since t1 = O(1), we
have ti = O(1) + S  (O(tm) + S  polylog(1/)) for all i 2 [S]. Thus R runs in total time
poly(t; S;m; log(1/))  t0.
Suppose for contradiction that w.p. at least 1  over coins of R used to generate M (i)
and A, AM(i)(1n) outputs a randomized circuit cW (i) s.t. E[cW (i)(X;B)] E[cW (i)(X;C(i))] 
. By union bound w.p. at least 1  2  S = 1/3, in all iterations we have
E[W (i)(X;B)]  E[W (i)(X;C(i))]  E[cW (i)(X;B)]  E[cW (i)(X;C(i))]  30    30:
Let W  be the uniform distribution over W (1); : : : ;W (S). By the Uniform Min-Max Theo-
rem – Average Case (Theorem 2.5), w.p. at least 1/3, W  satisﬁes
E [W (X;B)]  E [W (X;C)]    30  O(0) > 0
for all Player 1 strategies (X;C) 2 V . Taking (X;C) = (X;B) yields a contradiction.
As an immediate corollary, we obtain a “sampling” version, which is cleaner, and
convenient for several applications. Recall that for a distribution Z, we denote by OZ the
sampling oracle of Z, i.e. on each query OZ returns a random sample of Z.
Theorem 2.17 (A Regularity Theorem for time complexity – average case (sampling ver-
sion)). Let n be a security parameter, ` = `(n), t = t(n)  n,  = (n) > 0 all computable
in poly(n) time. Let (X;B) = (X;B)(n) be a joint distribution on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`, and
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Q = Q(n) be any poly(n)-time samplable distribution on f0; 1gn. Let A be a t-time ran-
domized oracle algorithm. Then there is a t0 = poly(2`; t; 1/)-time randomized algorithm
R that w.p. at least 
(2/`) outputs a randomized circuit P of size at most t0 satisfying:
E[AOQ;P (Q)(X;B)]  E[AOQ;P (Q)(X;P (X))] < :
Proof. Given a t-time randomized oracle algorithm A, we deﬁne a 2`  poly(t; 1/)-time
randomized oracle algorithm A0 to which we apply Theorem 2.16, as follows. First deﬁne
the randomized function bA(x; y; a) to equal A(x; y) where we ﬁx the outputs of the sampling
oracle to be a 2  f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`t. For every M : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! [0; 1], let A0M (1n)
generate a(1); : : : ; a(m) as m = O((1/2)  log(c`/2)) random samples of (Q;PM (Q))t, where
PM is the randomized function such that M is a conditional measure for PM (Q)jQ, and c is
a constant to be determined later. Recall that Q is poly(n)-time samplable by assumption,
and we can construct from M a circuit that samples (Q;PM (Q)) by computing M(x; y) for
all y 2 f0; 1g`. We then let A0M (1n) output a randomized circuit W (x; y) computing the
average of bA(x; y; a(i)) over all i. By a Chernoﬀ bound, w.p. at least 2/c` overW  A0M (1n)
we have
E [W (X;B)] E [W (X;PM (X))]  E
h
AOQ;PM (Q)(X;B)
i
 E
h
AOQ;PM (Q)(X;PM (X))
i
 /2:
By applying Theorem 2.16 toA0, there is a poly(2`; t; 1/)-algorithmR such that w.p. 
(2/`)
over M  R(1n) and W  A0M (1n) we have
E[W (X;B)]  E[W (X;C)] < /2:
Thus w.p. at least 
(2/`)  2/c` = 
(2/`) (for a suﬃciently large c) over M  R(1n),
E[AOQ;PM (Q)(X;B)]  E[AOQ;PM (Q)(X;PM (X))] < :
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We now apply Theorem 2.17 to show Theorem 2.18, the uniform analogue of Theorem
2.15 (which in turn is the low circuit complexity version of [GW] Lemma 3.1). We do so
mainly because it is convenient for applications, including (i) deriving a uniform Dense
Model Theorem (see Section 3.2, Theorem 3.11); (ii) showing impossibility of construct-
ing succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs) via black-box reductions under uniform
hardness assumptions (see Section 6, Theorem 6.7).
Theorem 2.18 (Low time complexity version of Lemma 3.1 of [GW]). Let n be a secu-
rity parameter, ` = `(n), s = s(n)  n,  = (n) > 0 all computable in poly(n) time.
Let X = X(n) and U = U(n) be poly(n)-time samplable distributions on f0; 1gn that are
-indistinguishable for s-time randomized algorithms. Let B = B(n) be a distribution on
f0; 1g` jointly distributed with X, and let Q = Q(n) be any poly(n)-time samplable distribu-
tion on f0; 1gn. Let A be a t-time randomized oracle algorithm, for t = s
(1)/poly(2`; 1/).
Then there is a t0 = poly(2`; t; 1/)-time randomized algorithm R such that w.p. at least

(2/`), R outputs a randomized circuit P satisfying
E[AOQ;P (Q)(X;B)]  E[AOQ;P (Q)(U;P (U))] < 2:
Proof. By Theorem 2.17, there is a t0-time algorithm R that w.p. at least  = 
(2/`)
outputs a randomized circuit P satisfying
E[AOQ;P (Q)(X;B)]  E[AOQ;P (Q)(X;P (X))] < 0:9:
Since P is eﬃcient, -indistinguishability of X and U implies that with probability at least
1  /2 over P ,
E[AOQ;P (Q)(X;P (X))]  E[AOQ;P (Q)(U;P (U))] < 1:1:
Indeed, suppose that AQ;P (Q) achieves distinguishing advantage at least 1:1 w.p. at least
/2 over P , then we could obtain an -distinguisher for X and U by running R for
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O((1/) log(1/)) times, each time testing the distinguisher T (x) = AQ;P 0(Q)(x; P 0(x)) where
P 0 is the randomized circuit output by R (by running on O((1/2) log(1/)) random samples
of X, U and (Q;P 0(Q))), and ﬁnally taking the best one. This yields an -distinguisher for
X and U that runs in time O((1/2) log(1/))  (poly(n)+ (1/) log(1/)  (t+poly(t0)))  s,
violating their indistinguishability.
Combining the two inequalities, we get with probability at least /2 over P  R,
E[AOQ;P (Q)(X;B)]  E[AOQ;P (Q)(U;P (U))] < 2:
43
Chapter 3
Uniform Hardcore Theorem and
Dense Model Theorem
A fundamental result in complexity theory is Impagliazzo’s Hardcore Theorem [Imp],
which says that a boolean function f that is hard on average must contain a large subset
of inputs on which f is indistinguishable to a random function.
Closely related is the Dense Model Theorem of Green and Tao [GT], Tao and Ziegler
[TZ], various formulations of which are due to Reingold et al. and Gowers [RTTV, Gow].
Green and Tao used it as a key in their celebrated result of on arithmetic progressions
of prime numbers. Roughly, the Dense Model Theorem says that a dense subset of a
pseudorandom set must be indistinguishable to a dense set.
In this chapter, we apply the Uniform Min-Max Theorem and related results from
Chapter 2 to obtain simpler proofs of Uniform Hardcore Theorem and Uniform Dense
Model Theorem, where uniform means that indistinguishability is with respect to uniform
polynomial-time algorithms.
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3.1 Uniform Hardcore Theorem
Impagliazzo’s Hardcore Theorem [Imp], in strengthened versions due to Klivans and
Servedio [KS] and Holenstein [Hol1], says that every function f : f0; 1gn ! f0; 1g that is
-hard for poly-sized boolean circuits (that is, every poly-sized circuit fails to compute f
on at least  fraction of inputs) must be extremely hard on a subset of inputs of density
at least 2 (the hardcore set) (and may be easy elsewhere). Following [Imp], we will deal
with hardcore distributions instead of hardcore sets, which are equivalent up to a negligible
additive diﬀerence in density, where density of a distribution is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Density of distribution). Let X and Y be distributions over some ﬁnite
set . We say X is -dense in Y if Pr [Y = x]    Pr [X = x] for all x 2 . We say X is
-dense if it is -dense in U (equivalently, having min-entropy at least log jj   log(1/)).
We denote by Cm; the set of all -dense distributions on f0; 1gm.
The asymptotically optimal nonuniform Hardcore Theorem is due to [KS], using tech-
niques from boosting and an idea of iteratively increasing hardcore size due to Wigderson,
and can be stated as follows:
Theorem 3.2 (Hardcore Theorem [KS]). Let (X;B)1 be a joint distribution on f0; 1gn 
f0; 1g and  > 0. Let B be (t; )-hard given X, i.e. for every size t circuit P it holds
that Pr[P (X) = B]  1   . Then there is a joint distribution (X^; B^) that is 2-dense in
(X;B), such that for every size t0 = t/O(log(1/)/2) circuit A it holds that Pr[A(X^) =
B^]  (1 + )/2.
Theorem 3.2 is asymptotically optimal as it achieves optimal hardcore density 2, as
1The version we state is a slight generalization of the version in [KS], which only allows B to be a
deterministic boolean function of X. However, the more general version follows readily from almost the
same proof.
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well as optimal complexity blow-up O(log(1/)/2), where the lower bound of 
(log(1/)/2)
is due to Lu, Tsai, and Wu [LTW]2.
The original paper of Impagliazzo [Imp] contains both a non-trivial constructive proof,
as well as a much simpler, yet non-constructive proof due to Nisan that uses the Min-Max
Theorem. Nisan’s proof has an appealing simplicity: Assume for contradiction that there
is no hardcore distribution of high density. Then, by the Min-Max Theorem there is a
universal predictor A such that for every (X^; B^) that is dense in (X;B) it holds that
Pr
h
A(X^) = B^
i
> (1 + )/2: A is a distribution over circuits of size t, and its prediction
probability is taken over this distribution as well as (X^; B^). By subsampling we can assume
that A is uniform over a multiset of S = O((1/2) log(1/)) circuits of size t, while changing
the advantage  by at most a constant fraction. Given the universal predictor A, one can
build a good predictor for B, contradicting the hardness of B given X, as formalized in
Lemma 3.3:
Lemma 3.3 (From universal circuit to predictor [Imp]). Let (X;B) be a joint distribu-
tion on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g. Let A be the uniform distribution over a multiset of S circuits
of size t. Suppose for every joint distribution (X^; B^) that is -dense in (X;B) it holds
that Pr
h
A(X^) = B^
i
> (1 + )/2: Then there is a circuit P of size O(S  t) such that
Pr [P (X) = B] > 1  :
Speciﬁcally, we can let P (x) = majorityfA(x) : A 2 Ag. Equivalently, P (x) outputs 1
with probability
1
2

1 + sign

Pr[A(x) = 1]  1
2

:
Unfortunately, both proofs in [Imp] yield a suboptimal hardcore density of . Following
Nisan’s proof using Min-Max Theorem, Holenstein [Hol1] proves the Hardcore Theorem with
2[LTW] showed a black-box lower bound on the number of t0-sized circuits that a black-box reduction
needs to obtain to construct some P with Pr[P (X) = B] > 1  .
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optimal hardcore density of 2 (Theorem 3.2), by strengthening the above lemma to Lemma
3.4 below (using a trick from Levin’s proof of the XOR Lemma).
Lemma 3.4 (From universal circuit to optimal predictor [Hol1]). Let (X;B) be a joint
distribution on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g. Let A be the uniform distribution over a multiset of S
circuits of size t. Suppose for every joint distribution (X^; B^) that is 2-dense in (X;B) it
holds that Pr
h
A(X^) = B^
i
> (1 + )/2: Then there is a circuit P of size O(S  t) such that
Pr [P (X) = B] > 1  (1  ) :
Speciﬁcally, we can let P (x) output 1 with probability p(x) truncated at 0 and 1
(i.e. P (x) = minfmaxfp(x); 0g; 1g), for
p(x) =
1
2
 
1 +
PrA [A(x) = 1]  12

!
where  is the least number s.t. PrX;B [PrA [A(X) = B]  1/2 + ]  2. (w.l.o.g.  is a
multiple of 1/S.)
One drawback of proofs based on the standard Min-Max Theorem is the suboptimal
complexity blow-up (due to suboptimal settings of S from the probabilistic construction of
the multiset deﬁning A). By replacing the use of Min-Max Theorem with the Uniform
Min-Max Theorem, we immediately achieve optimal complexity blow-up (by replacing the
probabilistic construction of the multiset with a smarter online learning/boosting algo-
rithm).
Remark 3.5. In Chapter 4 we prove a generalization of the Hardcore Theorem where B,
rather than being binary, can be O(logn) bits long. While the proof also begins with the
Min-Max Theorem, it diﬀers substantially thereafter. In particular, it achieves optimal
hardcore density without explicitly relying on Lemma 3.4 (i.e. the trick from the XOR
Lemma). Nonetheless, the complexity blow-up in that version is not known to be optimal
(even after replacing its use of the Min-Max Theorem by the Uniform Min-Max Theorem).
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Another drawback of proofs based on the standard Min-Max Theorem is that they are
non-constructive. Indeed, a constructive proof such as the one by Impagliazzo [Imp] can be
interpreted as a Hardcore Theorem for the uniform setting of hardness, where the hardness
is with respect to eﬃcient algorithms rather than small circuits. (See Theorem 3.6 below for
the exact formulation). This Uniform Hardcore Theorem is needed for several important
applications ([KS, Hol1, Hol2, HHR1, HRV]). Building on the constructive proof in [Imp],
Holenstein [Hol1] also shows a Uniform Hardcore Theorem with optimal hardcore density,
but is rather involved and fails to achieve the optimal complexity blow-up O(log(1/)/2).
Subsequently, Barak, Hardt, and Kale ([BHK]) gave an alternative proof of Uniform Hard-
core Theorem achieving optimal complexity blow-up of O(log(1/)/2) as well as optimal
hardcore density 2 (by using Lemma 3.4), based on ideas of multiplicative weights and
Bregman projection.
As an application of the Uniform Min-Max Theorem (which itself is inspired by [BHK]),
we oﬀer a new proof of the Uniform Hardcore Theorem of [BHK] (with optimal hardcore
density and complexity blow-up). The advantage of the new proof is that it is more modular:
we simply replace the use of Min-Max Theorem in Holenstein’s proof (of the nonuniform
Hardcore Theorem, Theorem 3.2) with the Uniform Min-Max Theorem. In contrast, [BHK]
adapt the analysis of multiplicative weights and Bregman projection (from [HW]) to the
speciﬁc context of the Hardcore Theorem.
Notation. For a distribution Z, let OZ denote the oracle that gives a random sample from
Z when queried.
Theorem 3.6 (Uniform Hardcore Theorem). Let n be a security parameter, m = m(n) =
poly(n),  = (n), 0 = 0(n), q = q(n) all computable in poly(n) time, and (X;B) = g(Um)
be a joint distribution where g : f0; 1gm ! f0; 1gn  f0; 1g is computable in poly(n) time.
Suppose that (X;B) has no hardcore distribution of density at least 2, i.e. there is a t-time
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oracle algorithm A such that for inﬁnitely many n and every C 2 Cm;2,
Pr
(x;b) g(C)

AOC (x) = b

>
1
2
+ 0:
Then there is a poly(t; n; 1/; 1/0)-time randomized algorithm P such that for inﬁnitely
many n,
Pr[P (X) = B] > 1  :
Moreover, P is constructed by making O(log(1/)/02) calls to A.
For the proof of Uniform Hardcore Theorem, we will need the notion of measures.
Recall that measures are simply [0; 1] bounded, unnormalized mass functions.
Deﬁnition 3.7 (Density of measure). A measure M : X ! [0; 1] is -dense if its density
(M) =
P
x2X M(x)/ jX j is at least . We denote by Mm; the set of all -dense measures
deﬁned on f0; 1gm. One can verify that if M 2Mm; then M 2 Cm; (but not conversely).
Proof of Theorem 3.6. We will apply Chapter 2, Theorem 2.4 (Uniform Min-Max Theo-
rem), with
 V = Cm;2;
 W = f(deterministic) circuits of size tm+ poly(t)g;
 f(z;W ) = I(W (x) = b), where (x; b) = g(z) and I() is the indicator function.
This corresponds to the two-player zero-sum game where Player 1 chooses some distribution
C 2 Cm;2, and Player 2 chooses a tm + poly(t) sized circuit W , with expected payoﬀ
E[f(C;W )] = Pr(x;b) g(C) [W (x) = b] for Player 2. We will use A to show that Chapter 2,
Algorithm 2.1 (Finding Universal Strategy) with KL projection on the set V = Cm;2 can be
implemented eﬃciently, such that for inﬁnitely many n, in each iteration we obtain some
W with good prediction probability. This gives us an eﬃcient universal predictor A of B
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given X, by the Uniform Min-Max Theorem. From the universal predictor, we then show
how to obtain a (1  )-predictor of B using Lemma 3.4.
In Algorithm 2.1, we start with an initial distribution V (1) that is uniform on f0; 1gm.
Let  = 0/c for a suﬃciently large constant c, and  = /2S. The number of iterations is
S =

m  min
C2Cm;2
Hsh(C)

/2 = (m  (m  log(1/2)))/2 = (log(1/)  1)/2:
In each iteration we represent the distribution V (i) (the current C) by a circuit M (i) com-
puting a measure for V (i). So we can take M (1)(x) = 1 for all x. We will need the following
claim to implement an iteration.
Claim 3.8. There is a randomized algorithm that, given oracle access to a measure M 2
Mm;2, w.p. at least 1    outputs a tm + poly(t) sized (deterministic) boolean circuit
W such that Pr(x;b) g(M )[W (x) = b] > 1/2 + 0   4. Moreover it runs in time t +
poly(n; s; t; 1/; 1/0; log(1/)) time where s is a bound on the bit length of M(x).
Proof of Claim 3.8. Given oracle access to M , we can generate t random samples of M
in time t0 = t O((1/) log(t/))  (s+m) + poly(n) and w.p. at least 1  , using rejection
sampling (see Lemma A.2). Thus we can eliminate all A’s oracle queries to OM and obtain
some t0 time randomized algorithm A0 such that Pr(x;b) g(M )[A0(x) = b] > 1/2 + 0   .
Write A0(x) = A0(x; r) where r is the coin tosses of A0 (which consists of coin tosses
for A and at most t0 random bits for the rejection sampling). For each r we compute
an estimate E(r) of Pr(x;b) g(M )[A0(x; r) = b] within  error with probability at least
/2q, for q = O((1/) log(1/)). By a Chernoﬀ bound, this can be done by testing A0(; r)
on q0 = O((1/2) log(q/)) random samples of (x; b)  g(M ) (which we generate with
probability at least 1   (/q), again using Lemma A.2). We repeat this for q randomly
chosen r, and if E(r) > 1/2 + 0   3 output a circuit W computing A0(; r).
By union bound with probability at least 1   /2, all q estimates E(r) are within 
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error. By the Markov inequality, w.p. 1   (1   
())q  1   /2 at least one of the r’s
satisﬁes Pr(x;b) g()[A0(x; r) = b] > 1/2+ 0  2 so E(r)  1/2+ 0  3. Moreover we have
Pr(x;b) g(C)[A(x; r) = b] > 1/2 + 0   4 whenever E(r) > 1/2 + 0   3. We conclude that
w.p. at least 1  we output the desired circuit, all in time q0q (t0+O((1/) log(qq0/)) (s+
m))+poly(n) = poly(n; s; t; 1/; 1/0; log(1/)). Finally, the circuitW is of size tm+poly(t)
as it simply runs A using the t ﬁxed samples of M (which can be stored as tm nonuniform
bits).
We now implement the ith iteration as follows. For technical convenience we assume
that e  has bit-length log(1/) (if not, we replace  by some ~ = O() such that e ~ has
bit-length log(1/)).
1. Obtaining Player 2’s Response W (i): Suppose that we have constructed a ti sized
circuitM (i) computing a measure for V (i), and outputs ofM (i) have bit-length at most
O(i  log(1/)). Using Claim 3.8, we can obtain a (deterministic) circuitW (i) such that
Pr
(x;b) g(V (i))
[W (i)(x) = b] >
1
2
+ 0   4;
in time poly(ti; n; t; 1/; 1/; log(1/)) and w.p. at least 1 . Note, however, that the
circuit size of W (i) is tm+ poly(t), independent of ti.
2. Weight Update: We represent the resulting distribution V (i)0 by the circuitM (i)0(z) =
exp
    I  W (i)(x) = b  M (i)(z), where (x; b) = g(z), which computes a mea-
sure for V (i)0 . Since I
 
W (i)(x) = b
 2 f0; 1g, exp     I  W (i)(x) = b has bit-
length log(1/). M (i)(z) has bit-length O(i  log(1/)), thus multiplication takes time
poly(i  log(1/)). Thus M (i)0 has circuit size t0i = ti + tm+ poly(t) + i  polylog(1/),
bit-length at most O(i  log(1/) + log(1/)), and can be constructed in similar time.
3. KL Projection: It is shown in Lemma A.3 (approximating KL projection on high
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min-entropy distributions, which is based on Lemma 2.3 of [BHK]) that given M (i)0 ,
w.p. 1   one can generate a ti+1 = t0i + polylog(1/) sized circuit M (i+1) computing
a measure for a distribution V (i+1) that is an 2-approximate KL projection of V (i)0 =
M(i)0 on Cm;2. Furthermore, outputs of M (i+1) have bit-length at most O((i +
1) log(1/)). This can be done in time poly(n; 1/; log(1/); log(1/))  t0i.
By union bound w.p. at least 1  2S = 1   all S iterations complete successfully. Since
t1 = O(1) and ti+1 = ti+ tm+poly(t)+ i polylog(1/), we have ti = poly(n; t; 1/; log(1/))
for all i 2 [S]. Let A be the uniform distribution over W (1); : : : ;W (S), thus A can be
computed in total time poly(n; t; 1/; 1/). By Chapter 2, Theorem 2.4 (Uniform Min-Max
Theorem), for all Player 1 strategies C 2 Cm;2,
Pr
(x;b) g(C)
[A(x) = b] > (1  )

1
2
+ 0   4

 O()  1 + 
0
2
:
Equivalently, for every joint distribution (X^; B^) that is 2-dense in (X;B) = g(Um) we have
Pr[A(X^) = B^] > 1 + 
0
2
(since (X^; B^) equals g(C) for some C 2 Cm;2).
From Universal Weak Predictor to (1  )-Predictor. Now that we have a universal
weak predictor A as the uniform distribution over S = O(log(1/)/02) circuits, applying
Lemma 3.3 already proves a version of the Uniform Hardcore Theorem with suboptimal
hardcore density.
To achieve optimal hardcore density, we apply Lemma 3.4 by guessing the value of
 2 [0; 1/2], which is a multiple of 1/S. More concretely, for each  = 1/S; 2/S; : : : ; 1/2, we
compute some estimate E of Pr[P(X) = B], where P denotes the predictor in Lemma
3.4 with  set to . Our ﬁnal (uniform) predictor P will run P for the  where the estimate
E is the highest.
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We compute E by taking O((1/022) log(1/0)) samples of (X;B) and coins of P, so
that by a Chernoﬀ bound, for each  w.p. at least 1 0/4 we have jE   Pr[P(X) = B]j 
0/4. The probability that either E or the highest estimate is oﬀ by more than 0/4 is
at most 0/2 . So it follows from Lemma 3.4 that
Pr [P (X) = B]  Pr [P(X) = B]  0/2  0/2 > 1 
 
1  0    0 = 1  
completing the proof.
3.2 Uniform Dense Model Theorem
A celebrated result of Green and Tao [GT] shows that there exist arbitrarily long
arithmetic progressions of prime numbers. A key new component of their proof is the
Dense Model Theorem which, in the generalized form of Tao and Ziegler [TZ], says if X is a
pseudorandom distribution and D is a distribution dense in X, then D is indistinguishable
to a distribution M that is dense in the uniform distribution. Like our results in Chapter
2, Section 2.3.1, notions of indistinguishability and pseudorandomness in the Dense Model
Theorem can be deﬁned with respect to an arbitrary class of distinguishers W, and are not
restricted to classes of circuit distinguishers.
In the original proof, the indistinguishability (i.e. the bound on distinguishing proba-
bility) between D and M is exponentially larger than the indistinguishability between X
and the uniform distribution, making it inapplicable for the typical complexity-theoretic or
cryptographic settings of parameters. Using the Min-Max Theorem, Reingold et al. [RTTV]
provided another proof where the indistinguishability and complexity blow-ups are only
polynomial; a similar proof was given by Gowers [Gow]. These requirements are crucial
for applications in leakage-resilient cryptography [DP2, DP1, FOR], and for connections to
computational diﬀerential privacy [MPRV].
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We now state a Dense Model Theorem due to Zhang [Zha], where the complexity
blow-up O((/)2 log(1/)) is asymptotically optimal.3
Recall from Deﬁnition 3.1 that for distributions X and Y on , we say X is -dense
in Y if Pr [Y = x]   Pr [X = x] for all x 2 , and say X is -dense if it is -dense in U.
It will be convenient to denote by Tht(x) the boolean threshold function i.e. Tht(x) = 1 if
x  t and Tht(x) = 0 if x < t.
Theorem 3.9 (Dense Model Theorem [Zha]). Let  be a ﬁnite set, W be an arbitrary
class of functions W :  ! [0; 1],  > 0,  > 0. Then the following holds for some
S = O((/)2 log(1/)).
Let W 0 be the set of all functions W 0 : ! f0; 1g deﬁned by
W 0(x) = Tht
 
SX
i=1
Wi(x)/S
!
for some W1; : : : ;WS 2 W and t 2 [0; 1]. Let X be a distribution on  that is -
indistinguishable from U by W 0. Let D be a distribution -dense in X. Then there is
a -dense distribution M such that D and M are O(/)-indistinguishable by W.
A Min-Max Theorem based proof with a suboptimal blow-up of S = O((/)2 log(1/))
proceeds as follows. (Note that we may assume  > , else the conclusion of O(/)-
indistinguishability is trivial.) Assume for contradiction that for every -dense M there
is a distinguisher W 2 W. By the Min-Max Theorem there is a universal distinguisher
W  such that E [W (D)]  E [W (M)]  O(/) for every -dense M . By subsampling we
can assume that W  is the average over a multiset of O((/)2 log(1/)) elements of W,
while changing the distinguishing advantage by at most a constant fraction. Given such
universal distinguisher W  we can construct an -distinguisher in W 0 between X and U,
as formalized in Lemma 3.10:
3Zhang [Zha] shows optimality by proving a black-box lower bound on the number of elements of W that
a black-box reduction needs to obtain to construct a distinguisher between X and the uniform distribution.
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Lemma 3.10 (Implicit in [RTTV]). Let  be a ﬁnite set,  > 0,  > 0. Let X, D be
distributions on , and D is -dense in X. Let W  : ! [0; 1] be a function such that for
every -dense distribution M we have
E [W (D)]  E [W (M)]  O(/):
Then for some t as a multiple of O(/), we have
E [Tht(W (X))]  E [Tht(W (U))]  :
This proves a Dense Model Theorem, but with a suboptimal complexity blow-up of
O((/)2 log(1/)) (due to the probabilistic construction of the multiset deﬁningW ). Zhang
[Zha] achieved optimal blow-up in Theorem 3.9 by adapting the technique of multiplicative
weights with KL projection from Barak, Hardt, and Kale [BHK].
Replacing the use of the Min-Max Theorem in the above argument by our Uniform Min-
Max Theorem (Chapter 2, Theorem 2.4), we immediate obtain a simple proof of Theorem
3.9, with an optimal complexity blow-up that comes from the setting of
S =
(log jj  minM2V Hsh(M))

(/)2
= O
 log(1/)
(/)2

in Theorem 2.4, with V being the set of -dense distribution on . Compared to [Zha],
the proof using the Uniform Min-Max Theorem is more modular, and avoids adapting the
analysis of [HW] and [BHK] to the speciﬁc setting of the Dense Model Theorem.
In the rest of the section, we prove a Uniform Dense Model Theorem where the distin-
guishers are (uniform) algorithms rather than (nonuniform) [0; 1]-valued functions. Rather
than directly applying the Uniform Min-Max Theorem and using Lemma 3.10, we follow
[TTV] and deduce the Dense Model Theorem from a Regularity Theorem. Speciﬁcally,
[TTV] shows how to deduce the nonuniform Dense Model Theorem from a Nonuniform
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Regularity Theorem analogous to Chapter 2, Theorem 2.12; we prove our Uniform Dense
Model Theorem using a Uniform Regularity Theorem (Chapter 2, Theorem 2.18).
We begin with an overview of the proof of the nonuniform Dense Model Theorem in
[TTV]. The distribution D being -dense in X means that there is a (possibly ineﬃcient)
binary random variable B jointly distributed with X such that D = XjB=1, and Pr[B =
1]  . By a Regularity Theorem, there is an eﬃcient randomized function P such that
(X;B) and (X;P (X)) are indistinguishable. Since P is eﬃcient, indistinguishability of
X and Un implies that (X;P (X)) and (Un; P (Un)) are also indistinguishable. So we can
take M = UnjP (Un)=1. M is -dense because Pr[P (Un) = 1]  Pr[P (X) = 1], again by
indistinguishability of X and Un. (Note that we use indistinguishability of X and Un twice.
In the uniform setting, the uniform distinguisher will have to determine which case to use,
by testing whether Pr[P (Un) = 1]  Pr[P (X) = 1] or not.)
Theorem 3.11 (Uniform Dense Model Theorem). Let n be a security parameter,  = (n),
 = (n), s = s(n)  n all computable in poly(n) time. Let X = X(n) and U = U(n) be
poly-time samplable distributions on f0; 1gn such that X and U are -indistinguishable for
s-time randomized algorithms. Let D = D(n) be a distribution that is -dense in X. Then
for some t = s
(1)/poly(1/; 1/) and all t-time randomized oracle algorithms A, there is a
distribution M =M(n) that is (  O())-dense in U such that for all n,
E

AOM (D)
  E AOM (M)  O(/):
Moreover, M is constructive: M = U jP (U)=1 for some randomized circuit P such that
some poly(t; 1/)-time randomized algorithm R outputs P w.p. at least 
(1/2).
Proof. w.l.o.g. we assume 1 >  > c for a suﬃciently large constant c. D being -dense inX
means that there is a (possibly ineﬃcient) binary random variable B jointly distributed with
X such that D = XjB=1, and B = Pr[B = 1] = . Consider any t-time randomized oracle
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algorithm A. Let A0 be the randomized oracle algorithm where for every joint distribution
(U;C) over f0; 1gn  f0; 1g, A0OU;C on input (x; y) does the following:
1. Compute an estimate ^C of C = Pr[C = 1] such that
^C   C   w.p. at least
1   . To do so we take O((1/2) log(1/)) random samples of (U;C) and let ^C be
the fraction on which C equals 1.
2. If ^C < B   5 then return y; if ^C > B + 5 then return 1  y.
3. Otherwise,
^C   B  5, and
(a) If y = 0 then return zero.
(b) If y = 1 then simulate AON (x) for the distribution N = U jC=1, and return the
output. To simulate AON (x), we obtain t random samples of N w.p. at least
1   , where each sample is generated using rejection sampling from OU;C for
O((1/C) log(t/)) times, where C  B   4  /2.
A0 runs in time t0 = t+O((1/2) log(1/))  poly(n) +O((1/) log(t/))  t  poly(n). By
Chapter 2, Theorem 2.18, there is a poly(t0; 1/)-time randomized algorithm R that w.p. at
least 
(2) outputs a randomized circuit P satisfying
2 > E

A0OU;P (U)(X;B)
  E A0OU;P (U)(U;P (U))
 Pr
^C
h
^C   B > 5
i
 (C   B) + Pr
^C
h
^C   B <  5
i
 (B   C)
+ Pr
^C
h^C   B  5i   B  E[AOM (D)]  C  E[AOM (M)]   : (3.1)
Take (U;C) = (U;P (U)) and M = U jC=1. We claim that C  B   6, i.e. M is
(  O())-dense in U . Indeed, if C < B   6 then a Chernoﬀ bound implies
Pr
^C
h
^C   B > 5
i
 (C   B) + Pr
^C
h
^C   B <  5
i
 (B   C) > 5
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violating Eq. 3.1. By symmetry, we must have C 2 [B   6; B + 6].
We now show thatD andM are indistinguishable by AOM . Suppose that C 2 [B; B+
6] (the case C 2 [B   6; B] is similar). Then Pr^C
h
^C   B <  5
i
  and Eq. 3.1
implies
2 
 
1    Pr
^C
h^C   B  5i!  (C   B)  
+ Pr
^C
h^C   B  5i   B  E[AOM (D)]  E[AOM (M)]  (C   B)  
which simpliﬁes to
B 
 
E[AOM (D)]  E[AOM (M)]

<
3  (1  ) (C   B)
Pr
h^C   B  5i + 2 (C   B) + : (3.2)
Consider these cases:
 If 0  C   B < 4, then Pr
h^C   B  5i  1   hence RHS of Eq. 3.2 is at most
3/(1  ) + (2  (1  )/(1  )) (C   B) +   O():
 If 4  C   B  6, then RHS of Eq. 3.2 is at most 2 (C   B) +   O().
Thus we conclude that E[AOM (D)]  E[AOM (M)]  O()/B  O(/):
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Characterizations of
Computational Entropies
Computational analogues of information-theoretic notions have given rise to some of
the most interesting phenomena in cryptography and pseudorandomness theory. For ex-
ample, (computational) indistinguishability [GM2], which is the computational analogue of
statistical distance, enabled bypassing Shannon’s impossibility results on perfectly secure
encryption [Sha], and provided the basis for the computational theory of pseudorandom-
ness [BM, Yao2].
Computational analogues of entropy were introduced by Yao [Yao2] and Håstad, Im-
pagliazzo, Levin, and Luby [HILL]. The Håstad et al. notions, known as pseudo-min-entropy
and pseudoentropy1, were key to their fundamental result establishing the equivalence of
pseudorandom generators and one-way functions, and have also now become a basic concept
in complexity theory and cryptography.
Average-case variants of the Håstad et al. notions are known as pseudo-avg-min-entropy
1Håstad et al. uses a somewhat diﬀerent terminology, e.g. pseudoentropy is called “computational en-
tropy.”
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[HLR] and conditional pseudoentropy [HRV], respectively. Pseudo-avg-min-entropy, in the
special case involving only a binary alphabet, is equivalent to dense “hardcore distributions”
introduced by Impagliazzo [Imp] (see Chapter 3 for discussions on Impagliazzo’s Hardcore
Theorem). Conditional pseudoentropy was recently introduced by Haitner, Reingold, and
Vadhan [HRV] to give a simpler and more eﬃcient construction of pseudorandom generators
from one-way functions.
In this chapter, we establish new characterizations of pseudo-avg-min-entropy, pseu-
doentropy, and conditional pseudoentropy, in terms of certain (diﬀerent) measures of “hard-
ness” for distributions.
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Characterizing Pseudo-Avg-Min-Entropy
Håstad et al. introduced the following computational analogue of min-entropy:
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Pseudo-min-entropy [HILL], informal). A distribution X has pseudo-min-
entropy at least k if there exists a distribution Y such that:
1. X is indistinguishable from Y .
2. H1(Y )  k, where H1() denotes min-entropy.
Pseudo-min-entropy is interesting because a distribution can have much higher pseudo-
min-entropy than its min-entropy. Indeed, if G : f0; 1gn ! f0; 1gm is a pseudorandom
generator, then G(Un) has min-entropy at most n, but is indistinguishable from Um (by
deﬁnition) and hence has pseudo-min-entropy m > n.
A conditional version is known as pseudo-avg-min-entropy:
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Deﬁnition 4.2 (Pseudo-avg-min-entropy [HLR], informal). Let (X;B) be a joint distri-
bution. We say that B has pseudo-avg-min-entropy at least k given X if there exists a
distribution C jointly distributed with X such that
1. (X;B) is indistinguishable from (X;C).
2. eH1(C j X), the average min-entropy of C given X, is at least k, where
eH1(C j X) = log
0@ 1
ExX
h
1
2H1(CjX=x)
i
1A = log 1
ExX [maxa Pr[C = ajX = x]]

:
It can be shown that eH1(C j X)  k iﬀ for every (computationally unbounded)
randomized predictor S, Pr[S(X) = C]  2 k. Our result is a computational analogue of
this equivalence:
Theorem 4.3 (Characterizing pseudo-avg-min-entropy, informal). Let (X;B) be a joint
distribution where B takes values in a polynomial-sized set . Then B has pseudo-avg-min-
entropy at least k given X if and only if there is no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
S such that Pr[S(X) = B]  2 k  n !(1).
In other words, we show that pseudo-avg-min-entropy coincides with unpredictability
entropy [HLR] for polynomial-sized alphabets. To provide some more intuition, we compare
two previous results relating forms of computational randomness and unpredictability, both
as special cases of Theorem 4.3:
1. Yao [Yao1] showed that if B is a single bit, then (X;B) is indistinguishable from
(X;U1) (i.e. B has pseudo-avg-min-entropy 1 given X) iﬀ B cannot be predicted
from X with probability noticeably more than 1/2. This can be generalized to B
taking values in a polynomial-sized alphabet : B 2  has pseudo-avg-min-entropy
k = log jj given X iﬀ B cannot be predicted with probability noticeably greater
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than 2 k = 1/jj. Thus, Theorem 4.3 has been known to hold in the extreme case of
maximal entropy (k = log jj).
2. The Hardcore Theorem of Impagliazzo [Imp] (and subsequent strengthenings [KS,
Hol1, BHK]) can be interpreted (as done in [STV]) as saying that when B is a single
bit, B cannot be predicted from X with probability greater than 1    iﬀ “B is
indistinguishable from a random bit on a 2 fraction of the probability space (X;B)”
(this fraction of the probability space is typically called the “hardcore measure”).
The latter condition is equivalent to saying that (X;B) has pseudo-avg-min-entropy
at least log(1/(1   )) given X (see discussions in Section 4.2 for details). Thus,
Theorem 4.3 can be viewed as a generalization of the Hardcore Theorem to larger
alphabets. We refer to Chapter 3 for more discussions on the Hardcore Theorem.
We note that the constraint that B takes values in a polynomial-sized set is essential for
Theorem 4.3. If f : f0; 1gn ! f0; 1gn is a one-way permutation and X is a uniformly
random output, then it is very hard to predict f 1(X) given X, but the pseudo-avg-min-
entropy of f 1(X) given X is negligible (since we can eﬃciently recognize f 1(X) given
X).
For B that takes values exponentially large set, Goldreich and Levin [GL] showed that
if B is very hard to predict from X (i.e. cannot be predicted with nonnegligible probability),
then we can choose a random hash function H whose range is a polynomial-sized set  and
it will hold that H(B) 2  has pseudo-avg-min-entropy log jj given X and H. While
this is very useful and has many applications, it does not characterize the pseudo-avg-min-
entropy of B itself (but rather a hash of it), requires a hash function that supports “local
list-decoding,” and again only talks about maximal entropy (log jj).
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4.1.2 Characterizing (Conditional) Pseudoentropy
Håstad et al. also introduced the following computational analogue of Shannon entropy:
Deﬁnition 4.4 (Pseudoentropy [HILL], informal). A distribution X has pseudoentropy at
least k if there exists a distribution Y such that:
1. X is indistinguishable from Y .
2. Hsh(Y )  k, where Hsh() denotes Shannon entropy.
Pseudoentropy is interesting because a distribution can have much higher pseudoen-
tropy than its min-entropy. As in the case of pseudo-min-entropy, a canonical example is
the output distribution of a pseudorandom generator.
A useful, average-case generalization is the notion of conditional pseudoentropy:
Deﬁnition 4.5 (Conditional pseudoentropy [HRV], informal). Let (X;B) be a joint distri-
bution. We say that B has (conditional) pseudoentropy at least k given X if there exists a
distribution C jointly distributed with X such that
1. (X;B) is indistinguishable from (X;C).
2. Hsh(CjX)  k.
Note that if B has pseudoentropy at least k given X, then (X;B) has pseudoentropy at
least Hsh(X) + k, but the converse is false (consider X that has pseudoentropy Hsh(X) + k
on its own, with a B that has no pseudoentropy).
Conditional pseudoentropy is useful because it captures the pseudoentropy from the
perspective of an adversary who ﬁrst sees X and later B, instead of both X and B at once.
Thus, the sum of the pseudoentropy of X and the pseudoentropy of B given X can be larger
than the pseudoentropy of the joint distribution (X;B).
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We give an exact characterization of (conditional) pseudoentropy, which bears a lot of
similarity to the characterization of pseudo-avg-min-entropy (Theorem 4.3). Unlike Theo-
rem 4.3, our result here refers to “hardness of sampling” rather than unpredictability:
Theorem 4.6 (Characterizing conditional pseudoentropy, informal). Let (X;B) be a joint
distribution where B takes values in a polynomial-sized set. Then B has pseudoentropy at
least Hsh(BjX)+ given X if and only if there is no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
S such that the KL divergence from (X;B) to (X;S(X)) is at most .
A nice feature of Theorem 4.6 compared to Theorem 4.3 is that it focuses on the
computational hardness in B given X, as measured by the pseudoentropy gap . For ex-
ample, suppose that B is a uniform random bit, independent of X. Then B has 1 bit of
pseudo-avg-min-entropy given X and cannot be predicted from X with probability better
than randomly guessing, but these are not for computational reasons (i.e. they also hold for
computationally unbounded algorithms). It is often desirable to focus solely on the com-
putational randomness in B. For pseudoentropy, we can do this by subtracting Hsh(BjX)
(from the pseudoentropy of B). For unpredictability, we can do this by considering the
feasibility of sampling the distribution BjX=x given a sample x X. Thus, in the example
that B is a random bit independent of X, this sampling is easy to do (in contrast to the
task of predicting B from X).
The constraint that B takes values in a polynomial-sized set is essential here, for the
same reason as Theorem 4.3. However, we do have an alternative version of our result that
holds for B taking values in an exponentially large range. In that version, we replace the
task of sampling a distribution S(X) from X with that of computing a “measure” that,
when normalized to be a distribution, has small KL divergence from (X;B). In particular,
this alternative formulation is interesting even when X is empty and gives a characterization
of pseudoentropy of an arbitrary distribution B:
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Theorem 4.7 (Characterizing pseudoentropy, informal (nonuniform setting only)). Let
(X;B) be a joint distribution. Then B has pseudoentropy at least Hsh(BjX) +  given X if
and only if there is no polynomial-sized circuit P that computes a conditional measure for
a joint distribution (X;C) such that the KL divergence from (X;B) to (X;C) is at most .
In Chapter 5, we use Theorem 4.6 to obtain simpliﬁed and more eﬃcient constructions
of pseudorandom generators from one-way functions.
We also establish uniform versions of Theorem 4.3 and 4.6, namely with respect to
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms S.
4.1.3 Our Techniques
We give a high-level view of proof techniques for the more interesting direction of
Theorem 4.3 and 4.6: unpredictability (or hardness of sampling) implies pseudo-avg-min-
entropy (or conditional pseudoentropy). First, let us assume the nonuniform model of
computation (i.e. boolean circuits).
1. In light of relation between Theorem 4.3 and the Hardcore Theorem, it is natural
that our proofs also begin by applying the Min-Max Theorem, following Nisan and
Holenstein’s proofs of the Hardcore Theorem [Imp, Hol1]. Suppose for contradiction
that B does not have high pseudo-avg-min-entropy (or pseudoentropy) given X. That
is, for every joint distribution (X;C) where C has high pseudo-avg-min-entropy (or
pseudoentropy) given X, there is a poly-sized boolean circuit W that achieves dis-
tinguishing advantage E[W (X;B)]   E[W (X;C)]  , for  = 1/poly(n). By the
Nonuniform Min-Max Theorem (Chapter 2 Theorem 2.3), there is a single poly-sized
boolean circuit W  that achieves E[W (X;B)]   E[W (X;C)]  
() for all (X;C)
where C has high pseudo-avg-min-entropy (or pseudoentropy).
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2. Let (X;C) be the distribution that maximizes E[W (X;C)] among all C that have
high pseudo-avg-min-entropy (or pseudoentropy) given X. Thus of all such (X;C),
(X;C) is the hardest to distinguish from (X;B) for W . We show that C can be
“represented” eﬃciently using the poly-sized circuit for W , where the meaning of
“represent” diﬀers for pseudo-avg-min-entropy and conditional pseudoentropy.
3. From W  we construct some circuit S such that S’s performance, i.e. Pr[S(X) =
B] (or KL(X;B k X;S(X))), is expressed in terms of the distinguishing advantage
E[W (X;B)] E[W (X;C)]. We then plug in the fact E[W (X;B)] E[W (X;C)] 

() to conclude Pr[S(X) = B]  2 k (or KL(X;B k X;S(X))  ). Thus we
violate the assumption that B is unpredictable (or infeasible to sample within  KL
divergence) given X.
For pseudo-avg-min-entropy, the S we construct in Step 3 is a generalization of the predictor
constructed in Holenstein’s proofs of the Hardcore Theorem to larger alphabets. Nonethe-
less, even when B is a single bit, our proof of Theorem 4.3 diﬀers notably from existing
approaches to the Hardcore Theorem. In particular, by looking at the hardest-to-distinguish
(X;C) in Step 2, we achieve optimal “hardcore density” without relying on the technical
lemma of Holenstein (see Chapter 3, Remark 3.5).
For conditional pseudoentropy, the S we construct in Step 3 is simply so that S(X) =
C. To prove such S achieves KL(X;B k X;S(X))  , we develop a generic framework
that potentially applies to any “suﬃciently nice”, concave function H, not just the Shannon
entropy function. The generic framework relates “pseudo-H” (e.g. pseudoentropy when
H is Shannon entropy) of a distribution B to the infeasibility of sampling a distribution
close to B where closeness is measured by the “Bregman divergence” associated with H
(cf. Deﬁnition 1.7). This generic framework, combined with Step 1 and 2, gives rise to a
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meta characterization theorem:
Informal Theorem 4.8 (Meta characterization theorem). Let (X;B) be a joint distribution
where B takes value in a polynomial-sized set. For all “suﬃciently nice,” strictly concave
functions H (e.g. H is Shannon entropy), the following are equivalent:
1. There exists a joint distribution (X;C) such that (X;C) and (X;B) are indistinguish-
able for poly-sized circuits, and H(CjX)  H(BjX) +    1/n!(1);
2. For all polynomial-sized circuits S, we have DH(X;B k X;S(X)) >    1/n!(1).
Theorem 4.6 is an instantiation of the meta theorem, since if H = Hsh then DH = KL
(see Deﬁnition 1.9). We do not prove the meta theorem, but rather describe more concretely
in Section 4.3.3 how it follows as an immediate corollary of a few underlying lemmas, where
the exact requirement of “suﬀciently nice” is made clear.
Uniform Settings. In the uniform model of computation, we replace the use of Nonuni-
form Min-Max Theorem in Step 1 by the Uniform Min-Max Theorem in Chapter 2. In order
to apply the Uniform Min-Max Theorem, we develop eﬃcient algorithms to approximately
compute KL projections on the set of all distributions with high average min-entropy, and
on the set of all distributions with high conditional Shannon-entropy.
4.1.4 Relation to Inaccessible Entropy
A variety of computational notions of entropy have been studied in the cryptography
and complexity literature, e.g. [Yao1, HILL, BSW, HLR, HRVW, HRV, HHR+3, FR, Rey].
In addition to the notions discussed above, our work was also inspired by the works on
inaccessible entropy [HRVW, HHR+3].
Like our characterization of conditional pseudoentropy, inaccessible entropy refers to
a diﬃculty of sampling a distribution B from a jointly distributed X. However, there are
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important diﬀerences. In our characterization (Theorem 4.6), the sample of X is generated
externally and fed to the adversary, who tries then to sample the conditional distribution
BjX. In the [HHR+3] notion of inaccessible entropy, the adversary is also given the random
coins used to generate X, and we compare its output distribution conditioned on those coins
to BjX. And in the original notion of inaccessible entropy, from [HRVW], the adversary is
the one who generates X (or some approximation to it). These three notions are analogous
to the security conditions for one-way functions, target collision-resistant hash functions
(i.e. UOWHFs), and collision-resistant hash functions, respectively (thinking of X = f(B)
for B 2R f0; 1gn). We note that the hardness of sampling we consider also diﬀers from inac-
cessible entropy in the way it measures how well an adversary approximates the conditional
distribution BjX. Roughly speaking, in our notion (measuring the KL divergence from BjX
to the adversary’s output), the adversary’s goal is to produce an output distribution that
contains BjX as tightly as possible. In the notions of inaccessible entropy, the adversary’s
goal is to produce an output distribution that is contained within BjX as tightly as possible.
There is also signiﬁcant similarity between how one-way functions can be used to gen-
erate inaccessible entropy [HRVW], and conditional pseudoentropy (see Chapter 5, Section
5.3). In [HRVW], it is shown that if f is a one-way function, then (f(Un); Un) is a next-bit
inaccessible entropy generator, just like we show that it is a next-bit pseudoentropy gen-
erator in Chapter 5, Theorem 5.5. However, for inaccessible entropy, it is only necessary
to break f(Un) into bits (Un can be treated as a single block), and for pseudoentropy it is
only necessary to break Un into bits (f(Un) can be treated as a single block). Nevertheless,
there are enough similarities to suggest that there may be a deeper connection between in-
accessible entropy and pseudoentropy; trying to formalize this connection is an interesting
question for future work.
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4.2 Characterizing Pseudo-Avg-Min-Entropy
4.2.1 Deﬁnitions
The conditional version of min-entropy we consider is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 4.9 (Average min-entropy [DORS]). For every joint distribution (X;B), the
average min-entropy of B given X is deﬁned to be
eH1(B j X) = log
0@ 1
ExX
h
1
2H1(BjX=x)
i
1A = log 1
ExX

maxa2supp(B)B(ajx)
! :
We remark that there are other ways to deﬁne conditional entropies, but the above
deﬁnition has turned out to be the most convenient, and has an unpredictability interpre-
tation. That is, eH1(B j X)  k if and only if it is impossible to predict B from X with
probability more than 2 k:
Proposition 4.10. For every joint distribution (X;B),
H1(BjX)  k () 8(randomized) S;Pr[S(X) = B]  2 k:
Proof. To maximize Pr[S(X) = B], S should output the most probable value of BjX=x,
thus achieves Pr[S(X) = B] = ExX [maxa Pr[B = ajX = x]] = 2 H1(BjX).
A computational analogue of average min-entropy is pseudo-avg-min-entropy, intro-
duced by Hsiao, Lu, and Reyzin [HLR] (for the nonuniform setting). We begin with the
nonuniform deﬁnition because it is simpler:
Deﬁnition 4.11 (Pseudo-avg-min-entropy, nonuniform setting). Let (X;B) be a joint dis-
tribution. We say B has (T; ) nonuniform pseudo-avg-min-entropy at least k given X if
there exists a random variable C jointly distributed with X such that the following holds:
 eH1(CjX)  k;
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 (X;B) and (X;C) are -indistinguishable by all size T circuits.
If (X;B) = (X;B)(n) for a security parameter n, we say B has pseudo-avg-min-entropy at
least k = k(n) given X if for every constant c, B has (nc; 1/nc) pseudo-avg-min-entropy at
least k given X for all suﬃciently large n.
In the uniform setting, where we consider randomized algorithms instead of circuits as
the distinguishers, the right deﬁnitions are more subtle. It turns out that we must require
indistinguishability even against algorithms equipped with an sampling oracle. (See remark
below for more discussion.)
Notation. For a distribution Z, let OZ denote the oracle that gives a random sample from
Z when queried.
Deﬁnition 4.12 (Pseudo-avg-min-entropy, uniform setting). Let n be a security parameter,
T = T (n),  = (n), k = k(n), ` = `(n). Let (X;B) = (X;B)(n) be a joint distribution on
f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`. We say B has (T; ) uniform pseudo-avg-min-entropy at least k given X
if for every randomized oracle algorithm A computable in time T , there is a distribution C
jointly distributed with X such that the following holds for all suﬃciently large n:
 eH1(CjX)  k;
 (X;B) and (X;C) are indistinguishable by AOX;B;C :
jPr[AOX;B;C (X;B) = 1]  Pr[AOX;B;C (X;C) = 1]j < :
We say B has uniform pseudo-avg-min-entropy at least k = k(n) given X if for every
constant c, B has (nc; 1/nc) uniform pseudo-avg-min-entropy at least k given X.
The reason to give the distinguishers oracle access to OX;B;C is to ensure that the
deﬁnition composes: if (X1; B1) and (X2; B2) are iid copies of (X;B), we would like to
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say that (B1; B2) has pseudo-avg-min-entropy at least 2k given (X1; X2). Indeed we would
want to say that (X1; B1; X2; B2) is indistinguishable from (X1; C1; X2; C2) where C1; C2 are
iid copies of C. However, indistinguishability against uniform algorithms is not preserved
under taking multiple independent samples in general [GM1]. Requiring indistinguishability
against distinguishers with oracle access to OX;B;C ensures that indistinguishability will be
preserved under taking multiple independent samples.
However, a consequence of our results is that the deﬁnition with oracle OX;B;C is equiv-
alent to the deﬁnition with oracle OX;B provided B comes from a polynomial-sized alphabet.
In particular, if (X;B) is also polynomial-time samplable, the deﬁnition is equivalent to
one without oracle OX;B;C . (See Corollary 4.22.)
In the deﬁnition of pseudo-avg-min-entropy, a question asked by Leo Reyzin is whether
allowing changing both X and B (rather than changing (X;B) to (X;C), with X ﬁxed)
makes any diﬀerence. Another consequence of our results is that this is equivalent to the
above deﬁnition. (See Corollary 4.22.)
For a joint distribution (X;B), it is a basic complexity-theoretic question how well B
can be eﬃciently predicted given X:
Deﬁnition 4.13 (Hardness of prediction, nonuniform setting). Let (X;B) be a joint dis-
tribution on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`. We say B is nonuniformly (t; )-hard to predict given X if
for all size t circuits S it holds that Pr[S(X) = B] < 1  .
We say B is nonuniformly -hard to predict given X if for every constant c, B is
nonuniformly (nc;    1/nc)-hard to predict given X for all suﬃciently large n.
Note that the (nonuniform) hardness of prediction generalizes the average-case hardness
of a function f : f0; 1gn ! f0; 1g` by taking X = Un, B = f(X), and is equivalent to
unpredictability entropy studied by Hsiao, Lu, and Reyzin [HLR].
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We can also deﬁne hardness of prediction with respect to uniform algorithms. Note
that we give the predictor oracle access to the sampling oracle OX;B (which is redundant
in case (X;B) is eﬃciently samplable):
Deﬁnition 4.14 (Hardness of prediction, uniform setting). Let n be a security parameter,
 = (n) > 0, t = t(n) 2 N, ` = `(n). Let (X;B) be a joint distribution on f0; 1gnf0; 1g`.
We say B is uniformly (t; )-hard to predict given X if for all time t randomized oracle
algorithms S and all suﬃciently large n, Pr[SOX;B (X) = B] < 1  .
We say B is uniformly -hard to predict given X if for every constant c, B is uniformly
(nc;    1/nc)-hard to predict given X.
4.2.2 Main Results
For a joint distribution (X;B) on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` where ` = O(logn), we give a
characterization of the pseudo-avg-min-entropy of B given X, in terms of the hardness of
predicting B given X:
Theorem 4.15 (Characterizing pseudo-avg-min-entropy). Let n be a security parameter,
` = `(n) = O(logn), r = r(n)  `(n). Let (X;B) = (X;B)(n) be a joint distribution on
f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`. Then B has (non)uniform pseudo-avg-min-entropy at least r given X if
and only if B is (non)uniformly (1  2 r)-hard to predict given X.
Note that this is an computational analogue of Proposition 4.10, which proves an equiv-
alence between average min-entropy and unpredictability for computationally unbounded
algorithms.
Relation to the Hardcore Theorem (Theorem 3.2 and 3.6). Theorem 4.15 can
be viewed as a generalization of Impagliazzo’s Hardcore Theorem [Imp] for functions that
are not necessarily binary. Indeed, versions of the Hardcore Theorem [KS, Hol1] that
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achieve optimal “hardcore size” are equivalent to Theorem 4.15 with ` = 1. (For formal
statement and discussions of the Hardcore Theorem, we refer to Chapter 3.) We consider
the nonuniform setting for simplicity.
The proof that the Hardcore Theorem implies Theorem 4.15 with ` = 1, X = Un, and
B = f(X), follows an argument of [STV]. Suppose B is -hard to predict given X. By the
Hardcore Theorem there is a 2-dense hardcore distribution on f0; 1gn, hence a hardcore set
H  f0; 1gn of size roughly 2 2n, which can be formed by taking random samples from the
hardcore distribution. Let (X;C) be the joint distribution such that given X = x, either C
is a uniform random bit if x 2 H, or C = f(x) if x /2 H. Then C has average min-entropy
at least log(1/(1  )) given X, and (X;C) is indistinguishable from (X;B) both inside H
(since C is a uniform random bit and B is extremely hard [Yao1]) and outside H (since C
equals B). Thus B has pseudo-avg-min-entropy at least log(1/(1  )).
To see that Theorem 4.15 implies the Hardcore Theorem, take X = Un and B = f(X)
where f is the -hard function (or, for the slightly generalized version of Chapter 3 Theorem
3.2, take (X;B) to be (X;B)). By Theorem 4.15 there is some joint distribution (X;C)
indistinguishable from (X;B) such that C has average min-entropy at least log(1/(1  ))
given X. Moreover, we can w.l.o.g. assume that (x; a) 7! C(ajx) is computable by a poly-
sized circuit, by the Regularity Theorem for circuit complexity — average case (Chapter 2
Theorem 2.12) setting V to be the set of all joint distributions (X;C 0) on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g
where C 0 has average min-entropy at least log(1/(1 )) given X (such V is KL-projectable;
see Section 4.2.4.1).
Deﬁne a probabilistic function
T (x; a) =
8>>><>>>:
1; w.p. minfC(0jx);C(1jx)gC(ajx)
0; otherwise
:
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Note that T is deﬁned such that given T (X;C) = 1, C is a uniform random bit, and
E[T (X;C)] = E
xX
24 X
a2f0;1g
C(ajx)minfC(0jx); C(1jx)g
C(ajx)
35
= 2  E
xX
[minfC(0jx); C(1jx)g]
 2: (by average min-entropy of C)
We claim that (X;B)jT (X;B)=1 is a 2-dense hardcore distribution. Note that (X;B)jT (X;B)=1
is 2-dense in (X;B) because E[T (X;B)]  E[T (X;C)]  2, by eﬃciency of T and indis-
tinguishability. For hardcore-ness, consider any poly-sized circuit P . Deﬁne W such that
W (x; a) outputs 1 iﬀ P (x) = a and T (x; a) = 1. Thus
E [W (X;B)] = Pr[P (X) = B ^ T (X;B) = 1]
= Pr [T (X;B) = 1]  Pr[P (X) = BjT (X;B) = 1]
 Pr [T (X;C) = 1]  Pr[P (X) = BjT (X;B) = 1]
and
E [W (X;C)] = Pr[P (X) = C ^ T (X;C) = 1]
= Pr [T (X;C) = 1]  Pr[P (X) = CjT (X;C) = 1]
= Pr [T (X;C) = 1]  1
2
where the last equality is because given T (X;C) = 1, C is a uniform random bit. By
eﬃciency of W and indistinguishability, E[W (X;B)]  E[W (X;C)] < , which implies
Pr[P (X) = BjT (X;B) = 1] < 1
2
+

E [T (X;C)]
<
1 + /
2
:
Thus (X;B)jT (X;B)=1 is a 2-dense hardcore distribution.
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4.2.3 Hardness of Prediction Implies Pseudo-Avg-Min-Entropy, Nonuni-
form Setting
We begin with an outline of the proof for the nonuniform setting. Suppose for con-
tradiction that B does not have high pseudo-avg-min-entropy given X. In other words,
for every (X;C) where C has high average min-entropy given X, there is a small circuit
W distinguishing (X;B) from (X;C). By the Nonuniform Min-Max Theorem (Chapter 2,
Theorem 2.3), there exists a universal distinguisher W  of small circuit size, i.e. W  dis-
tinguishes (X;B) from all (X;C) where C has high average min-entropy given X. It turns
out that, from such W  we can construct a predictor P where Pr[P (X) = B]  2 r   ,
contradicting the hardness of predicting B from X.
This last step is stated as Lemma 4.16 below. Note that Lemma 4.16 even provides an
eﬃcient algorithm N for converting W  to the predictor P ; such uniformity is an overkill
in the nonuniform setting, but will be needed for the uniform setting (Section 4.2.4).
The following notations are used throughout this and the next section.
Notation. For a function W : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! [0; 1], we let W (x;#i) denote the ith
largest element of the multiset fW (x; a) : a 2 f0; 1g`g, i.e. W (x;#1)      W (x;#2`),
breaking ties arbitrarily. For  = 1; : : : ; 2` let W (x; ) =
P
i=1 (W (x;#i) W (x;#)),
thus 0 = (x; 1)      (x; 2`). We denote by C(#ijx) the probability of the ith heaviest
element of CjX=x, breaking ties arbitrarily, so that C(#1jx)  C(#2jx)  : : : .
Lemma 4.16. There exists a randomized oracle algorithm N such that the following holds.
Let  = (n) > 0,  = (n) > 0, ` = `(n), and 0 < r = r(n)  `. Let (X;B) = (X;B)(n)
be a joint distribution on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` such that Pr[X = x]   for all x. Let W :
f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! [0; 1] be a function whose output has bit length  = (n), and such that
W (x; ) is distinct for each pair of x 2 f0; 1gn and  2 [2`]. Then w.p. at least 1   ,
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NOX ;W (2 r; ; ) outputs a randomized oracle circuit P satisfying
Pr[PW (X) = B]  2 r   + E[W (X;B)]  E[W (X;C)]

where  2 (0; 2`] and (X;C) is a joint distribution with eH1(CjX)  r. Moreover, N runs
in time poly(n; 2`; ; 1/; log(1/)), and P is of size 2`  n  log(1/)  poly(; `) making 2`
oracle queries.
Proof. Deﬁne x() = maxf : W (x; )  g 2 [2`], thus
W (x; x())   < W (x; x() + 1) (4.1)
where for the second inequality we assume x() + 1  2`. Note that x() is increasing in
.
Note that W (x;#1), …, W (x;#2`) are distinct, by distinctness of W (x; ). We deﬁne
the following function P parameterized by  2 (0; 2`]:
Pr[P(x) = i] =
8>>><>>>:
1
x()
+ 1

W (x;#i) 
Px()
j=1 W (x;#j)
x()

; 1  i  x()
0; i  x() + 1
:
We let P^ be the predictor that computes i  P(x), and outputs the string a 2 f0; 1g`
such that W (x; a) =W (x;#i).
We check that P is well-deﬁned, i.e. satisﬁes (i)
P2`
i=1 Pr[P(x) = i] = 1; (ii) Pr[P(x) =
i]  0. We verify (i) by inspection. For (ii), note that for all 1  i  x(),
Pr[P(x) = i]
 1
x()
+
1

 
W (x;#x()) 
Px()
j=1 W (x;#j)
x()
!
(since W (x;#x()) W (x;#i))
=
1
x()
+
1

  W (x; x())
x()
 1
x()
+
1

  
x()
= 0 (by 4:1)
76
Chapter 4: Characterizations of Computational Entropies
We next show that P^’s prediction probability P^(X) = B can be expressed in terms
of W ’s distinguishing advantage E[W (X;B)]  E[W (X;C)], for some C with high average
min-entropy (that depends on ).
Claim 4.17. For every  2 (0; 2`] there exists a joint distribution (X;C) satisfying eH1(CjX) 
log (1/ExX [1/x()]) and
Pr[P^(X) = B]  E
xX
[1/x()] +
E[W (X;B)]  E[W (X;C)]

:
Proof of Claim. Consider any x. For all i  x() + 1, we have
Pr[P(x) = i] = 0
=
1
x()
+
 
  x()
 1
x()
+
 W (x; x() + 1)
  x() (by 4:1)
=
1
x()
+
Px()+1
j=1 (W (x;#x() + 1) W (x;#j))
  x()
 1
x()
+
1


Px()
j=1 (W (x;#i) W (x;#j))
x()
(as W (x;#i) W (x;#x() + 1))
=
1
x()
+
1

 
W (x;#i) 
Px()
j=1 W (x;#j)
x()
!
:
Thus for all i,
Pr[P(x) = i]  1
x()
+
1

 
W (x;#i) 
Px()
j=1 W (x;#j)
x()
!
(4.2)
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(in the case of 1  i  x(), it follows from the deﬁnition of P). Therefore,
Pr[P^(X) = B]
= E
xX
"X
i
B(#ijx)Pr[P(x) = i]
#
 E
xX
"
1
x()
+
1

 X
i
B(#ijx)W (x;#i) 
Px()
j=1 W (x;#j)
x()
!#
(by 4:2)
= E
xX

1
x()

+
E[W (X;B)]  ExX
Px()
j=1 W (x;#j)
x()


:
To complete the proof, note that ExX
Px()
j=1 W (x;#j)
x()

= E[W (X;C)] for the following
distribution C:
C(ajx) =
8>>><>>>:
1
x()
; 1  j  x()
0; j  x() + 1
where j is the number such that W (x; a) =W (x;#j).
The algorithm. Given Claim 4.17, our algorithm works as follows:
1. Take a multiset T ofm = O(
 
1/2

(log( + `) + log(1/))) random samples of x  X.
2. Search for the least  2 (0; 2`] such that E  2 r   :1 and  is a multiple of 2  ,
where E = Ex2RT [1/x()] is an estimate of ExX [1/x()]. This can be done by a
(`+ )-round binary search, since ExX [1/x()] is decreasing in .
3. Let  be the  found in Step 2. Output an oracle circuit PW computing P^ .
(Speciﬁcally, PW ﬁrst computes Pr[P^(x) = a] for each a, then samples P^(x)
w.p. at least 1  :1.)
The running time is poly(n; 2`; ; 1/; log(1/)), and the circuit P is of size 2`  n  log(1/) 
poly(; `) with at most 2` queries.
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Correctness. We assume that for all the ( + `) values of  examined during Step 2’s
binary search, E   E
xX

1
x()
  :1:
This holds with all but at most ( + `)  2 
(m2)  /2 probability, by a Chernoﬀ bound
and union bound. According to Step 2 of the algorithm, this implies
E
xX

1
x()

 E + :1  2 r;
as well as
E
xX

1
x(   2  )

 E 2    :1  2 r   :2:
Furthermore, since W (; ) are all distinct multiples of 2  , x() and x(   2  )
must be identical for all x except for at most one value x = z where z() 1 = z( 2  ).
That is,
E
xX

1
x()

 E
xX

1
x(   2  )

  Pr[X = z] 

1
z()  1  
1
z()

 2 r   :2  Pr[X = z]  1
2
 2 r   :7
where we use the assumption that Pr[X = x]   for all x.
Applying Claim 4.17 with  =  yields
Pr[P^(X) = B]  E
xX

1
x()

+
E[W (X;B)]  E[W (X;C)]

 2 r   :7+ E[W (X;B)]  E[W (X;C)]

for some joint distribution (X;C) satisfying eH1(CjX)  log (1/ExX [1/x()])  r.
Therefore
Pr[PW (X) = B]  Pr[P^(X) = B]  :1  2 r   + E[W (X;B)]  E[W (X;C)]

where the :1 additional loss is due to the sampling by P .
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Theorem 4.18 (Hardness of prediction =) pseudo-avg-min-entropy, nonuniform setting).
Let  > 0, and (X;B) be a joint distribution on f0; 1gnf0; 1g` such that B is nonuniformly
(t; 1 2 r)-hard to predict given X. Then B has nonuniform (t0; ) pseudo-avg-min-entropy
at least r given X, for t0 = t/
 
2`  poly(n; `; 1/).
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that B does not have nonuniform (t0; ) pseudo-avg-min-
entropy at least r given X. That is, for every joint distribution (X;C) with eH1(CjX)  r
there is a size t0 deterministic circuit W with E [W (X;B)]   E [W (X;C)]  . We will
construct a size t randomized circuit P such that Pr[P (X) = B]  2 r.
Consider the following two player zero-sum game. Player 1 picks a distribution (X;C)
with eH1(CjX)  r. Player 2 picks a size t0 deterministic circuit W : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` !
f0; 1g, and receives expected payoﬀ E [W (X;B)] E [W (X;C)]. Thus, our assumption says
that for every mixed strategy for Player 1, there is a strategy for Player 2 that achieves
payoﬀ at least . So, by the Nonuniform Min-Max Theorem (Chapter 2, Theorem 2.3),
Player 2 has a mixed strategy, uniformly distributed over S = O(n/2) size t0 circuits, that
achieves expected at least than 3/4 regardless of Player 1’s move. Rephrasing, there is a
size O(St0) deterministic circuit W  : f0; 1gn f0; 1g ! [0; 1] (which computes an average)
such that E [W (X;B)]   E [W (X;C)]  /2 for all (X;C) that satisﬁes eH1(CjX)  r.
This implies E [W (X;B)]   E [W (X;C)]  /4 for all (X;C) such that eH1(CjX)  r0
where 2 r0 = 2 r + /4.
In order to apply Lemma 4.16 we make the following assumptions:
1. Pr[X = x]  /4 for all x. This is w.l.o.g. because we can pad X with log(1/) + 2
random bits, i.e. replace (X;B) by the new joint distribution ((X;Ulog(1/)+2); B).
2. We “perturb” W  into gW  so that
(a) gW (x; ) is distinct for each pair of x 2 f0; 1gn and  2 [2`];
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(b) E
hgW (X;B)i   E hgW (X;C)i  E [W (X;B)]   E [W (X;C)]   /4 for all
(X;C).
The can be done by adding a negligible minfS 1; :1g   x  i/2n+` to W (x; i), where
we interpret x as a natural number. The resulting gW (; ) has bit length at most
 = n + O(logn) + ` + O(1/), and is of size t00 = O(St0) + O( + log(1/S)) =
t0  poly(n; `; 1/).
By Lemma 4.16, there is a randomized circuit P of size 2`  (n  log(1/)  poly(; `) + t00) =
t0  2`  poly(n; `; 1/)  t such that
Pr[P (X) = B]  2 r0   
4
+
E[gW (X;B)]  E[gW (X;C)]

 2 r0   
4
+
E[W (X;B)]  E[W (X;C)]  /4

where  2 (0; 2`] and (X;C) is a joint distribution with eH1(CjX)  r0. Since E[W (X;B)] 
E[W (X;C)]  /4, we get
Pr[P (X) = B]  2 r0   
4
 2 r
contradicting the hardness of predicting B given X.
4.2.4 Hardness of Prediction Implies Pseudo-Avg-Min-Entropy, Uniform
setting
Our proof in the uniform setting only diﬀers in the use of the Uniform Min-Max Theo-
rem (Chapter 2, Theorem 2.5). Since Player 1’s strategies are the set of all joint distributions
(X;C) where C has high pseudo-avg-min-entropy, we must be able to compute (approxi-
mate) KL projections on the set, to instantiate the underlying algorithm of the Uniform
Min-Max Theorem.
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4.2.4.1 Approximating KL Projection on High Average Min-Entropy Distribu-
tions
Notation. We denote by eVr(X) the set of all joint distributions (X;C) on f0; 1gnf0; 1g`
(where C may vary and X is ﬁxed) such that eH1(CjX)  r.
We begin by characterizing the (exact) KL projection of an joint distribution (X;C) /2
eVr(X) on the set eVr(X) (Lemma 4.19). Using this characterization, we then show in The-
orem 4.20 how to eﬃciently compute an approximate KL projection (X;C 0), where (X;C)
is represented by a circuit computing the probability vectors of CjX=x, likewise for (X;C 0).
Lemma 4.19 (KL projection on high average min-entropy distributions). Let (X;C) be a
joint distribution on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` such that Pr[C = bjX = x] > 0 for all x 2 supp(X)
and b 2 f0; 1g`. Let (X;Cfxg) be the distribution parameterized by the constant x 2
[2 `; C(#1jx)] for each x, deﬁned as follows: For all x 2 supp(X) and a 2 f0; 1g`,
Cfxg(ajx) = min fx; x  C(ajx)g
where x  1 is a scaling factor such that
P
aC

fxg(ajx) = 1. Note that given any x, there
is a unique x = x(x) that ensures
P
aC

fxg(ajx) = 1. Then for every r  `, the KL
projection of (X;C) on eVr(X) is the distribution (X;Cfxg(ajx)) where the values fxg are
determined as follows.
Let x() 2 f1; : : : ; 2`g denote the largest number i such that x()C(#ijx)  , i.e. the
number of elements that would be capped if we set x = . Let gx : (2 `; C(#1jx)]! ( 1; 0]
be the function
gx() =
x()X
i=1
log


x()  C(#ijx)

:
Then for all x 2 supp(X),
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1. gx is strictly increasing with range
Range(gx) =
0@ 2`X
i=1
log C(#2
`jx)
C(#ijx) ; 0
35 :
2.
x = x() =
8>>><>>>:
g 1x ();  2 Range(gx)
2 `; otherwise
where  2 ( 1; 0] is a constant chosen such that ExX [x()] = 2 r.
Proof. Assume w.l.o.g. that supp(X) = f0; 1gn. Note that for every x,
gx() =
x()X
i=1
log


x()  C(#ijx)

=
1


0@x()X
i=1
  log


x()  C(#ijx)

+
2`X
i=x()+1
Cfg(#ijx)  log

x()  C(#ijx)
x()  C(#ijx)
1A
=
1


2`X
i=1
Cfg(#ijx)  log
 
Cfg(#ijx)
x()  C(#ijx)
!
=
1



KL(CfgjX=x k CjX=x)  log x()

:
Thus gx is continuous, by the continuity of KL( k CjX=x), x, and the function  !
Cfg(ajx) for every a.
Next we show that gx is strictly increasing. We can expand gx to be
gx() =
x()X
i=1
log


x()  C(#ijx)

=
x()X
i=1
log

1 P()i=1 C(#ijx)  
(1  ()  )  C(#ijx) : (*)
We partition (2 `; C(#1jx)] into intervals I2`x ; : : : ; I1x according to the value of x(), i.e.  2
Ix ) x() =  (note that we listed Ix in reverse order of , as x() is monotone decreas-
ing). Since gx is continuous it suﬃces to show that gx is strictly increasing within each
interval Ix . Indeed, for ; 0 2 Ix ,  < 0, using expression () we have
gx(
0)  gx() =
X
i=1
log 
0  (1    )
  (1    0) > 0:
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Given monotonicity, the range of gx is speciﬁed by its values at (or towards) endpoints
of (2 `; C(#1jx)]. Using () we calculate
lim
!2 `+
gx() = lim
!2 `+
x()X
i=1
log
0@

1 P()i=1 C(#ijx)  
(1  ()  )  C(#ijx)
1A
=
2`X
i=1
log C(#2
`jx)
C(#ijx)
where we use x() = 2`   1 (for  ! 2 `+); as well as
gx(C(#1jx)) = log C(#1jx)  (1  C(#1jx))
1  C(#1jx) + log
1
C(#1jx) = 0
where we use x(C(#1jx)) = 1. Thus
Range(gx) =
0@ 2`X
i=1
log C(#2
`jx)
C(#ijx) ; 0
35 :
We can now prove that (X;Cfxg) is the KL projection. We assume r < `; otherwise
the result holds trivially. First note that for any ﬁxed x and any  2 [2 `; C(#1jx)], subject
to the constraint 8a;C(ajx)  , KL(CjX=x k CjX=x) is minimized by setting CjX=x to
equal CfgjX=x. See Lemma 2.3 of Barak et al. [BHK]. We view KL(X;Cfxg k X;C) as
a function f deﬁned on the 2n variables fx : x 2 f0; 1gng. Thus, to minimize KL(X;C k
X;C) subject to eH1(CjX)  r, it is equivalent to minimize f subject to the constraints
ExX [x]  2 r and 2 `  x  C(#1jx). In fact, we have ExX [x] = 2 r as the KL
projection must be on the boundary (Lemma A.4). We now use the KKT condition to ﬁnd
such minimum.
It can be veriﬁed that, in the interior of every nonempty interval Ix , f has a partial
derivative w.r.t. x of
@
@x
KL(X;Cfxg k X;C) = Pr[X = x] 
@
@x
KL(CfxgjX=x k CjX=x)
= Pr[X = x]  gx(x)
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As gx is continuous, this is a continuous partial derivative of f within all of (2 `; C(#1jx)].
Also, the constraint ExX [x] = 2 r is linear in x with coeﬃcient Pr[X = x]. The KKT
condition says that for the optimal fxg, there must exist a constant  2 ( 1; 0] such that
for all x, either
1. x = 2 `; or
2. x = C(#1jx); or
3. x 2 (2 `; C(#1jx)) and x = g 1x ():
(Note that the KKT condition can be applied since all our constraints are linear. See
e.g. [BV] Chapter 5 for details on the KKT condition.)
To complete the proof, it remains to show that Item 1 holds only if  /2 Range(gx)
(the argument that Item 2 holds only if  = 0 is similar). Suppose for contradiction that
for some x0, Item 1 holds namely x0 = 2 `, but  2 Range(gx0). Let x0 2 (2 `; C(#1jx0)]
be such that x0 = g 1x0 (). Since ExX [x] = 2 r > 2 `, by averaging there must exist
x00 6= x0 such that x00 > 2 `. Imagine that we modify Cfxg by increasing x0 from 2 `
by /Pr[X = x0] for some miniscule  > 0, and simultaneously decreasing x00 > 2 ` by
/Pr[X = x00]. Since x00 > x0 and the gradient Pr[X = x] gx() is strictly increasing for all
x, the modiﬁed distribution will have a smaller KL divergence (with average min-entropy
unchanged), contradicting the optimality of (X;Cfxg).
Theorem 4.20 (Approximating KL projection on high average min-entropy distributions).
Let n be a security parameter, X = X(n) be a distribution on f0; 1gn. There exists a
poly(n; 2`; ; 1/; log(1/)) time randomized algorithm  such that the following holds. Let
W be a deterministic circuit of size s such thatW (x) outputs the probability vector of CjX=x,
for some distribution C on f0; 1g`=`(n) jointly distributed with X where C(j) has bit length
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at most  = (n). Then for all  > 0 and 0  r  `, OX (W; r; ) outputs w.p. 1   some
deterministic circuit M such that
1. M(x) outputs the probability vector of C 0jX=x for some distribution C 0 on f0; 1g`
jointly distributed with X, where (X;C 0) is a -approximate KL projection of (X;C)
on eVr;
2. M is of size s+ 2`  poly(n; `; ; log(1/));
3. For all x, a, C 0(ajx) has bit length  +O(`+ log(1/)).
Proof. On the high level, the algorithm  performs a binary search to approximate the
 2 ( 1; 0] in Lemma 4.19 that achieves ExX [x()] = 2 r, and then approximates x()
to obtain an approximate KL projection. Binary search is possible because given that gx is
strictly increasing, ExX [x()] is also strictly increasing.
We will assume all the notations of Lemma 4.19, which says that the (exact) KL
projection equals (X;C) = (X;Cfx()g). Given that gx has range (
P2`
i=1 log C(#2
`jx)
C(#ijx) ; 0]
(by Lemma 4.19), we can w.l.o.g. assume that
 
2`X
i=1
log C(#2
`jx)
C(#ijx)   2
`  
where the last inequality holds because  is an upper bound on the bit length of C(#2`jx).
The Algorithm . We now describe the algorithm . Let  = /
 
c  2` for a suﬃciently
large constant c. W.l.o.g. we assume  , 1/, and 1/ are all powers of 2. The algorithm 
proceeds in t = `(log +log(1/)) iterations. Initially the range of  is [low1;high1] = [ 2` 
; 0]. In the ith iteration, we reduce the range of  from [lowi;highi] to either [lowi;midi]
or [midi;highi] where midi = (lowi + highi) /2, as follows:
1. (Deterministically) compute an approximation ex(midi) of x(midi), such that x(midi) ex(midi) 2 [0; ] and ex(midi) is a multiple of /2;
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2. Compute an estimate Ei of ExX
hex(midi)i, by taking m = O((1/2) log(t/)) inde-
pendent samples of x  X;
3. If Ei  2 r, we reduce the range to [midi;highi], otherwise we reduce the range to
[lowi;midi].
After all t iterations, we let e = lowt+1   2 be the approximation for , and let
X;Cfex(~)g

be the desired -approximate KL projection.
Since we require a bounded bit length, we round down Cfex(~)g(#ijx) after maxf +
log(1/) + 1; `+ log(1/) + 1g bits for all i < 2`, and increase Cfex(~)g(#2`jx) accordingly.
(We keep at least  + log(1/) + 1 bits to ensure that the approximation is within a factor
of 1 + /2 from Cfex(~)g(#ijx). We keep at least ` + log(1/) + 1 bits to ensure that
Cfex(~)g(#2`jx) will never exceed ex(e) which is log(1/) + 1 bit long). Let C^fex(~)g be the
resulting distribution;  outputs a deterministic circuit M such that M(x) outputs the
probability vector of C^fex(~)gjX=x.
Implementation for Step 1. We now describe how to implement Step 1 eﬃciently.
Since gx is strictly increasing, we do an O(log(1/))-round binary search for the largest
 2 (2 `; C(#1jx)] such that gx()  midi and  is a multiple of /2. In fact, since gx()
cannot be computed exactly, we will use an approximation egx() 2 [gx()  /2; gx()] that
can be computed eﬃciently. We let ex(midi) =  where  is the outcome of the binary
search.
Note that replacing gx() by egx() is equivalent to replacing midi by some gmidi 2
[midi   /2;midi]. The /2 granularity in binary search ensures that x(gmidi)    2
[0; /2:] Moreover, the /2 deviation from midi causes at most /2 deviation from x(midi),
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i.e. x(midi)  x(gmidi) 2 [0; /2], as shown in Claim 4.21 below. Therefore, we achieve
x(midi)  ex(midi) = x(midi)  x(gmidi)+ x(gmidi)   2 h0; 
2
+

2
i
:
Finally we describe how to approximate gx() to  0 = 1 + log(1/) decimal places, for
any  2 (2 `; C(#1jx)] that is a multiple of /2, using the formula
gx() =
x()X
i=1
log


x()  C(#ijx)

=
x()X
i=1
log

1 P()i=1 C(#ijx)  
(1  ()  )  C(#ijx) :
Evaluating x() involves O(2`) comparisons of s-bit numbers in [0; 1]. Approximating gx()
involves: (i) computing O(2`) logarithms of maxf;  0g-bit numbers in [0; 1], to  0+`+O(1)
decimal places; (ii) O(2`) additions on maxf;  0g-bit numbers in [0; 1]; (iii) O(2`) additions
on O ( +  0 + `)-bit numbers that each have  0 + `+O(1) decimal places.
Eﬃciency and Circuit Size. Approximating gx() requires 2`(s+ poly(n; `; ; log(1/)))
time. Thus the overall time of computing ex() is 2`(s+ poly(n; `; ; log(1/))), and the over-
all running time of  ism s+ t  2`  poly(n; `; ; log(1/)) = spoly(n; 2`; ; 1/; log(1/)).
Moreover,  constructs a circuit computing C^fex(~)g(ajx) of size 2`(s+ poly(n; `; ; log(1/))).
Correctness of . Recall that to prove (X; C^fex(~)g) is a -approximate KL projection,
by Pythagorean Theorem (Theorem 1.13), it suﬃces to show that (X; C^fex(~)g) 2 eVr(X) and
KL(X;B k X; C^fex(~)g)   KL(X;B k X;Cfx(x)g)   for all joint distributions (X;B) 2eVr(X). Suppose x() ex(~) 2 [0; 2 ` 1] for all x; then we are done, because that implies:
 (X; C^fex(~)g) 2 eVr(X), since
eH1(X; C^fex(~)g)  log 1ExX h ex(e)i  log
1
ExX [x()]
= r;
 Cfx()g(ajx)  (1+/2)Cfex(~)g(ajx) for all pairs of (x; a). Recall that C^fex(~)g(ajx) 
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(1 + /2)  Cfex(~)g(ajx), thus for all joint distributions (X;B),
KL(X;B k X; C^fex(~)g) KL(X;B k X;Cfx(x)g)
= E
xX
24X
a
B(ajx) log
Cfx()g(ajx)
C^fex(~)g(ajx)
35
= E
xX
24X
a
B(ajx) log
0@Cfx()g(ajx)
Cfex(~)g(ajx) 
Cfex(~)g(ajx)
C^fex(~)g(ajx)
1A35
 E
xX
"X
a
B(ajx) log

(1 +

2
)  (1 + 
2
)
#
 E
xX
"X
a
B(ajx)  
#
= :
Hence for the rest of the proof we will show x()  ex(~) 2 [0; 2 ` 1], assuming that Step
2 of all iterations achieves an accurate estimation, i.e.
Ei   ExX hex(midi)i  . The
latter assumption holds with all but t  2 
(m2)   probability, by a Chernoﬀ bound and
a union bound.
By triangle inequality,Ei   E
xX
[x(midi)]
  Ei   E
xX
h ex(midi)i+  E
xX
h ex(midi)i  E
xX
[x(midi)]
  2:
Thus Step 3 ensures  2 [lowi   2; highi + 2] for all i. In particular, since hight+1  
lowt+1 =   2`/2t   and e = lowt+1   2, we have    e 2 [0; 5]. By Claim 4.21 below,
x()  x(e) 2 [0; 5], thus
x()  ex(~) = x()  x(e)+ x(e)  ex(e) 2 [0; 6] = [0; 2 ` 1]
completing the proof.
Claim 4.21. Let 1 < 2  0. Then x(2)  x(1) 2 [0; 2   1).
Proof. Note that, where diﬀerentiable, gx has a gradient of
g0x() =
log e

x()
  2 >
log e
4
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where we use the fact that 2` <  < C(1jx) and 1  x()  2`   1 to obtain the bound.
The claim follows because x() is continuous, and where diﬀerentiable, x() has a gradient
of either 1/g0x < 1, or zero (when x() = 2`). x() is continuous because it equals the
inverse of the strictly increasing continuous function gx, except when outside the range of
gx, x() equals 2`, the left endpoint of the interval on which gx is deﬁned.
4.2.4.2 Putting it Together
Theorem 4.22 (Hardness of prediction =) pseudo-avg-min-entropy, uniform setting). Let
n be a security parameter, ` = `(n), t = t(n),  = (n), r = r(n)  `(n), where t,
, and 2 r are computable in poly(n) time. Let (X;B) = (X;B)(n) be a poly(n) time
samplable joint distribution on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` such that B is uniformly (t; 1   2 r)-hard
to predict given X. Then B has uniform (t0; ) pseudo-avg-min-entropy at least r given X,
for t0 =
 
t  2 `
(1) /poly(n; `; 1/).
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that B does not have uniform (t0; ) pseudo-avg-min-
entropy at least r given X. By deﬁnition, there is a time t0 randomized oracle algorithm
A such that for inﬁnitely many n and every joint distribution (X;C) with eH1(CjX)  r,
AOX;B;C is an -distinguisher between (X;B) and (X;C). Using A we shall construct a time
t oracle algorithm P such that for inﬁnitely many n, Pr[POX;B (X) = B]  2 r.
Consider the two-player zero-sum game where Player 1 chooses some joint distribution
(X;C) 2 eVr(X), Player 2 chooses a circuitW and receives expected payoﬀ E[f((X;C);W )] =
E[W (X;B)]  E[W (X;C)]. We will apply the Uniform Min-Max Theorem – Average Case
(Chapter 2, Theorem 2.5) to this game, i.e. with
 V = eVr;
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 W = f(deterministic) circuitsg;
 f((x; a);W ) = E[W (X;B)] W (x; a).
We run an instantiation of Algorithm 2.2 (Finding Universal Strategy – Average Case) for
the game with KL projection on the set eVr(X), which we describe below. Using the oracle
algorithm A(), we will show that in each iteration we obtain some W (i) that distinguishes
(X;B) and (X;C). Thus, by the Uniform Min-Max Theorem – Average Case, we obtain a
universal distinguisher W . From this W , we then obtain an eﬃcient predictor for B by
applying Lemma 4.16, exactly like in the nonuniform setting.
Our instantiation of Algorithm 2.1 starts with an initial distribution (X;C(1)) where
C(1) is uniform on f0; 1g` and independent of X. Let 0 = /c for a suﬃciently large constant
c. The number of iterations is S = O(`/02), and we let 0 = /8S. In each iteration we
represent C(i) by a deterministic circuit M (i) such that M (i)(x) outputs the probability
vector of C(i)jX=x. So we can take M (1)(x) to be the vector (1/2`; : : : ; 1/2`) for every x.
We show how to implement each of the S iterations of Algorithm 2.2 eﬃciently:
1. Obtaining Player 2’s Response W (i): Suppose that we have constructed a ti-size
deterministic circuit M (i), and C(i)(j) has bit length i. There are two steps:
(a) Generate a deterministic circuit fW (i) such that
E[fW (i)(X;B)] E[fW (i)(X;C(i))]  E[AOX;B;C(i) (X;B)] E[AOX;B;C(i) (X;C(i))] 0:
To do so, we ﬁrst generatem = O(log(1/0)/02) random samples of (X;B;C(i))t0
and Ut0 . This can be done in time mt02`  poly(n; ti), where we sample C(i)jX=x
from its probability vector M (i)(x). Now let fW (i)(x; a) runs A()(x; a) for m
times and returns the average of the m outputs; each time A()(x; a) is run using
one copy of (X;B;C(i))t0 to answer oracle queries of A, and one copy of Ut0 as
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coin tosses of A. The m random samples are hardwired in fW (i), thus fW (i) is of
size t00 = O(t0 m  (n+ `)), which does not depend on the size of M (i) (but the
size of M (i+1) will additively depend on t00). By a Chernoﬀ bound, the above
inequality holds w.p. at least 1  0.
(b) Our choice of W (i) is the following approximation to fW (i), so that exp( 0  (1 
W (i)(x; a))) can be computed precisely and eﬃciently. First, we use Newton’s
method to compute a polylog(1/)-bit approximation E(x; a) 2 (0; 1] of exp( 0 
(1 fW (i)(x; a))) within 02 error, in time O(tm)+polylog(1/). We deﬁne W (i)
to be such that exp( 0(1 W (i)(x; a))) = E(x; a). Thus
W (i)(x; a) fW (i)(x; a) 
0, and
E[W (i)(X;B)]  E[W (i)(X;C(i))]  E[fW (i)(X;B)]  E[fW (i)(X;C(i))]  20:
2. Weight Update: We represent the resulting distribution C(i)0 after weight update
by the circuit M (i)0 where M (i)0(x) outputs the probability vector of C(i)0 jX=x. Since
E(x; a) = exp
  0  (1 W (i)(x; a)) has bit length polylog(1/) and C(ajx) has bit
length i, multiplication takes time polylog(1/0)  i for each pair of x, a. Thus, M (i)0
has circuit size t0i = ti + 2`  (t00 + polylog(1/0)  i) and can be constructed in similar
time; C(i)0(j) has bit length  0i = i + polylog(1/0).
3. KL Projection: We use Theorem 4.20 to eﬃciently obtain a circuit M (i+1) such
that M (i+1)(x) outputs the probability vector of C(i+1)jX=x, where (X;C(i+1)) is
an 02-approximate KL projection of (X;C(i)0) on eVr. This can be done in time
poly(t0i; n; 2`;  0i ; 1/0; log(1/0)) and w.p. at least 1   0. Moreover, M (i+1) is of size
ti+1 = t
0
i + 2
`  poly(n; `;  0i ; log(1/0)), and C(i+1)(j) has bit length i+1 =  0i +O(`+
log(1/0)).
We now prove eﬃciency of the algorithm. First, note that 1 = O(`), and i = i 
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(polylog(1/0) +O(`)) by induction. Also, t1 = O(`) and ti+1 = ti+2`poly(t0; n; `; i; 1/0) =
ti+2
`  poly(t0; n; `; 1/0). Thus the above algorithm runs in total time 2`  poly(t0; n; `; 1/).
Suppose that Step 1 (a) and Step 3 complete successfully in all iterations. By a union
bound, this holds w.p. at least 1   20S = 1   /4 . For all i, since (X;C(i)) 2 eVr ,the
pseudo-avg-min-entropy of B implies
E[W (i)(X;B)]  E[W (i)(X;C(i))]  E[fW (i)(X;B)]  E[fW (i)(X;C(i))]  20
 E[AOX;B;C(i) (X;B)]  E[AOX;B;C(i) (X;C(i))]  0   20
   20:
Let W  be the size O(St00) deterministic circuit computing the average of fW (1); : : : ;fW (S).
Note thatW  is at most 20 apart from the average ofW (1); : : : ;W (S). Hence by the Uniform
Min-Max Theorem – Average Case (Theorem 2.5), for all Player 1 strategies (X;C) 2 eVr,
E[W (X;B)]  E[W (X;C)]    20  O(0)  20  3/4:
This implies E [W (X;B)]   E [W (X;C)]  3/4   /2 = /4 for all (X;C) such that
eH1(CjX)  r0 where 2 r0 = 2 r+/2. In other words, the algorithm constructs a universal
/4-distinguisher W  between (X;B) and eVr0(X) w.p. at least 1  /4.
Given a universal distinguisherW , the remainder of the proof is similar to the nonuni-
form setting. In order to apply Lemma 4.16 we make the following assumptions:
1. Pr[X = x]  /4 for all x. This is w.l.o.g. because we can pad X with log(1/) + 2
random bits, i.e. replace (X;B) by the new joint distribution ((X;Ulog(1/)+2); B).
2. We “perturb” W  into gW  so that
(a) gW (x; ) is distinct for each pair of x 2 f0; 1gn and  2 [2`];
(b) E
hgW (X;B)i   E hgW (X;C)i  E [W (X;B)]   E [W (X;C)]   /4 for all
(X;C).
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The can be done by adding a negligible minfS 1; :1g   x  i/2n+` to W (x; i), where
we interpret x as a natural number. The resulting gW (; ) has bit length at most
 = n + O(logn) + ` + O(1/), and is of size t00 = O(St0) + O( + log(1/S)) =
t0  poly(n; `; 1/).
We run the algorithm N in Lemma 4.16 to convert gW  into a predictor. By Lemma 4.16,
this yields a time 2`  poly(t0; n; `; 1/)  t randomized oracle algorithm P such that
Pr[POX;B (X) = B]  2 r0   
4
+
E[gW (X;B)]  E[gW (X;C)]

 2 r0   
4
+
E[W (X;B)]  E[W (X;C)]  /4

where  2 (0; 2`] and (X;C) 2 eVr0(X). Recall that w.p. at least 1   /4, we have
E[W (X;B)]  E[W (X;C)]  /4. Therefore,
Pr[POX;B (X) = B]  2 r0   
4
  
4
 2 r
contradicting the hardness of predicting B given X.
4.2.5 Pseudo-Avg-Min-Entropy Implies Hardness of Prediction
This direction of the characterization is straightforward to show. In fact, we show that
even a weak form of pseudo-avg-min-entropy suﬃces:
Deﬁnition 4.23 (Weak pseudo-avg-min-entropy, nonuniform setting). Let (X;B) be a
joint distribution. We say B has (T; ) weak nonuniform pseudo-avg-min-entropy at least k
given X if there exists a joint distribution (Y;C) such that the following holds:
 eH1(CjY )  k;
 (X;B) and (Y;C) are -indistinguishable by all size T circuits.
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If (X;B) = (X;B)(n) for a security parameter n, we say B has weak pseudo-avg-min-entropy
at least k = k(n) given X if for every constant c, B has (nc; 1/nc) weak pseudo-avg-min-
entropy at least k given X for all suﬃciently large n.
In the uniform setting, it suﬃces to assume an even weaker form of pseudo-avg-min-
entropy, where we only require indistinguishability against distinguishers given oracle access
to OX;B but not OX;B;C :
Deﬁnition 4.24 (Weak pseudo-avg-min-entropy, uniform setting). Let n be a security
parameter, T = T (n),  = (n), k = k(n), ` = `(n). Let (X;B) = (X;B)(n) be a joint
distribution on f0; 1gnf0; 1g`. We say B has (T; ) weak uniform pseudo-avg-min-entropy
at least k given X if for every randomized oracle algorithm A computable in time T , there
is a joint distribution (Y;C) such that the following holds for all suﬃciently large n:
 eH1(CjY )  k;
 (X;B) and (Y;C) are indistinguishable by AOX;B :
jPr[AOX;B (X;B) = 1]  Pr[AOX;B (Y;C) = 1]j < :
We say B has weak uniform pseudo-avg-min-entropy at least k = k(n) given X if for every
constant c, B has (nc; 1/nc) weak uniform pseudo-avg-min-entropy at least k given X. Note
that in this “polynomial” version, OX;B is redundant if (X;B) is polynomial-time samplable.
Theorem 4.25 (Weak pseudo-avg-min-entropy =) hardness of prediction, uniform and
nonuniform settings). Let n be a security parameter, ` = `(n), t = t(n),  = (n), r =
r(n)  `(n). Let (X;B) = (X;B)(n) be a joint distribution on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` such that
B has weak (non)uniform (t; ) pseudo-avg-min-entropy at least r given X. Then B is
(non)uniformly (t O(1); 1  2 r   )-hard to predict given X.
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Proof. We give a proof for the uniform setting; the proof for the nonuniform setting is essen-
tially the same. Suppose for contradiction that there is a time t O(1) randomized oracle
algorithm P such that Pr[POX;B (X) = B]  2 r + . Deﬁne a distinguisher WOX;B (x; a)
that outputs 1 if POX;B (x) = a, and 0 otherwise. Note that for all joint distributions (Y;C)
we have an information-theoretic bound Pr[POX;B (Y ) = C]  ExY [maxaC(ajx)]. Thus
all joint distributions (Y;C) on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` with ExY [maxaC(ajx)]  2 r, we have
E[WOX;B (X;B)]  E[WOX;B (Y;C)] = Pr[POX;B (X) = B]  Pr[POX;B (Y ) = C]
 2 r +   2 r = ;
contradicting the fact that B has weak uniform (t; ) pseudo-avg-min-entropy at least r.
Since Theorem 4.25 only requires weak pseudo-avg-min-entropy, we now have the fol-
lowing equivalence:
Corollary 4.26. Let n be a security parameter, and let  = (n) > 0, and ` = `(n) =
O(logn) be computable in time poly(n). Let (X;B) be a joint distribution on f0; 1gnf0; 1g`.
Then the following are equivalent:
1. B is (non)uniformly (1  2 k)-hard to predict given X;
2. B has (non)uniform pseudo-avg-min-entropy at least k given X;
3. B has weak (non)uniform pseudo-avg-min-entropy at least k given X.
Proof. 1 =) 2 by Theorem 4.18 and 4.22. 2 =) 3 by deﬁnition. 3 =) 1 by Theorem
4.25.
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4.3 Characterizing Pseudoentropy
4.3.1 Deﬁnitions
The computational analogue of Shannon entropy, pseudoentropy, was ﬁrst introduced
by Håstad et al. [HILL]. We begin with the nonuniform deﬁnition because it is simpler:
Deﬁnition 4.27 (Pseudoentropy, nonuniform setting). We say that a distribution X has
(T; ) nonuniform pseudoentropy at least k if there exists a distribution Y with Hsh(Y )  k
such that X and Y are -indistinguishable by all size T circuits.
If X = X(n) for a security parameter n, we say X has nonuniform pseudoentropy at
least k = k(n) if for every constant c, X(n) has (nc; 1/nc) nonuniform pseudoentropy at
least k(n)  1/nc for all suﬃciently large n.
A natural generalization of pseudoentropy is the notion of conditional pseudoentropy:
Deﬁnition 4.28 (Conditional pseudoentropy, nonuniform setting). Let (X;B) be a joint
distribution. We say B has (T; ) nonuniform (conditional) pseudoentropy at least k given
X if there exists a distribution C jointly distributed with X such that the following holds:
 Hsh(CjX)  k;
 (X;B) and (X;C) are -indistinguishable by all size T circuits.
k  Hsh(BjX) is known as the pseudoentropy gap.
If (X;B) = (X;B)(n) for a security parameter n, we say B has nonuniform (condi-
tional) pseudoentropy at least k = k(n) given X if for every constant c, B has (nc; 1/nc)
nonuniform (conditional) pseudoentropy at least k(n)   1/nc given X for all suﬃciently
large n.
Like pseudo-avg-min-entropy, both pseudoentropy and conditional pseudoentropy can
be deﬁned with respect to uniform observers:
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Deﬁnition 4.29 (Pseudoentropy, uniform setting). Let n be a security parameter, T =
T (n),  = (n), k = k(n), ` = `(n). Let X = X(n) be a distribution on f0; 1g`. We say X
has (T; ) uniform pseudoentropy at least k if for all time T randomized oracle algorithm A,
there exists a distribution Y = Y (n) such that the following holds for all suﬃciently large
n:
 Hsh(Y )  k;
 X, Y are -indistinguishable by AOX;Y :
Pr[AOX;Y (X) = 1]  Pr[AOX;Y (Y ) = 1] < :
We say X has uniform pseudoentropy at least k = k(n) if for every constant c, X(n) has
(nc; 1/nc) uniform pseudoentropy at least k(n)  1/nc.
Deﬁnition 4.30 (Conditional pseudoentropy, uniform setting). Let n be a security pa-
rameter, T = T (n),  = (n), k = k(n), ` = `(n). Let (X;B) = (X;B)(n) be a joint
distribution on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`. We say B has (T; ) uniform (conditional) pseudoentropy
at least k given X if for every randomized oracle algorithm A computable in time T , there is
a distribution C jointly distributed with X such that the following holds for all suﬃciently
large n:
 Hsh(CjX)  k;
 (X;B) and (X;C) are indistinguishable by AOX;B;C :
jPr[AOX;B;C (X;B) = 1]  Pr[AOX;B;C (X;C) = 1]j < :
We say B has uniform (conditional) pseudoentropy at least k = k(n) given X if for every
constant c, B has (nc; 1/nc) uniform (conditional) pseudoentropy at least k(n) 1/nc given
X.
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As in the deﬁnition of uniform pseudo-avg-min-entropy, we give the distinguishers
oracle access to OX;Y (for pseudoentropy) and OX;B;C (for conditional pseudoentropy).
For conditional pseudoentropy, however, a consequence of our results is that the deﬁnition
with oracle OX;B;C is equivalent to the deﬁnition with oracle OX;B provided B comes from
a polynomial-sized alphabet. In particular, if (X;B) is also polynomial-time samplable
(which will be the case in our applications), the deﬁnition is equivalent to one without
oracle OX;B;C . (See Corollary 4.58.)
In the deﬁnition of conditional pseudoentropy, a question asked by Leo Reyzin is
whether allowing changing both X and B (rather than changing (X;B) to (X;C), with
X ﬁxed) makes any diﬀerence. Another consequence of our results is that this is equivalent
to the above deﬁnition. (See Corollary 4.58.)
To capture exactly the computational hardness in B given X, we consider the closest
“distance” from (X;B) to any joint distribution (X;C) where the distribution C can be
eﬃciently “represented” given X. We will use KL divergence as the “distance,” and consider
two ways to algorithmically represent C: (i) By a randomized algorithm or circuit S that
samples C from X, i.e. C = S(X); (ii) By an algorithm or circuit P that computes the
(conditional) probability mass function (pmf) of C, i.e. P (x; a) = Pr[C = ajX = x]. In
general, having an eﬃcient algorithm for one representation does not imply having an
eﬃcient algorithm for the other (under certain complexity assumptions) [KMR+, Nao2].
But when C is short (` = O(logn)), approximating the pmf of C given X (say to within
) is equivalent to approximately sampling C given X (say to within statistical distance
), up to a factor of poly(2`; 1/) in running time. (See Lemma 4.36 and 4.37 below.) The
sampler-based deﬁnition may appear more natural, as a closer parallel to Deﬁnition 4.13:
Deﬁnition 4.31 (KL-hard for sampling, nonuniform setting). Let (X;B) be a joint distri-
bution on f0; 1gnf0; 1g`. We say B is nonuniformly (t; ) KL-hard for sampling given X if
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for all size t randomized circuits S : f0; 1gn ! f0; 1g` it holds that KL(X;BjjX;S(X))  .
Analogously to pseudoentropy, the nonuniform and uniform deﬁnitions diﬀer in whether
we need to give a sampling oracle to the adversary.
Deﬁnition 4.32 (KL-hard for sampling, uniform setting). Let n be a security parameter,
 = (n) > 0, t = t(n) 2 N, ` = `(n). Let (X;B) be a distribution on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`. We
say B is uniformly (t; ) KL-hard for sampling given X if for all time t randomized oracle
algorithms S, for all suﬃciently large n, it holds that KL(X;BjjX;SOX;B (X))  .
In our characterization of pseudoentropy (Section 4.3), however, we adopt the pmf-
based representation (rather than the sampling-based). This is because our techniques
require ﬁner manipulations of the distribution.
We will in fact use “measures” rather than pmfs, because it can be infeasible to maintain
the normalization Pa P (x; a) = 1 while manipulating P if the alphabet size 2` is large.
Recall that a function P : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! [0; 1] is called a conditional measure for CjX
if:
C(ajx) = P (x; a)P
b P (x; b)
;
and we denote (X;C) by (X;P ). We generalize the pmf representation so that P only has
to compute some conditional measure for CjX.
Deﬁnition 4.33 (KL predictors). Let (X;B) be a joint distribution on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`.
We say that a conditional measure P : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! [0; 1] is a -KL predictor of B
given X if
KL(X;BjjX;P ) < :
If P is randomized, we say that P is a -KL predictor of B given X if
E
pP
[KL(X;BjjX;p)] < 
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where we view P as a distribution over functions p : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! [0; 1].
Deﬁnition 4.34 (KL-hard, nonuniform setting). Let (X;B) be a joint distribution on
f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`. We say B is nonuniformly (t; ) KL-hard given X if there is no circuit P
of size t that is a -KL predictor of B given X.
We say B is nonuniformly  KL-hard given X if for every constant c, B is nonuniformly
(nc;    1/nc) KL-hard given X for all suﬃciently large n.
Deﬁnition 4.35 (KL-hard, uniform setting). Let n be a security parameter,  = (n) > 0,
t = t(n) 2 N, ` = `(n). Let (X;B) be a joint distribution on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`. We
say B is uniformly (t; ) KL-hard given X if for all time t randomized oracle algorithms
P : f0; 1gnf0; 1g` ! [0; 1] and all suﬃciently large n, POX;B is not a -KL predictor of B
given X (where the randomness of POX;B consists both of its internal coin tosses and the
samples it gets from the oracle OX;B).
We say B is uniformly  KL-hard given X if for every constant c, B is uniformly
(nc;    1/nc) KL-hard given X.
Note that by letting P (x; a) = 1, we already get C = U` i.e. KL(X;BjjX;C) = `  
Hsh(BjX)  `. Thus it only makes sense to talk about KL-hardness for   `.
Finally, we show that the two notions, KL-hard and KL-hard for sampling, are equiv-
alent up to a polynomial factor in t, provided that ` is logarithmic in n:
Lemma 4.36. Let (X;B) be a joint distribution on f0; 1gnf0; 1g`. If B is nonuniformly
(t; ) KL-hard for sampling given X, then B is nonuniformly (
(t/2`); ) KL-hard given X.
Conversely, if B is nonuniformly (t; ) KL-hard given X, then B is nonuniformly (t0;   )
KL-hard for sampling given X for t0 = t/poly(n; 2`; 1/), for every  > 0.
Proof. Suppose B is not nonuniformly (t0; ) KL-hard given X. That is, there exists a size
t0 circuit P : f0; 1gnf0; 1g` ! [0; 1] such that KL(X;BjjX;P )  . Then we can sample
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S(x) = a w.p. Pr[P = ajX = x] so that KL(X;BjjX;S(X))  . S has circuit size
O(2`  t0). This contradicts the fact that B is nonuniformly (t; ) KL-hard for sampling, for
t0 = 
(t/q).
Conversely, suppose KL(X;BjjX;S(X))      for some size t0 circuit S. We will
construct a size t randomized -KL predictor P (so that it will be useful for the uniform
setting, Lemma 4.37, as well) as follows. We compute E(x; a) such that w.p. at least 1  ,
jPr[S(x) = a]  E(x; a)j  2/c22` for all x, a, where c is a large enough constant. This is
done by taking m = O (n+ `+ log(1/))  22`/4 samples of the randomness of S. We then
output P (x; a) = maxfE(x; a); /c2`g 2 (/c2`; 1].
We view P as a distribution over functions p : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! (/c2`; 1]. Consider
any p 2 supp(P ) such thatjPr[S(x) = a]  E(x; a)j  2/c22` for all x, a. Notice thatP
b p(x; b)  1 + 2` 
 
/c2`

= 1 + /c. If Pr[S(x) = a] > /c2`, then
log Pr[S(x) = a]Pr[p = ajX = x]  log
p(x; a) + 
2
c2
p(x; a)
+ log
X
b
p(x; b)  log(1 + 
c
) + log(1 + 
c
)  
2
:
If Pr[S(x) = a]  /c2`, then
log Pr[S(x) = a]Pr[p = ajX = x] = log
Pr[S(x) = a]
p(x; a)
+ log
X
b
p(x; b)  log(1 + /c)  
2
:
Thus we get
KL(X;BjjX;p)
= KL(X;BjjX;S(X)) + E
xX
"X
a
Pr[B = ajX = x] log Pr[S(x) = a]Pr[p = ajX = x]
#
    + 
2
:
On the other hand, for every p : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! (/c2`; 1] it holds that
KL(X;BjjX;p) = E
"X
a
Pr[B = ajX = x] log (Pr[B = ajX = x]/Pr[p = ajX = x])
#
 max
x;a
log (1/Pr[p = ajX = x]) = O

`+ log 1


:
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Thus,
E
pP
[KL(X;BjjX;p)]  (1  )  (   
2
) +  O

`+ log 1


 ;
for an appropriate choice of  = O(/(` + log(1/))). Furthermore, P has circuit size
O (t0m) = t. Thus B is not nonuniformly (t; ) KL-hard given X.
Lemma 4.37. Let n be a security parameter,  = (n) > 0, t = t(n) 2 N, p = p(n),
 = (n) > 0, ` = `(n) all computable in time poly(n). Let (X;B) be a joint distribution on
f0; 1gnf0; 1g`. If B is uniformly (t; ) KL-hard for sampling given X, then B is uniformly
(
(t/(2` + n)); ) KL-hard given X. Conversely, if B is uniformly (t; ) KL-hard given X,
then B is uniformly (t0;    ) KL-hard for sampling given X, for t0 = t/poly(n; 2`; 1/).
Proof. The proof for the second part is identical to Lemma 4.36. For the ﬁrst part, suppose
B is not uniformly (t0; ) KL-hard given X. That is, there is a time t0 oracle algorithm P
such that when POX;B is viewed as a distribution over functions p : f0; 1gnf0; 1g` ! [0; 1],
for inﬁnitely many n,
E
pPOX;B [KL(X;BjjX;p)]  :
Then we can sample S(x) = a w.p. EpPOX;B [Pr[p = ajX = x]], where we ﬁrst pick p 
POX;B by ﬁxing the internal coin tosses of P and samples from oracle OX;B. By convexity
of KL(X;BjjX; ),
KL(X;BjjX;S(X)) = KL  X;BjjX;
P
OX;B
  E
pPOX;B [KL (X;BjjX;p)]  :
This contradicts the fact that B is uniformly (t; ) KL-hard for sampling, for t0 = 
(t/(2`+
n)).
4.3.2 Main Results
We show that a distribution B having pseudoentropy given X, is equivalent to B being
KL-hard given X (a notion which, as discussed above, captures the computational hardness
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of sampling B given X in terms of KL divergence). We prove the equivalence in both
nonuniform and uniform models of computation.
Theorem 4.38 (Characterizing pseudoentropy, nonuniform setting). Let (X;B) be a joint
distribution on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`,  > 0,  > 0.
1. If B is nonuniformly (t; ) KL-hard given X, then for every  > 0, B has nonuniform
(t0; ) pseudoentropy at least Hsh(BjX) +     given X, for t0 = t
(1)/poly(n; `; 1/).
2. Conversely, if B has nonuniform (t; ) pseudoentropy at least Hsh(BjX) +  given
X, then for every  > 0, B is nonuniformly (t0; 0) KL-hard given X, for t0 =
minft
(1)/polylog (1/) ;
(/)g and 0 =    .
Corollary 4.39. Let (X;B) be a joint distribution on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`. Then B has
nonuniform pseudoentropy at least Hsh(BjX) +  given X if and only if B is nonuniformly
 KL-hard given X.
By dropping X, the polynomial dependence on ` gives us a characterization of nonuni-
form pseudoentropy for an `-bit distribution: (Note that without conditioning on X, the
deﬁnition of KL-hard still makes sense, expressing the hardness of computing a measure
that approximates the distribution B.)
Corollary 4.40. A distribution B on f0; 1g` has nonuniform pseudoentropy at least Hsh(B)+
 if and only if B is nonuniformly  KL-hard.
We now state the uniform versions of our results, which are analogous to the nonuniform
versions but have an exponential dependence on ` (we do not know whether it can be made
polynomial like in Theorem 4.38, so we don’t have a uniform analogue of Corollary 4.40.)
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Theorem 4.41 (Characterizing pseudoentropy, uniform setting). Let n be a security pa-
rameter,  = (n) > 0, t = t(n) 2 N,  = (n) > 0, ` = `(n),  = (n) all computable in
time poly(n). Let (X;B) be a joint distribution on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`.
1. If B is uniformly (t; ) KL-hard given X, then B has uniform (t0; ) pseudoentropy at
least Hsh(BjX) +     given X, for t0 = t
(1)/poly(n; 2`; 1/).
2. Conversely, if B has uniform (t; ) pseudoentropy at least Hsh(BjX)+ given X, then
B is uniformly (t0; 0) KL-hard given X, for t0 = minft
(1)/poly(n; log(1/);
(/)g
and 0 =    .
Corollary 4.42. Let n be a security parameter,  = (n) > 0, ` = polylog(n) computable
in time poly(n). Let (X;B) be a joint distribution on f0; 1gnf0; 1g`. Then B has uniform
pseudoentropy at least Hsh(BjX)+  given X if and only if B is uniformly  KL-hard given
X.
Note that we do not make any samplability assumption on X (in both nonuniform and
uniform settings).
4.3.3 A Generic Framework
In this section, we provide a generic framework for proving statements such as the
characterization of (conditional) pseudoentropy, yielding our meta characterization theorem
(Theorem 4.8).
Throught the section, we consider an arbitrary strictly concave function
H : fdistributions on g ! R0
that is diﬀerentiable in the interior of the simplex in jj-space (e.g. the Shannon entropy of
a distribution on ). We also extend H to the conditional setting in the natural way: For
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a joint distribution (X;C), deﬁne H(CjX) to equal Ex X [H (CjX=x)] (e.g. the conditional
Shannon entropy of C given X).
A key to our framework is interpreting the Bregman divergence associated with H,
DH(X k Y ) (see Deﬁnition 1.7), in terms of the distinguishing advantage of a special
distinguisher W :
Lemma 4.43. Let X and Y be distributions on a ﬁnite set . Let W :  ! R0 be the
function
W (x) =   @H(Y )
@ Pr[Y = x]
where the LHS denotes the derivative of H at Y w.r.t. Pr[Y = x]. Then
DH(X k Y ) = H(Y ) H(X)  (E[W (X)]  E[W (Y )]) :
Moreover, Y 0 = Y maximizes E[W (Y 0)] over all distributions Y 0 on  where H(Y 0)  H(Y ).
For some intuition, suppose W is a constant function and H is Shannon entropy. Then
C = U` and Lemma 4.44 becomes the familiar identity
KL(X k U`) = ` Hsh(X):
Proof of Lemma 4.43. By deﬁnition of Bregman divergence,
DH(X k Y ) = H(Y ) H(X)  hrH(Y ); Y  Xi
= H(Y ) H(X) +
X
x
W (x)  Pr[Y = x] 
X
x
W (x)  Pr[X = x]
= H(Y ) H(X)  (E[W (X)]  E[W (Y )]) :
Nonnegativity of Bregman divergence (Proposition 1.8) and the above equality together
imply if E[W (Y 0)] > E[W (Y )] thenH(Y 0) < H(Y ), i.e. Y 0 = Y maximizes E[W (Y 0)] subject
to H(Y 0)  H(Y ).
106
Chapter 4: Characterizations of Computational Entropies
In our applications it is often more convenient to consider an average-case version,
which follows as an immediate corollary of Lemma 4.43:
Corollary 4.44. Let (X;B) and (X;C) be joint distributions on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`. Let
W : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! R0 be the function
W (x; a) =   @H(CjX)
@ Pr[C = ajX = x]
where the LHS denotes the derivative of H(CjX) w.r.t. Pr[C = ajX = x]. Then
DH(X;B k X;C) = H(CjX) H(BjX)  (E[W (X;B)]  E[W (X;C)]) :
Moreover, (X;C 0) = (X;C) maximizes E[W (X;C 0)] subject to H(C 0jX)  H(CjX)
(over all C 0 jointly distributed with X).
Now we show why the lemma is useful: If W achieves good distinguishing advantage
E[W (X;B)]   E[W (X;C)] for all C where H(CjX) is not too much larger than H(BjX),
then we can use C to approximate B within small Bregman divergence:
Lemma 4.45. Let (X;B) be any joint distribution on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`,  > 0, and  > 0.
Let W  : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! [0; 1] be a function such that E[W (X;B)]  E[W (X;C)]  
for all `-bit random variables C jointly distributed with X with H(CjX)  H(BjX) + .
Suppose that there exists a joint distribution (X;C) such that H(CjX) = H(BjX) + 
and for some constant   0,
8x; a; @H(C
jX=x)
@ Pr[C = ajX = x] =   W
(x; a):
Then
DH(X;B k X;C)  :
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Proof. By Corollary 4.44,
DH(X;B k X;C) = H(CjX) H(BjX)    (E[W (X;B)]  E[W (X;C)])
        :
Lemma 4.43 can also be used to show a “converse” to Lemma 4.45.
Lemma 4.46. Let (X;B) and (Y;C) be joint distributions on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`,  > 0,
 > 0. Suppose DH(X;B k Y;C)  . Then for the function W  deﬁned as
W (x; a) =   @H(C
jX)
@ Pr[C = ajX = x] ;
and for all joint distributions (Y;C) on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` with H(Y;C)  H(X;B) +  + ,
we have E[W (X;B)]  E[W (Y;C)]  .
Proof. Consider any joint distribution (Y;C) with H(Y;C)  H(X;B) +  + . Applying
Lemma 4.43, we obtain
H(Y;C) H(X;B)  (E[W (X;B)]  E[W (Y;C)]) = DH(X;BjjY;C)  ;
as well as
H(Y;C) H(Y;C)  (E[W (Y;C)]  E[W (Y;C)]) = DH(Y;CjjY;C)  0:
Together they yield
E[W (X;B) W (Y;C)]
= E[W (X;B) W (Y;C)]  E[W (Y;C) W (Y;C)]
= H(Y;C) H(X;B) DH(X;B k Y;C)  (H(Y;C) H(Y;C) DH(Y;C k Y;C))
 H(Y;C) H(X;B)  
 :
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A consequence of Lemma 4.45 and 4.46 is the following meta characterization:
Informal Theorem 4.47 (Meta characterization theorem). Let n be a security parameter,
 = (n), ` = `(n), and (X;B) = (X;B)(n) be a joint distribution on f0; 1gnf0; 1g`. For
all “suﬃciently nice” H, the following are equivalent:
1. There exists a joint distribution (X;C) where (X;C) and (X;B) are indistinguishable
by poly-sized circuits, and H(CjX)  H(BjX) +    1/n!(1);
2. For all poly-sized circuits that “represent” a joint distribution (X;C), we have
DH(X;B k X;C) >    1/n!(1).
We now outline how we would obtain an actual proof for such a theorem for a given
H. We instantiate this approach for H being Shannon entropy in Section 4.3.4 below.
 Suppose that Item 1 of the meta theorem is false, i.e. for some constant c > 0, for
every C where H(CjX)  H(BjX)+ 1/nc there is a poly-sized (1/nc)-distinguisher
between (X;B) and (X;C). By the Nonuniform Min-Max Theorem (Chapter 2 The-
orem 2.3), there is a poly-sized circuit W  that (1/nc)-distinguishes (X;B) from all
(X;C) where H(CjX)  H(BjX) +    1/nc. We assume H is “suﬃciently nice” so
that for some constant   0, there exists a joint distribution (X;C) satisfying
8x; a; @H(C
jX=x)
@ Pr[C = ajX = x] =   W
(x; a)
and H(CjX)  H(BjX)+   1/nc, and can be “represented” by a poly-sized circuit
(which is often true, since W  is a poly-sized circuit). Now Lemma 4.45 implies that
DH(X;B k X;C)     1/nc, and we conclude that Item 2 of the meta theorem is
false.
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 Suppose that Item 2 of the meta theorem is false, i.e. for some constant c > 0 and
some (X;C) that can be “represented” by a poly-sized circuit, DH(X;B k X;C) 
  1/nc. Assuming H is “suﬃciently nice” so that (i) the W  deﬁned in Lemma 4.46
can be (approximately) computed by poly-sized circuit, and (ii) jW (x; a)j  poly(n),
then W  gives rise to a universal distinguisher between (X;B) and (X;C) for all
(X;C) where H(CjX)  H(BjX) +    1/nc, by Lemma 4.46. This concludes that
Item 1 is false.
4.3.4 KL-hardness Implies Pseudoentropy, Nonuniform Setting
In this section, we prove one (the more interesting) direction of the characterization of
nonuniform pseudoentropy (Theorem 4.38).
Consider the distribution (X;C) in Lemma 4.44 with H = Hsh. Given a function
W : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! R0, it is easy to verify that the hypothesis of Lemma 4.44 is
satisﬁed by (X;C) deﬁned as
C(ajx) = e
W (x;a)P
b e
W (x;b)
:
We denote such (X;C) by (X; eW ).
Proposition 4.48. Let W : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! R0. Then
8x; a; @H(e
W jX=x)
@ Pr[eW = ajX = x] =  W (x; a):
Remark. (X; eW ) is a conditional version of the Boltzmann distribution (or Gibbs distri-
bution; canonical ensemble) in statistical physics [LL], which is the unique distribution that
achieves maximum entropy under a linear constraint on the pmf. We consider the con-
ditional Boltzmann distribution in our context for a similar reason: for any distinguisher
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W , (X;C) = (X; ekW ) (k  0) minimizes E[W (X;B)]   E[W (X;C)] among all C with
Hsh(CjX)  r = Hsh(ekW jX). (The unconditional version is well known in statistical
physics [LL].)
We apply Lemma 4.45 to show the following result about (X; eW ), which captures the
essence of why KL-hardness implies pseudoentropy:
Lemma 4.49. Let (X;B) be any joint distribution on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`,  > 0, and 0 <
  ` Hsh(BjX). Let W : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! [0; 1] be a function such that E[W (X;B)] 
E[W (X;C)]   for all `-bit random strings C jointly distributed with X with Hsh(CjX) 
Hsh(BjX) + . Then there exists k 2 [0; `/] such that KL(X;B k X; ekW )  .
Proof. Let k0 = `/. First we show that there exists k 2 [0; k0] such that Hsh(ekW jX) =
Hsh(BjX) + . By Lemma 4.44 and Proposition 4.48,
E[W (X;B)]  E[W (X; ek0W )] = Hsh(e
k0W jX) Hsh(BjX) KL(X;B k X; ek0W )
k0
<
`
k0
= ;
where we use nonnegativity of Hsh and Bregman divergence. Thus, by assumption we must
have Hsh(ek0W jX) < Hsh(BjX) + . Now note that (i) Hsh(e0W jX)  Hsh(BjX) +  since
e0W is simply the uniform distribution; (ii) Hsh(ek0W jX) < Hsh(BjX)+; (iii) Hsh(ekW jX)
is continuous as a function of k 2 [0;+1). By the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists
k 2 [0; k0] such that Hsh(ekW jX) = Hsh(BjX) + .
The result now follows from Lemma 4.45 and Proposition 4.48.
Theorem 4.50 (KL-hardness =) pseudoentropy, nonuniform setting). Let (X;B) be a
joint distribution on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`,  > 0. If B is nonuniformly (t; ) KL-hard given X,
then for every  > 0, B has nonuniform (t0; ) pseudoentropy at least Hsh(BjX)+   given
X for t0 = t
(1)/poly (n; 1/; `).
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Proof. Suppose for contradiction that B does not have nonuniform (t0; ) conditional pseu-
doentropy at least Hsh(BjX) +    . By deﬁnition, for any `-bit random string C jointly
distributed with X where Hsh(CjX)  Hsh(BjX) +    , there is a size t0 deterministic
circuit W such that E[W (X;B)]  E[W (X;C))]  .
Consider the two-player zero-sum game where Player 1 selects some joint distribution
(X;C) on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` where Hsh(CjX)  Hsh(BjX) +    , Player 2 selects some
deterministic circuit W : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! f0; 1g of size t0, and receives expected payoﬀ
E[W (X;B)]   E[W (X;C)]. Note that by concavity of Hsh, any mixed strategy for Player
1 is still some joint distribution (X;C) with Hsh(CjX)  Hsh(BjX) +    . Since for all
Player 1 mixed strategies (X;C) there exists a Player 2 strategy W with expected payoﬀ
at least , by the Nonuniform Min-Max Theorem (Theorem 2.3) there is some size O(S  t0)
randomized circuit W , for S = O(`/2), such that
E[W (X;B)]  E[W (X;C)]  :9
for all (X;C) with Hsh(CjX)  Hsh(BjX)+ . By Lemma 4.49, there exists k 2 [0; O(`/)]
such that KL(X;BjjX; ekW )   . In other words, P (x; a) = exp(k W (x; a)) is a ( )-
KL-predictor. Thus it remains to show that P (x; a) = exp(k W (x; a)) can be computed
eﬃciently (within small error).
Eﬃciency. We approximate k by some rational ~k to (/c) precision for a suﬃciently
large constant c, so that 8x, a,
~k W (x; a)  k W (x; a)  /c. Since ~k  W (x; a)
is rational valued, we can use Newton’s method to construct a circuit P approximating
exp(~k W (x; a)). This can be done in such a way that
KL (X;BjjX;P )  KL(X;BjjX; ekW ) +   
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and P has circuit size t = poly (t0; n; 1/; `). See Lemma A.6 for details. This contradicts
the hypothesis that B is nonuniformly (t; ) KL-hard given X.
4.3.5 KL-hardness Implies Pseudoentropy, Uniform Setting
To prove the uniform complexity version of Theorem 4.50, we replace the use of the
Nonuniform Min-Max Theorem in the proof of Theorem 4.50 with the Uniform Min-Max
Theorem – Average Case (Chapter 2, Theorem 2.5).
Notation. We denote by Vr(X) the set of all joint distributions (X;C) on f0; 1gnf0; 1g`
(where C may vary and X is ﬁxed) such that Hsh(CjX)  r.
To implement Chapter 2, Algorithm 2.2 (Finding Universal Strategy – Average Case),
we need to compute -approximate KL projections on the conditional entropy ball Vr(X).
4.3.5.1 Approximating KL Projection on High Conditional Entropy Distribu-
tions
In this section we describe how to eﬃciently ﬁnd (X;C) as a -approximate KL pro-
jection of (X;C 0) on Vr(X). We ﬁrst describe in Lemma 4.51 the exact KL projection
of the joint distribution (X;C) on a conditional entropy ball Vr(X), then show how to
approximate it.
By deﬁnition of KL projection we need to ﬁnd some (X;C 0) 2 Vr(X) minimizing
KL(X;C 0 k X;C). Recall that for a function W : f0; 1gnf0; 1g` ! R0, k 2 R, we denote
by ekW the distribution jointly distributed with X such that:
ekW (ajx) = e
kW (x;a)P
b e
kW (x;b)
:
Now, if we write (X;C) as (X; eW ) for a function W : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! R0, then by
Lemma 4.44 and Proposition 4.48 we can minimize KL(X;C 0 k X; eW ) by maximizing
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E[W (X;C 0)] E[W (X; eW )], assuming that the entropy diﬀerence is ﬁxed. This is the idea
of Lemma 4.51 below.
Lemma 4.51 (KL projection on a conditional entropy ball Vr(X)). Let (X;C) be a joint
distribution on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` such that Pr[C = bjX = x] > 0 for all x, b. Deﬁne
W (x; a) = log Pr[C = ajX = x]minb fPr[C = bjX = x]g
so that (X;C) = (X; eW ). Then for every r  `, the KL projection of (X;C) on Vr(X)
equals (X; eW ) for some  2 (0; 1] such that Hsh(eW jX)  r. (In fact Hsh(eW jX) = r
as long as (X;C) /2 Vr(X)).
Proof. First, if (X;C) 2 Vr(X) then the KL projection is (X;C) = (X; eW ) itself, i.e.  = 1.
To ﬁnd the KL projection for (X;C) /2 Vr(X), we ﬁrst note there exists  2 (0; 1)
such that Hsh(eW jX) = r (by the Intermediate Value Theorem, because Hsh(eW jX) < r,
Hsh(e0W jX) = `  r and Hsh(ekW jX) is continuous as a function of k 2 (0; 1)). By
deﬁnition of KL projection, we want to minimize KL(X;C 0jjX; eW ) over all C 0 where
Hsh(C 0jX) = r (as KL projection is always on the boundary of Vr(X); see Lemma A.4).
Now by Lemma 4.44 and Proposition 4.48,
KL(X;C 0jjX; eW ) = Hsh(eW jX) Hsh(C 0jX) 
 
E[W (X;C 0)]  EW (X; eW )]

:
So minimizing KL(X;C 0jjX; eW ) is equivalent to maximizing E[W (X;C 0)]  EW (X; eW )],
and the result follows from 4.44.
Lemma 4.52 (Approximating KL projection on a conditional entropy ball Vr(X)). There
exists a poly(; n; 2`; 1/; log(1/)) time randomized algorithm  such that given oracle
access to a function W : f0; 1gnf0; 1g` ! [0; ] and OX , for all  > 0 and 0  r  `  ,
W;OX (r; ) outputs w.p. 1   some  2 (0; 1] such that (X; eW ) is a -approximate KL
projection of (X; eW ) on Vr(X), and  has bit length log(/) + log `+O(1).
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Proof. Our algorithm  works as follows.  computes an estimate E 2 [Hsh(eW jX)/6]
for every discrete  ranging from 0 to 1 in steps of /(c`) for some suﬃciently large constant
c. This can be done in time poly(; n; 2`; 1/; log(1/)), and w.p. 1  after a union bound
over all c`/ values of ; see Lemma A.6 for details.  then outputs any discrete  (as a
multiple of /(c`)) satisfying E 2 [r+/6; r+5/6], and outputs 1 if no such  is found.
We now argue the correctness in two cases.
Case 1: No discrete  satisﬁes E 2 [r+ /6; r+5/6]. We show that this happens only
when
 
X; eW
 2 Vr(X) i.e. the KL projection is itself, thus  is correct in outputting 1.
Indeed, suppose that
 
X; eW

/2 Vr(X). One can check that any /(c`) variation in 
causes at most /3 variation in Hsh(eW jX) (Lemma A.7). Since Hsh(e0W jX) = `  r + 
and Hsh(e1W jX) < r, a discrete Intermediate Value Theorem says there exists a discrete
 2 [0; 1] with Hsh(eW jX) 2 [r + /3; r + 2/3]. In other words there exists  satisfying
E 2 [r + /6; r + 5/6].
Case 2: There exists some  satisfying E 2 [r + /6; r + 5/6]. Consider any such .
Closeness of E to both r and Hsh(eW jX) guarantees that
r  Hsh(eW jX)  r + :
Thus (X; eW ) 2 Vr(X). Recall from Lemma 4.51 that the exact KL projection of (X; eW )
on Vr(X) equals (X; eW ) where  = 1 if (X; eW ) 2 Vr(X), or 0 <  < 1 and Hsh(eW ) = r
if (X; eW ) /2 Vr(X). We need to show that (X; eW ) is a -approximate KL projection. By
Pythagorean Theorem (Theorem 1.13) it suﬃces to show that for all (X;C) 2 Vr(X),
KL(X;CjjX; eW ) KL(X;CjjX; eW )  :
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By Lemma 4.44,
KL(X;CjjX; eW ) KL(X;CjjX; eW )
= Hsh(eW jX) Hsh(eW jX)
  

E[W (X;C)]  E[W (X; eW )]

+ 
 
E[W (X;C)]  E[W (X; eW )]

 (r + )  r   

E[W (X;C)]  E[W (X; eW )]

+ 
 
E[W (X;C)]  E[W (X; eW )]

=  + (  )E [W (X;C)] +   E[W (X; eW )]    E W (X; eW ) :
Note that   , because either  = 1   (when (X; eW ) 2 Vr(X)), or Hsh(eW jX) = r 
Hsh(eW jX) (when (X; eW ) /2 Vr(X)) and it follows from monotonicity of Hsh(ekW jX) as a
function of k in [0;+1) (Lemma A.5). Thus by Item 2 of Lemma 4.44, (  )E [W (X;C)] 
(  )E W (X; eW ), and the above inequality becomes
KL(X;CjjX; eW ) KL(X;CjjX; eW )   + 

E
h
W (X; eW )
i
  E W (X; eW ) :
Now applying Lemma 4.44 again yields


E[W (X; eW )]  E[W (X; eW )]

= Hsh(eW jX) Hsh(eW jX) KL(X; eW jjX; eW )
 Hsh(eW jX) Hsh(eW jX)  0;
where we used nonnegativity of KL divergence. Therefore
KL(X;CjjX; eW ) KL(X;CjjX; eW )  :
4.3.5.2 Putting it Together
We now have all the tools ready to prove Theorem 4.41 (KL hardness implies pseu-
doentropy, uniform setting). We just will replace the use of the Min-Max Theorem in the
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proof of Theorem 4.50 with the Uniform Min-Max Theorem for distinguishers (Chapter 2,
Theorem 2.5), using Lemma 4.52 to implement the approximate KL projection. However,
notice that Hsh(BjX) hence the “radius” of the conditional entropy ball Vr(X) is unknown.
We will simply try all radii (with quantization) and pick the distinguisher that results in
the best KL predictor, which can be tested by sampling (X;B).
Theorem 4.53 (KL-hardness =) pseudoentropy, uniform setting). Let n be a security
parameter,  = (n) > 0, t = t(n) 2 N,  = (n) > 0, ` = `(n) all computable in time
poly(n). Let (X;B) be a joint distribution on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`. If B is uniformly (t; )
KL-hard given X, then B has uniform (t0; ) pseudoentropy at least Hsh(BjX) +    given
X, for t0 = t
(1)/poly(n; 2`; 1/).
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that B does not have uniform (t0; ) conditional pseudoen-
tropy at least Hsh(BjX)+ . By deﬁnition, there is a time t0 randomized oracle algorithm
A such that for inﬁnitely many n and every C with Hsh(CjX)  Hsh(BjX)+   , AOX;B;C
is an -distinguisher between (X;B) and (X;C).
Recall that in the nonuniform setting (Theorem 4.50), we begin by obtaining a univer-
sal distinguisher W  using the Nonuniform Min-Max Theorem. Similarly, in the uniform
setting, we ﬁrst obtain a universal distinguisher uniformly using the Uniform Min-Max
Theorem – Average Case (Chapter 2, Theorem 2.5), as captured in the following claim:
Claim 4.54. There is a randomized oracle algorithm  that, for any r  Hsh(BjX) +   
/2, OX;B (r; n; `; t0; ; ) w.p. at least 1    outputs some deterministic circuit W r of size
poly(t0; n; `; 1/; log(1/)) such that for all (X;C) 2 Vr(X),
E[W r (X;B)]  E[W r (X;C)]  :9:
Moreover,  runs in time poly(t0; n; 2`; 1/; log(1/)).
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Note that given Claim 4.54, the theorem almost follows by the same argument in the
nonuniform setting (Theorem 4.50), by running OX;B (r; n; `; t0; ; ) to obtain the desired
universal distinguisher W , with r = Hsh(BjX) +    /2 and appropriate settings of .
However, in general Hsh(BjX) +     is unknown (as Hsh(BjX) may not be uniformly
eﬃciently computable). To overcome this, we need to search for an appropriate value of r,
which we settle after proving the claim.
Proof of Claim 4.54. Consider the two-player zero-sum game where Player 1 chooses some
joint distribution (X;C) 2 Vr(X), and Player 2 chooses a poly(t0; n; `; 1/; log(1/)) sized
circuit W , with expected payoﬀ E[f((X;C);W )] = E[W (X;B)]   E[W (X;C)] for Player
2. We will apply Theorem 2.5 (Uniform Min-Max Theorem – Average Case) to this game,
i.e. with
 V = Vr(X);
 W = f(deterministic) circuits of size poly(t0; n; `; 1/; log(1/))g;
 f((x; a);W ) = E[W (X;B)] W (x; a).
We let the algorithm  be an instantiation of Chapter 2, Algorithm 2.2 (Finding Universal
Strategy – Average Case) that we describe below for the game, with KL projection on the
set V = Vr(X). Then  outputs the deterministic circuit W r that computes the average
of W (1); : : : ;W (S). Using the oracle algorithm A(), we will show that in our instantiation
of Algorithm 2.2, in each iteration we can obtain some W (i) that distinguishes (X;B) and
(X;C). Thus, by the Uniform Min-Max Theorem – Average Case, W r is indeed a universal
distinguisher as desired.
Our instantiation of Algorithm 2.1 starts with an initial distribution (X;C(1)) where
C(1) is uniform on f0; 1g` and independent of X. Let 0 = /c for a suﬃciently large constant
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c. The number of iterations is S = O(`/02), and we let 0 = /2S. In each iteration we
represent the joint distribution (X;C(i)) by a circuit Wi : f0; 1gnf0; 1g` ! R0 such that
(X;C(i)) = (X; eWi). So we can take W1(x; a) = 0 for all x, a. We show how to implement
each of the S iterations of Algorithm 2.2 eﬃciently:
1. Obtaining Player 2’s Response W (i): Suppose that we have constructed a ti-size
deterministic circuit Wi : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! [0; i]. There are three steps:
(a) Obtain a deterministic boolean circuit M (i) such that (X;M(i)) approximates
(X;C(i)) = (X; eWi) in the following sense: (i) H(M(i) jX)  Hsh(C(i)jX)   0;
(ii) For every function W 0 : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! [0; 1],
E[W 0(X;B)]  E[W 0(X;C(i))]
 E[W 0(X;B)]  E[W 0(X;M(i))]  0:
This can be done in time poly(t0; ti; n; `; i; log(1/0)) using Newton’s method;
see Lemma A.6 for details.
(b) Generate m = O(log(1/0)/02) random samples of (X;B;M(i))t
0 and Ut0 (note
that M(i) is samplable using the circuit M (i)). This can be done in time
poly(t0; ti; n; 2`; 1/0; log(1/0)).
(c) Finally, let W (i) be the deterministic circuit that on input (x; a), runs A()(x; a)
for m times and returns the average of the m outputs. Each time, A()(x; a) is
run using one copy of (X;B;M(i))t
0 to answer oracle queries of A, and one copy
of Ut0 as coin tosses of A. The m random samples are hardwired in W (i), thus
W (i) is of size t00 = O(t0 m  (n + `)), which does not depend on the size of Wi
(but the size ofWi+1 will additively depend on t00). By a Chernoﬀ bound, w.p. at
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least 1  0,
E[W (i)(X;B)]  E[W (i)(X;M(i))]
 E[AOX;B;M(i) (X;B)]  E[AOX;B;M(i) (X;M(i))]  0:
2. Weight Update: Note that (X;C(i)0) = (X; eWi+0W (i)), which is simply the con-
sequence of multiplicative weight update. We represent C(i)0 by the function W 0i =
Wi + 
0 W (i).
3. KL Projection: We use Lemma 4.52 to eﬃciently obtain an 02-approximate KL
projection (X;C(i+1)) = (X; eWi+1) of (X;C(i)0) = (X; eW 0i ) on Vr(X), where Wi+1 =
i+1 W 0i for some i+1 2 (0; 1] of bit length O(log(`i/0)). This can be done in time
poly(i; t0i; n; 2`; 1/0; log(1/0)) and w.p. at least 1   0, where t0i is the size of W 0i .
Note that Wi+1 is a [0; i+1]-valued function with i+1 = i + 0.
At last,  outputs the deterministic circuitW r that computes the average ofW (1); : : : ;W (S).
We argue that  runs in time poly(t0; n; 2`; 1/; log(1/)) and outputs a circuit W r of
size poly(t0; n; `; 1/; log(1/)). Note that the way Weight Update and KL Projection are
done guarantees that W 0i and Wi+1 are always linear combinations of W (1); : : : ;W (i), with
coeﬃcients 1 : : : j0 for some 0  j  i. Moreover, W (1); : : : ;W (i) have logm output bits
(as the average of m boolean values), and each i (i  S) is of bit length O(log(`i/0)) 
O(log(`i)) (as i = (i  1)0). Thus, one can easily verify that Wi+1 has circuit size ti+1 
poly(S log(`S); logm)+S t00 = poly(t0; n; `; 1/0; log(1/0)), and the same bound holds for t0i.
The total running time follows by plugging in ti+1 and t0i in the running time of each step.
Since W r computes the average of W (1); : : : ;W (S) it has size poly(t0; n; `; 1/; log(1/)).
Now, suppose all S iterations complete successfully, which happens w.p. at least 1  
20S = 1  , by a union bound. Since
H(M(i) jX)  Hsh(C(i)jX)  0  (Hsh(BjX) +    /2)  0  Hsh(BjX) +    ;
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the property of the distinguisher A guarantees that
E[W (i)(X;B)]  E[W (i)(X;C(i))]  E[W (i)(X;B)]  E[W (i)(X;M(i))]  0
 E[AOX;B;M(i) (X;B)]  E[AOX;B;M(i) (X;M(i))]  20
   20:
Hence by the Uniform Min-Max Theorem – Average Case (Theorem 2.5), for all Player 1
strategies (X;C) 2 Vr(X),
E[W r (X;B)]  E[W r (X;C)]    20  O(0)  :9:
Given the algorithm  in Claim 4.54, we claim that the following time t randomized
oracle algorithm P violates the hypothesis that B is uniformly (t; ) KL-hard given X. We
let  > 0 be an error parameter to be ﬁxed later, and c be a suﬃciently large constant.
INPUT: (x; a) 2 f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`
ORACLE: OX;B
for r  0 to ` in steps of /c do
W r  OX;B (r; n; `; t0; ; )
for k  0 to `/ in steps of /c do
Er;k  an estimate of KL(X;BjjX; ekW r ) +Hsh(BjX) within /c error
(estimated using oracle OX;B)
end
end
Let r; k minimize Er;k
Let p(x; a) 2 [0; 1] be an approximation of exp(k W r(x; a))/(2`  exp(k))
return p(x; a)
Algorithm 4.1: The oracle algorithm P
121
Chapter 4: Characterizations of Computational Entropies
To prove correctness, ﬁrst we claim that w.p. at least 1   , in some iteration the
variables r and k must satisfy
KL(X;BjjX; ekW r )     /3 + /c: (?)
Indeed, consider an iteration where r 2 [Hsh(BjX) +   /2;Hsh(BjX) +   /3]. Suppose
that E[W r (X;B)]  E[W r (X;C)]  :9 for all C satisfying
Hsh(CjX)  Hsh(BjX) +    /3  r:
This happens w.p. at least 1   by Claim 4.54 above. Recall that Lemma 4.49 says there
exists k0 2 [0; `/] such that KL(X;BjjX; ek0W r )   /3. Now consider any inner iteration
where k 2 [k0  /c; k0]. Note that an /c diﬀerence between k and k0 can introduce at most
/c diﬀerence in KL(X;BjjX; eW r ) (see Lemma A.7 for details), thus we conclude
KL(X;BjjX; ekW r )  KL(X;BjjX; ek0W r ) + /c     /3 + /c:
It turns out that by sampling, for every pair of r and k, we can compute an estimate
Er;k of KL(X;BjjX; ekW r ) + Hsh(BjX) within /c error w.p. at least 1   /2, in time
poly
 
t0; n; 1/; 2`; log(1/)

; see Lemma A.6 for details. Thus, it follows from (?) that w.p.
at least 1  2, the pair r and k that minimize Er;k must satisfy
KL(X;BjjX; ekW r )     /3 + /c+ 2/c: (??)
Finally, once k and W r are determined, the algorithm computes a (deterministic)
approximation p(x; a) 2 [1; exp(k)] of exp(k  W r(x; a)). To make P [0; 1]-valued (as
required in the deﬁnition of KL-predictor), we normalize p(x; a) to [0; 1] in the ﬁnal step.
Using Newton’s method (see Lemma A.6 for details), such p(x; a) can be computed in time
t = poly
 
t0; n; 1/; 2`

such that for the function p : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! [0; 1],
KL (X;BjjX;p)  KL(X;BjjX; ekW r ) + /c: (? ? ?)
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We view POX;B as a distribution on KL predictors p : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! [0; 1], where
the randomness comes from k and W r (which in turn are generated from coins of P and
OX;B). By deﬁnition of KL-hardness, we need to show
E
pPOX;B
[KL(X;BjjX;p)]  :
We know from (??) and (? ? ?) that w.p. at least 1  2 over p  POX;B ,
KL (X;BjjX;p)  KL(X;BjjX; ekW r ) + /c     /3 + 4/c     /4:
Meanwhile for every p : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! [0; 1],
KL(X;BjjX;p) = E
"X
a
B(ajX) log (B(ajX)/p(ajX))
#
 max
x;a
log (1/p(ajx)) = O(`+ 1/):
Thus
E
pPOX;B
[KL(X;BjjX;p)]  (1  2)  (   /4) + (2) O(`+ 1/)  
for an appropriate choice of  = 
(/(`+ 1/)), completing the proof.
4.3.6 Pseudoentropy Implies KL-hardness
We apply Theorem 4.46 to show that pseudoentropy implies KL-hardness. In fact, we
show that even a weak form of pseudoentropy suﬃces:
Deﬁnition 4.55 (Weak conditional pseudoentropy, nonuniform setting). Let (X;B) be a
joint distribution. We say B has (T; ) weak nonuniform (conditional) pseudoentropy at
least k given X if there exists a joint distribution (Y;C) such that the following holds:
 Hsh(CjY ) +Hsh(Y ) Hsh(X)  k. In particular, Hsh(CjY )  k if Hsh(Y ) = Hsh(X);
 (X;B) and (Y;C) are -indistinguishable by all size T circuits.
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If (X;B) = (X;B)(n) for a security parameter n, we say B has weak nonuniform (condi-
tional) pseudoentropy at least k = k(n) given X if for every constant c, B has (nc; 1/nc)
weak nonuniform (conditional) pseudoentropy at least k(n) 1/nc givenX for all suﬃciently
large n.
In the uniform setting, it suﬃces to assume an even weaker form of pseudoentropy,
where we only require indistinguishability against distinguishers given oracle access to OX;B
but not OX;B;C :
Deﬁnition 4.56 (Weak conditional pseudoentropy, uniform setting). Let n be a security
parameter, T = T (n),  = (n), k = k(n), ` = `(n). Let (X;B) = (X;B)(n) be a
joint distribution on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`. We say B has (T; ) weak uniform (conditional)
pseudoentropy at least k given X if for every randomized oracle algorithm A computable
in time T , there is joint distribution (Y;C) such that the following holds for all suﬃciently
large n:
 Hsh(CjY ) +Hsh(Y ) Hsh(X)  k. In particular, Hsh(CjY )  k if Hsh(Y ) = Hsh(X);
 (X;B) and (Y;C) are -indistinguishable by AOX;B :
jPr[AOX;B (X;B) = 1]  Pr[AOX;B (Y;C) = 1]j < :
We say B has weak uniform (conditional) pseudoentropy at least k = k(n) given X if
for every constant c, B has (nc; 1/nc) weak uniform (conditional) pseudoentropy at least
k(n)  1/nc given X. Note that in this “polynomial” version, OX;B is redundant if (X;B)
is polynomial-time samplable.
Theorem 4.57 (Weak pseudoentropy =) KL-hardness, nonuniform and uniform settings).
Let n be a security parameter,  = (n) > 0, t = t(n) 2 N,  = (n) > 0, ` = `(n),  = (n)
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all computable in time poly(n). Let (X;B) be a joint distribution on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`. If
B has weak (non)uniform (t; ) pseudoentropy at least Hsh(BjX) +  given X, then B is
(non)uniformly (t0; 0) KL-hard given X, for t0 = minft
(1)/poly(n; log(1/));
(/)g and
0 =    .
Proof. We ﬁrst give a proof for the nonuniform setting. The proof for the uniform setting
will follow naturally.
Suppose for contradiction that B is not nonuniformly (t0;    ) KL-hard. Then there
is size t0 circuit P : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! [0; 1] such that KL(X;B k X;P )     . We
assume w.l.o.g. that P (x; a) 6= 0 (otherwise, the bounded KL divergence implies (x; a) /2
supp(X;B), i.e. we can set P (x; a) to nonzero without aﬀecting anything).
We ﬁrst show that the function
W (x; a) =
logP (x; a)
t0
+ 1
satisﬁes E[W (X;B)]  E[W (Y;C)]   for every joint distribution (Y;C) with Hsh(CjY ) +
Hsh(Y ) Hsh(X)  Hsh(BjX) +  i.e. Hsh(Y;C)  Hsh(X;B) + . Note that W is indeed a
[0; 1]-valued function, because 2 t0  P (x; a)  1.
Consider the function W  deﬁned as
W (x; a) =   @Hsh(P jX=x)
@ Pr[P = ajX = x]
= log P (x; a)P
b P (x; b)
+ log e
= t0 W (x; a)  t0 + log e  log
X
b
P (x; b):
Since KL(X;B k X;P )     , Lemma 4.46 (whose hypothesis is satisﬁed by W )
implies that for every joint distribution (Y;C) with Hsh(Y;C)  Hsh(X;B) + , we have
E[W (X;B)]  E[W (Y;C)]  . Thus
E[W (X;B)]  E[W (Y;C)] = E[W
(X;B)]  E[W (Y;C)]
t0
 
t0
:
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Thus it remains to show that we can approximate W by a size t circuit. Let fW be
an approximation to W where logP (x; a) is computed to precision . Since P (x; a) is
represented as a rational p1/p2 where p1; p2  2t0 , the logarithm can be approximated to
that precision in time poly(t0; log(1/)). Thus fW has circuit size poly(t0; log(1/))  t.
Moreover, for all (Y;C) with Hsh(Y;C)  Hsh(X;B) + , we have
E[fW (X;B)]  E[fW (Y;C)]  E[W (X;B)]  E[W (Y;C)]  1
2t0
   
2t0
 ;
contradicting the weak pseudoentropy of B given X.
Proof for the uniform setting follows quite naturally. Suppose for contradiction that
we are given a t0-time randomized oracle algorithm P such that
E
pPOX;B
[KL(X;BjjX;p)]     
where POX;B is viewed as a distribution over functions p : f0; 1gnf0; 1g` ! [0; 1]. Implicit
in the nonuniform argument is an algorithm converting a -KL predictor to a universal
(   /2)/t0-distinguisher, for all . Thus, we let A be the time poly(n; t0; log(1/))  t
randomized oracle algorithm performing the above conversion from a -KL predictor to a
universal (  /2)/t0-distinguisher, replacing the circuit output P (x; a) with the output
of simulating POX;B on (x; a) (using random coin tosses and OX;B). Thus for every (Y;C)
with Hsh(Y;C)  Hsh(X;B) + ,
E

AOX;B (X;B)
  E AOX;B (Y;C)  E
pPOX;B

  KL(X;BjjX;p)  /2
t0

 
2t0
 ;
contradicting the weak pseudoentropy of B given X.
Since Theorem 4.57 only requires weak conditional pseudoentropy, we obtain the fol-
lowing equivalence:
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Corollary 4.58. Let n be a security parameter, let  = (n) > 0, and ` = `(n) = O(logn)
be computable in time poly(n). Let (X;B) be a joint distribution on f0; 1gnf0; 1g`. Then
the following are equivalent:
1. B is (non)uniformly  KL-hard given X;
2. B has (non)uniform pseudoentropy at least Hsh(BjX) +  given X;
3. B has weak (non)uniform pseudoentropy at least Hsh(BjX) +  given X.
Proof. 1 =) 2 by Theorem 4.50 and 4.53. 2 =) 3 by deﬁnition. 3 =) 1 by Theorem
4.57.
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Chapter 5
Constructing Pseudorandom
Generators from One-Way
Functions
A centerpiece of the foundations of cryptography and pseudorandomness theory is the
Håstad, Impagliazzo, Levin, and Luby [HILL] result that that pseudorandom generators
can be constructed from arbitrary one-way functions. In this chapter, we simplify and
improve the construction of pseudorandom generators from one-way functions, building on
the previous state-of-the-art construction of Haitner, Reingold, and Vadhan [HRV].
The simpliﬁed construction uses our characterization of conditional pseudoentropy from
Chapter 4 to obtain next-bit pseudoentropy from arbitrary one-way functions, proving a
conjecture of [HRV]. In particular, the construction only performs hashing once, and only
needs the hash functions that are randomness extractors (e.g. universal hash functions)
rather than needing them to support “local list-decoding” (as in the Goldreich-Levin hard-
core predicate [GL]). With an additional idea, we also show how to improve the eﬃciency
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of the Haitner, Reingold, and Vadhan construction, reducing the seed length of the pseudo-
random generator to ~O(n3) from ~O(n4) (which was already a signiﬁcant improvement over
Håstad et al.).
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Pseudorandom Generators and One-Way Functions
We begin with the deﬁnition of pseudorandom generators. A pseudorandom generator
is an eﬃcient deterministic algorithm G that stretches a short random string to a longer
string that looks random:
Deﬁnition 5.1 (Pseudorandom generator (PRG) [BM, Yao2], informal). A polynomial-
time computable function G : f0; 1gd ! f0; 1g`, d < `, is a pseudorandom generator if
G(Ud) is computationally indistinguishable from U`.
This is a very strong deﬁnition of pseudorandom generators as it guarantees security
(indistinguishability) against all eﬃcient adversaries (distinguishers), even those that run in
time greater than the time needed to compute the pseudorandom generator G itself (which is
a ﬁxed polynomial). Such kinds of pseudorandom generators are sometimes known as cryp-
tographic pseudorandom generators (to distinguish from other kinds of pseudodorandom
generators, used for derandomization), as they allow numerous other cryptographic prim-
itives to be constructed, such as private-key cryptography [GGM, LR], bit-commitment
schemes [Nao1], zero-knowledge proofs for NP [GMW], and identication schemes [FFS].
They are also the key assumptions for many complexity theoretic results, for example,
hardness results in learning [Val] and the natural proofs barrier for circuit lower bounds
[RR].
All of these applications beg the question whether pseudorandom generators exist at
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all. However, it can be easily seen that pseudorandom generators imply P 6= NP; thus
we do not expect to unconditionally establish their existence but rather hope to do so
based on computational assumptions. Unfortunately, it seems out of reach to base their
existence on complexity-theoretic statements such as P 6= NP. Nonetheless, it turns out
that pseudorandom generators can be based on the very plausible assumptions of functions
that are easy to compute but hard to invert:
Deﬁnition 5.2 (One-way function, informal). A polynomial-time computable function
f : f0; 1g ! f0; 1g is one-way if no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A satisﬁes
Pryf(Un)[f(A(y)) = y]  n O(1).
One-way functions are essential for complexity-based cryptography to exist and often
considered the minimal cryptographic primitive, as all the cryptographic primitives we
mentioned (and others) imply the existence of one-way functions, often via simple reductions
[IL, IR]. In contrast to pseudorandomness, one-wayness is a much more “unstructured”
property where hardness can be distributed arbitrarily across the n input bits. Nonetheless,
Håstad, Impagliazzo, Levin, and Luby [HILL] showed that pseudorandom generators can
be constructed from arbitrary one-way functions:
Theorem 5.3 (Håstad et al. [HILL]). The following are equivalent:
1. One-way functions exist;
2. Pseudorandom generators G : f0; 1gd ! f0; 1g` exist with ` = d+ 1;
3. For every constant c there exist pseudorandom generators with ` = dc.
The Håstad et al. paper is one of the centerpieces of the foundations of cryptography
and the theory of pseudorandomness. Not only does it tell us that all the cryptographic
primitives we mentioned are in fact equivalent, it also introduced concepts and techniques
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that now permeate the theory of pseudorandomness, such as pseudoentropy (see Chapter
4) and the Leftover Hash Lemma.
A drawback of the Håstad et al. construction, however, is that it is quite complicated.
While it utilizes elegant notions and ideas, the actual construction has to integrate them in
a rather ad hoc and indirect way (due to various technical issues). Moreover, the reduction
showing the correctness of the construction is much more complex in the uniform setting.
Aesthetic and pedagogical perspectives aside, the complexity of the construction also makes
it highly ineﬃcient. Speciﬁcally, the pseudorandom generator constructed from a one-way
function f : f0; 1gn ! f0; 1gn requires an input (known as the seed) length of d = O(n10),
unpractical even for very modest settings of parameters. (Håstad et al. also outlined a
construction of seed length O(n8), which was later formalized and proved in [Hol2]).
Progress has been made to simplify the construction and improve its eﬃciency. By
proving a Uniform Hardcore Theorem (cf. Chapter 3), Holenstein [Hol1, Hol2] substantially
simpliﬁed and modularized the proof in the uniform setting. Haitner, Harnik, and Reingold
[HHR2] reduced the seed length to O(n7). Holenstein [Hol2] generalized the Håstad et
al. result to base on one-way functions of any “hardness.” In particular, given a one-way
function that is secure again exponential time (2
(n)) adversaries, the seed length was
reduced to O(n4  !(logn)) (or O(n5) to obtain a PRG with exponential security), and
subsequently improved by Haitner, Harnik, and Reingold [HHR1] to O(n  !(logn)) (or
O(n2) to obtain a PRG with exponential security). All these constructions, however, still
retain the overall structure of the Håstad et al. construction based on pseudoentropy, and
thus retain some of the complex and ad hoc elements.
Recently, Haitner, Reingold, and Vadhan [HRV] provided a simpler and much more
eﬃcient construction, based on the more relaxed notion of conditional pseudoentropy (see
Chapter 4) as embedded in their notion of next-bit pseudoentropy. The new construction
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requires a much shorter seed length of ~O(n4). (If the one-way function is secure again
exponential time adversaries, then the seed length matches the [HHR1] result.)
5.1.2 From One-Way Functions to Next-Bit Pseudoentropy
The Haitner, Reingold, and Vadhan construction proceeds in two stages: ﬁrst, from
a one-way function construct a next-bit pseudoentropy generator, then convert next-bit
pseudoentropy to pseudorandomness. Next-bit pseudoentropy simply captures the total
conditional pseudoentropy (see Chapter 4) across all the bits:
Deﬁnition 5.4 (Next-block pseudoentropy [HRV], informal). A joint distribution (X1; : : : ; Xm)
has next-block pseudoentropy at least k iﬀ there exist a sequence of distributions Y1; : : : ; Ym,
jointly distributed with (X1; : : : ; Xm) such that:
1. (X1; : : : ; Xi 1; Xi) is computationally indistinguishable from (X1; : : : ; Xi 1; Yi), and
2. PiHsh(YijX1; : : : ; Xi 1)  k.
Equivalently, XI has pseudoentropy at least k/m given X1; : : : ; XI 1, where I is uni-
formly distributed in [m].
We say that a distribution X taking values in f0; 1gm has next-bit pseudoentropy at
least k iﬀ when we break X into 1-bit blocks, then X = (X1; : : : ; Xm) has next-block
pseudoentropy at least k.
Intuitively, next-bit pseudoentropy captures the pseudoentropy from the perspective of
an adversary who gets the bits one at a time (from left to right), instead of all at once. Thus,
the next-bit pseudoentropy of a distribution can be much larger than its pseudoentropy. For
example, if G : f0; 1gn ! f0; 1gm is a pseudorandom generator, then (G(Un); Un) has next-
bit pseudoentropy at least m > n, but does not have pseudoentropy larger than n.
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Haitner, Reingold, and Vadhan [HRV] showed that if f : f0; 1gn ! f0; 1gm is a one-
way function, X 2R f0; 1gn, and H : f0; 1gn ! f0; 1gn is a random hash function from an
appropriate family, then (f(X);H;H(X)) has next-bit pseudoentropy n+ r + logn; where
r is the number of random bits used to describe the hash function H. The intuition for
this is as follows: Condition on f(X) = y for some y 2 f0; 1gn. Given that f(X) = y, X is
uniformly distributed in a set of size jf 1(y)j. Thus, by the Leftover Hash Lemma [HILL],
the ﬁrst  log jf 1(y)j bits of H(X) are statistically close to uniform given the preﬁx
preceding them. In addition, it is still diﬃcult to invert f and predict X given these bits
(since a uniform random string can’t help in inverting). Thus, by the Goldreich–Levin
Theorem [GL], the next  logn bits of H(X) are computationally indistinguishable from
uniform given the preceding bits. Therefore the next-bit pseudoentropy of (f(X);H;H(X))
is at least
Hsh(f(X)) + r + E
y f(X)
[log jf 1(y)j] + logn
= Hsh(f(X)) + r +Hsh(Xjf(X)) + logn
= n+ r + logn:
Haitner, Reingold, and Vadhan [HRV] conjectured that the hashing in the above con-
struction is not necessary, and the hardness of inverting a one-way function directly provides
(next-bit) pseudoentropy. We prove their conjecture, using our characterization of uniform
conditional pseudoentropy from Chapter 4, Theorem 4.41:
Theorem 5.5 (One-way function =) next-bit pseudoentropy). If f : f0; 1gn ! f0; 1gm is
a one-way function and X 2R f0; 1gn, then (f(X); X) has next-bit pseudoentropy at least
n+ logn.
We will prove the theorem in the uniform security setting (where the adversaries for
one-way function and next-bit pseudoentropy are uniform algorithms), but the theorem
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holds also in the nonuniform setting (since it is proved via a uniform reduction converting
any adversary violating next-bit pseudoentropy to one violating the one-wayness of f).
The proof of this theorem starts by showing that the one-wayness of f implies that
for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, the KL divergence from (f(X); X) to
(f(X); A(f(X))) is at least logn; otherwise A would invert f with nonnegligible probabil-
ity. Then we show that the same holds also in a “next-bit” sense: if we break X into bits
X = X1   Xn and choose I 2R [n], then for every probabilistic polynomial-time S, the
KL divergence from (f(X); X1; : : : ; XI) to (f(X); X1; : : : ; XI 1; S(f(X); X1; : : : ; XI 1)) is
at least (logn)/n. (Otherwise by iteratively applying S n times, we can obtain a proba-
bilistic polynomial-time A such that (f(X); A(f(X))) has KL divergence at most logn from
(f(X); X).) By Chapter 4, Theorem 4.41, we deduce that XI has pseudoentropy at least
Hsh(XI jf(X); X1; : : : ; XI 1)+(logn)/n given f(X); X1; : : : ; XI 1. That is, on average, the
individual bits of X have (logn)/n extra bits of pseudoentropy (in addition to Shannon
entropy) given f(X) and the previous bits of X. Summing over all n bits of X, the next-bit
pseudoentropy is at least logn bits larger than the Shannon entropy of (f(X); X), which is
n.
5.1.3 From Next-Bit Pseudoentropy to Pseudorandomness
Given the next-bit pseudoentropy generator (f(X); X) 2 f0; 1gm+n of Theorem 5.5,
we can apply the construction of Haitner et al. [HRV] to obtain a pseudorandom generator
through the following three steps:
 Entropy Equalization: To spread the pseudoentropy out evenly among the bits, we
concatenate u = ~(n) independent random evaluations of (f(X); X), then drop the
ﬁrst I bits and the last m+n I bits of the u (n+m)-bit long result, for I 2R [m+n].
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 Converting Shannon Entropy to Min-Entropy and Amplifying the Gap:
Next, we take t = ~(n2) copies of the above next-bit pseudoentropy generator (after
entropy equalization), but concatenate them “vertically” to obtain blocks, each of
which consists of t bits. It can be shown that each of the blocks is indistinguishable
from having high min-entropy conditioned on the previous ones.
 Randomness Extraction: Finally, we use a single random universal hash function
to extract the pseudo-min-entropy from each of the blocks, and concatenate the results
to produce our output.
Thus, to obtain a pseudorandom generator from a one-way function f , we simply need to
evaluate f on u  t = ~O(n3) random inputs, arrange the input and output bits into a matrix
consisting of (u  1)  (m+ n) columns and t rows, and apply a universal hash function to
each column. (The seed of the pseudorandom generator consists of the u  t inputs to f ,
the t random shifts used for entropy equalization, and the description of the universal hash
function.) The construction is illustrated in Figure 5.1. Note that we only need to hash
once in the construction, and the only property we need of our hash function is randomness
extraction (e.g. via the Leftover Hash Lemma). In contrast, all previous constructions of
pseudorandom generators from one-way functions (even from one-way permutations) re-
quired hash functions with “local list-decoding” properties (e.g. the Goldreich–Levin hard-
core predicate) in addition to randomness extraction. As pointed out to us by Yuval Ishai,
an advantage of using only universal hash functions is that they can be implemented by
linear-size boolean circuits [IKOS], and thus we can obtain PRGs computable by circuits
of size linear in their stretch (from one-way functions that are computable by linear-size
circuits but exponentially hard to invert). Such PRGs have applications to “cryptography
with constant computational overhead” [IKOS].
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Figure 5.1: Simpliﬁed construction of PRG from one-way function f : f0; 1gn ! f0; 1gm.
Each row contains iid copies of (f(Un); Un), shifted by a random oﬀset I 2 [n + m]. To
extract pseudorandom bits, an arbitrary universal hash function H (with a proper output
length) is applied to all bits in the same column.
While simpler, the aforementioned construction achieves essentially the same parame-
ters as [HRV]. Using an additional idea, we show how to save a factor of roughly u = ~(n)
in the seed length. The idea is that to extract the randomness from a column of the afore-
mentioned matrix, we do not need to construct the entire matrix. We can use just enough
seed to ﬁll a single column, and then we can use randomness extracted from that column
to help generate more columns, and iterate. (This idea is independent of our simpliﬁca-
tions above, and can also be applied to the construction based on the [HRV] pseudoentropy
generator.) Thus we show:
Theorem 5.6 (One-way function =) pseudorandom generator, informal). Given a one-
way function f : f0; 1gn ! f0; 1gn, we can construct a pseudorandom generator G with seed
length ~O(n3).
This theorem improves the seed length of O(u  t  n) = ~O(n4) from Haitner, Reingold,
and Vadhan. This theorem generalizes to one-way functions of “any hardness,” and both the
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construction itself and the underlying security reduction are uniform (thus the construction
also works for nonuniform security settings). We note that Haitner, Reingold, and Vad-
han give a nonuniform construction of seed length ~O(n3), which requires poly(n) bits of
nonuniform advice to compute the pseudorandom generator. (They do so by avoid Entropy
Equalization, by nonuniformly hardwiring the amount of entropy contributed by each bit.)
Also, our construction still requires evaluating the one-way function at least u  t = ~(n3)
times; we just no longer need these evaluations to be independent. Finally, like Haitner,
Reingold, and Vadhan, the construction obtains (logn) bits of additive stretch per invo-
cation of the one-way function, which is optimal [GGKT].
With Theorem 5.6, now the only blow-up in seed length in constructing pseudorandom
generators from one-way functions is due to converting Shannon entropy to min-entropy.
On the ﬂip side, Holenstein and Sinha [HS] recently showed that any black-box construction
of pseudorandom generator from arbitrary one-way functions requires 
(n/ logn) calls to
the underlying one-way function. It is an intriguing open problem whether our seed length
blow-up of ~O(n2) and our complexity blow-up of ~O(n3) can be avoided, or shown to be
necessary by strengthening the Holenstein and Sinha lower bound.
5.2 Deﬁnitions
Deﬁnition 5.7 (One-way functions). A polynomial-time computable function f : f0; 1g !
f0; 1g is (T; ) one-way T = T (n),  = (n) if for every time T randomized algorithm A,
for all suﬃciently large n, it holds that Pryf(Un)[f(A(y)) = y] < . We say f is one-way if
f is (nc; 1/nc) one-way for every constant c.
Deﬁnition 5.8 (Pseudorandom). Let n be a security parameter, ` = `(n). A distribution
X on f0; 1g` is (T; ) pseudorandom for T = T (n),  = (n) if for all time T randomized
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algorithms A, Pr[A(X) = 1]  Pr[A(U`) = 1]  . A polynomial-time computable function
G : f0; 1gd=d(n) ! f0; 1g`=`(n) is a (T; ) pseudorandom generator (PRG) if G(Ud) is (T; )
pseudorandom.
We say G is a pseudorandom generator if G is a (nc; 1/nc) pseudorandom generator for
every constant c. The input to a pseudorandom generator is called the seed. The number
of extra bits, `  d, is called the stretch.
Note that nonuniform pseudorandomness and pseudorandom generators can be deﬁned
by replacing time T algorithms by size T boolean circuits.
It is useful to talk about the total conditional pseudoentropy of a sequence of jointly
distributed strings, called the next-block pseudoentropy:
Deﬁnition 5.9 (Next-block pseudoentropy). Let n be a security parameter, k = k(n),
and B(i) be a distribution for each i = 1; : : : ;m = m(n). We say
 
B(1); B(2); : : :

has
(non)uniform next-block (or next-bit, if each B(i) is a bit) pseudoentropy at least k if B(I)
has (non)uniform pseudoentropy at least k/m given B(1) : : : B(I 1), for I 2R [m].
Note that next-bit pseudoentropy is a more relaxed notion than pseudoentropy, and
to increase the next-block pseudoentropy, we would like “blocks” to be small i.e. as bits.
Note that the next-bit pseudoentropy is sensitive to the order of the bits; for example,
for any one-way function f , (Un; f(Un)) does not have next-bit pseudoentropy n + 1, but
(f(Un); Un) has next-bit pseudoentropy at least n+
(logn) as we show in the next section.
5.3 From One-Way Functions to Next-Bit Pseudoentropy
In this section, we show how to obtain a next-bit pseudoentropy generator from an
arbitrary one-way function f .
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This section is structured as follows. Given a one-way function f , we ﬁrst show that
Un is KL-hard for sampling given f(Un). By a chain rule for KL-hardness, we then argue
it is KL-hard to sample the next bit of Un given f(Un) and all previous bits of Un. Finally,
we use the equivalences between KL-hardness for sampling, KL-hardness, and conditional
pseudoentropy (Chapter 4, Lemma 4.37 and Theorem 4.53) to derive that (f(Un); Un) has
a lot of total next-bit pseudoentropy.
Lemma 5.10 (One-way function =) KL-hard for sampling). Let n be a security parameter,
and f : f0; 1gn ! f0; 1gn be (t; ) one-way, for t = t(n),  = (n). Then Un is uniformly
(t0; log(1/)) KL-hard for sampling given f(Un), for t0 = t/poly(n).
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that Un is not uniformly (t0; log(1/)) KL-hard for sam-
pling given f(Un), i.e. there exists a time t0 randomized oracle algorithm S such that
KL
 
f(Un); Unjjf(Un); SOf(Un);Un (f(Un))
  log 1

:
Let g(y; x) be the indicator function that f(x) = y. Since applying a (deterministic) function
does not increase KL divergence (Lemma 1.11),
KL
 
g (f(Un); Un) jjg
 
f(Un); S
Of(Un);Un (f(Un))
  log 1

where g(f(Un); Un)  1, and g
 
(f(Un); S
Of(Un);Un (f(Un))

equals 1 with probability p =
Pr[SOf(Un);Un (f(Un)) = Un]. Since the KL divergence from Bernoulli(1) to Bernoulli(p) is
log(1/p), we must have p  . That is,
Pr[SOf(Un);Un (f(Un)) = Un]  :
Since Of(Un);Un can be simulated in time poly(n), this violates the fact that f is (t; )
one-way for t = t0  poly(n).
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Lemma 5.11 (Chain rule for KL-hardness). Let Y be a distribution over f0; 1gn, jointly
distributed with Z. If Y is uniformly (t; ) KL-hard for sampling given Z, then YI is
uniformly (t0; /n) KL-hard for sampling given (Z; Y1; : : : ; YI 1), for I 2R [n], t0 = t/O(n).
Proof. Suppose YI is not uniformly (t0; /n) KL-hard for sampling given (Z; Y1; : : : ; YI 1),
that is there exists a time t0 randomized oracle algorithm S such that
KL
 
Z; Y1; : : : ; YI jjZ; Y1; : : : ; YI 1; SOZ;Y1;:::;YI (Z; Y1; : : : ; YI 1)
  
n
:
Consider the time O(nt0) = t algorithm that samples W1; : : : ;Wn from Z using oracle
OZ;Y , whereWi is inductively deﬁned to be SOZ;Y1;:::;YI (Z;W1; : : : ;Wi 1). By the chain rule
for KL divergence (Proposition 1.10),
KL(Z; Y1; : : : ; Yj jjZ;W1; : : : ;Wj) KL(Z; Y1; : : : ; Yj 1jjZ;W1; : : : ;Wj 1)
= KL((Yj jZ; Y1; : : : ; Yj 1)jj(Wj jZ;W1; : : : ;Wj 1))
= KL(Z; Y1; : : : ; Yj jjZ; Y1; : : : ; Yj 1; SOZ;Y1;:::;YI (Z; Y1; : : : ; Yj 1));
where the last equality follows from deﬁnition of conditional KL divergence. Telescoping
over j = 1; : : : ; n,
KL(Z; Y jjZ;W1; : : : ;Wn)
=
nX
i=1
KL(Z; Y1; : : : ; YijjZ; Y1; : : : ; Yi 1; SOZ;Y1;:::;YI (Z; Y1; : : : ; Yi 1))
= n KL(Z; Y1; : : : ; YI jjZ; Y1; : : : ; YI 1; SOZ;Y1;:::;YI (Z; Y1; : : : ; YI 1))
 n  
n
= :
This violates Y being uniformly (t; ) KL-hard for sampling given Z.
Now the remainder of showing next-bit pseudoentropy of (f(Un); Un) follows from (i)
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KL-hard for sampling implies KL-hard (Chapter 4, Lemma 4.37); (ii) KL-hard implies
conditional pseudoentropy (Chapter 4, Theorem 4.53). Formally,
Theorem 5.12 (One-way function =) next-bit pseudoentropy). Let n be a security pa-
rameter, t = t(n),  = (n),  = (n) all computable in polynomial time. Let f : f0; 1gn !
f0; 1gn be (t; ) one-way. Then (f(Un); Un) has (t0; ) uniform next-bit pseudoentropy at
least n+ log(1/)  , for t0 = t
(1)/poly(n; 1/).
Proof. Let Z = f(Un), Y = Un and I 2R [n]. By Lemma 5.10 and 5.11, YI is uni-
formly (t/poly(n); log(1/)/n) KL-hard for sampling given (Z; Y1; : : : ; YI 1). By Chapter
4, Lemma 4.37, YI is uniformly (t/poly(n); log(1/)/n) KL-hard given (Z; Y1; : : : ; YI 1). By
Chapter 4, Theorem 4.53, YI has (t0; ) uniform conditional pseudoentropy at least
Hsh(YI jZ; Y1; : : : ; YI 1) + log(1/)/n  /n;
for t0 = t
(1)/poly(n; 1/). Equivalently, (Z; Y ) has (t0; ) uniform next-bit pseudoentropy
at least Hsh(Y; Z) + log(1/)   = n+ log(1/)  .
Remark 5.13. The argument in this section says that (f(Un); Un) has a lot of next-bit
pseudoentropy as long as Un is KL-hard to sample from f(Un). The KL-hardness of sampling
Un from f(Un) is similar to the notion of a distributional one-way function [IL] which
amounts to replacing KL divergence with statistical distance.
For Un to be KL-hard to sample from f(Un), it is not necessary that f is one-way. For
example, given any one-way function h : f0; 1gn ! f0; 1gn/2, deﬁne
f(x) =
8>>><>>>:
x1;:::;n/2 (xn/2+1;:::;n = 0
n/2)
h(x) (otherwise)
:
Clearly f is not one-way, but Un is still KL-hard to sample from f(Un). Thus, our construc-
tion of next-bit pseudoentropy generators (and later on, pseudorandom generators) can be
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based on a larger class of functions.
5.4 From Next-Bit Pseudoentropy to Pseudorandomness
In this section, for brevity, we always assume the uniform setting whenever referring to
one-way functions and computational notions of (conditional) entropy. Nonetheless, these
results hold in the nonuniform setting too, with little or no change in the argument.
5.4.1 The Construction
Haitner et al. show a construction of a pseudorandom generator from any next-bit
pseudoentropy generator Gnb. Their result can be stated as follows:
Theorem 5.14 (Pseudorandomness from next-bit pseudoentropy [HRV]). Let n be a se-
curity parameter. Let  = (n) 2 [1/poly(n); n], m = m(n),  = (n) 2 [n/2] be
polynomial time computable. For every polynomial time computable Gnb : f0; 1gn !
f0; 1gm such that Gnb(Un) has (T; ) next-bit pseudoentropy at least n + , there exists
a (T  nO(1); nO(1)  (+2 )) pseudorandom generator G : f0; 1gd ! f0; 1gd(1+
(/n)) with
seed length
d = O

m2n2 log2 n
3

:
Moreover, G is computable in NC1 with O(d/n) (uniformly random) oracle calls to Gnb.
By Theorem 5.12, we can simply use Un ! (f(Un); Un) as the next-bit pseudoen-
tropy generator, and obtain the following construction of PRG G from one-way functions
f (illustrated in Figure 5.1), by applying the construction in Theorem 5.14:
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f(Un), Un f(Un), Un
f(Un), Un f(Un), Un f(Un), Un
f(Un), Un
f(Un), Un f(Un), Un f(Un), Un
H
(·)
H
(·)
H
(·)
pseudorandom bits
t
(u− 1)(n+m)
01
..
.1
10
..
.1
10
..
.0
Figure 5.2: Simpliﬁed construction of PRG from one-way function f : f0; 1gn ! f0; 1gm.
Each row contains u = (n/ logn) iid copies of (f(Un); Un), shifted by a random oﬀset
I 2 [n +m]. To extract pseudorandom bits, an arbitrary universal hash function H (with
a proper output length) is applied to all t = (d/(u  (n+m))) bits in the same column.
Construction 1. Given input Ud, the pseudorandom generator output
h; h(G11G
2
1 : : : G
t
1); h(G
1
2G
2
2 : : : G
t
2); : : :
where h is a universal hash function, and for each 1  i  t, Gi consists of u = (n/)
iid copies of (f(Un); Un), with the ﬁrst I bits of the ﬁrst copy and the last m + n   I bits
of the last copy discarded, for I 2R [n +m] (using a new copy of I for each Gi). We let
t = (d/(u  n)).
If f : f0; 1gn ! f0; 1gn is one-way, then setting parameters m = n,  = logn and
 = !(logn), G is a PRG with seed length any d = !(n4) and stretch d  
((logn)/n).
The following corollary was pointed out to us by Yuval Ishai: If f is a one-way function
with exponential security and linear circuit size, by using universal hash functions that have
linear circuit size as constructed in [IKOS], we can obtain a PRG whose circuit complexity
is linear in its stretch. Such pseudorandom generators (with circuit complexity linear in
their stretch) are useful for cryptography with constant computational overhead [IKOS].
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Corollary 5.15 (Pseudorandom generators with constant overhead). Suppose that there is
a function f : f0; 1gn ! f0; 1gn computable by uniform circuits of size O(n) and such that
for some constant  > 0 and every constant c, f is (nc; 2 n) one-way. Then there exists
a pseudorandom generator G : f0; 1gd ! f0; 1g2d computable by uniform boolean circuits of
size O(d), for d = O(n  polylog(n)).
Proof. By Theorem 5.12, Gnb(Un) has uniform next-bit pseudoentropy at least (1 + )n.
By Theorem 5.14, there exists a pseudorandom generator G : f0; 1gd ! f0; 1gd(1+) with
seed length d = O(n log3 n). We see from the construction (Construction 1) that G (i)
performs O(d/n) evaluations of f , for a total circuit size of O(d) since f has O(n) circuit
size; (ii) applies hashing on all (n/) columns and a total of O(d) bits, for a total circuit
size of O(d) using universal hash functions computable by uniform circuits of linear size
[IKOS]. Thus G has circuit size O(d). We then do iterative composition [Gol] d1/e times
to increase the output length to 2d; this increases the circuit size by a constant factor.
This result does not follow from the [HRV] construction alone, since their next-bit
pseudoentropy generator requires hash functions that support “local list-decoding” and are
not known to be implementable in linear size.
5.4.2 Saving Seed Length
In this section, we show how to save the seed length of [HRV]’s construction of pseu-
dorandom generators from next-bit pseudoentropy generators, by a factor of (n).
There are three steps in the construction:
1. Entropy equalization — discarding the ﬁrst I bits of the ﬁrst copy and the last m  I
bits of the last copy of Gnb. Since Gnb is highly unstructured, nothing can be said
about the conditional pseudoentropy in any ﬁxed bit, yet by discarding a random
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preﬁx, each position is now a random bit in Gnb. By taking many copies of Gnb, the
amortized loss of next-bit pseudoentropy is small.
Lemma 5.16. [HRV] Let n be a security parameter, m = m(n) = poly(n) and
` = `(n) = poly(n) be poly(n) time computable integer functions, where `(n) > 1.
Let X be a distribution on f0; 1gm with (T; )-next-bit pseudoentropy at least k, for
T = T (n),  = (n) and k = k(n). Let J be uniformly distributed over [m] and let
~X = X
(1)
J ; : : : ; X
(1)
m ; : : : ; X
(`)
1 ; : : : ; X
(`)
J 1, where X(i)’s are iid copies of X. Then every
bit of ~X has (T   O(`  m); `  ) conditional pseudoentropy at least (`   1)k/(`m),
conditioned on previous bits of ~X and J . 1
2. Converting conditional Shannon entropy to conditional min-entropy— taking multiple
(parallel) copies. This generalizes the standard procedure of converting Shannon
entropy to min-entropy by taking suﬃciently many copies. Conditional pseudo-min-
entropy is deﬁned analogously to conditional pseudoentropy; see [HRV].
Lemma 5.17. [HRV] Let n be a security parameter, m = m(n) = poly(n) and t =
t(n) = poly(n) be poly(n) time computable integer functions. Let X be a distribution
on f0; 1gm where every bit of X has (T; ) conditional pseudoentropy at least , for
T = T (n),  = (n),  = (n). Then for every  = (n) > 0 it holds that every block
of

X
(1)
1 ; X
(2)
1 ; : : : ; X
(t)
1

, …,

X
(1)
m ; X
(2)
m ; : : : ; X
(t)
m

, conditioned on previous blocks,
has (T 0; 0) conditional pseudo-min-entropy 0, where X(i)’s are iid copies of X, and
 T 0 = T 0(n) = T  O(m  t),
 0 = 0(n) = t2  (+ 2  + 2 ct) for a universal constant c > 0, and
 0 = 0(n) = t     (t; ), for  (t; k) 2 O(pt    log t).
1This is slightly stronger than the version in [HRV], which does not condition on J . However, it is easy
to see from their proof that one can additionally condition on J .
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3. Randomness extraction. This step is essentially a computational version of block
source extraction. At the previous step, the amount of next-bit pseudo-min-entropy
in each block is known. So we may choose hash functions of ﬁxed output length to
make the output pseudorandom.
Lemma 5.18. [HRV] Let n be a security parameter, m = m(n) = poly(n), t =
t(n) = poly(n),  = (n) 2 [t(n)] and  = (n) 2 [(n)] be poly(n) time computable
integer functions. Let fhs : f0; 1gt ! f0; 1g g be some family of universal hash
functions. Let X1; : : : ; Xm be distributions on f0; 1gt such that every Xi conditioned on
X1; : : : ; Xi 1 has (T; ) conditional pseudo-min-entropy , for T = T (n) and  = (n).
Then (h; h(X1); : : : ; h(Xm)) is (T  m  tO(1);m  (+ 2 /2)) pseudorandom, where h
is a random hash function from the family.
We refer to [HRV] for the proofs and detailed explanation of intuition behind these steps.
The seed length blow up in [HRV] comes from Step 1 (Entropy Equalization) and Step
2 (Converting to conditional min-entropy), as each involves repeating the current generator
on many independent seeds. We show how to save the blow up due to Entropy Equalization,
by showing how randomness from a “few” copies of Gnb can be used to generate more copies
of Gnb, and iteratively.
Speciﬁcally, we show that the [HRV] construction above, but taking only ` = 2 copies
in Entropy Equalization, gives rise to a “Z-seeded” PRG, one that given input distribution
Z outputs some ( ~Z; ~U) indistinguishable from (Z;U). (If Z were uniformly distributed
in f0; 1gd, this would be a standard PRG.) Then we apply iterative composition (just like
iterative composition for standard PRGs [Gol]) to increase the number of pseudorandom
bits (without changing the seed distribution Z).
We begin by describing the iterative composition of Z-seeded PRGs, illustrated in
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GZ
U˜σ
GZ˜
˜˜Uσ
SamplerUd
Figure 5.3: Iterative composition for Z-seeded PRG G
Figure 5.3.
Lemma 5.19 (Iterative composition of Z-seeded PRGs). Let n be a security parameter.
Let  = (n); ` = `(n) = poly(n) be poly(n) time computable functions. Let Z = Z(n) be
a distribution samplable in poly(n) time using d = d(n) bits of randomness. Let G be a
generator computable in poly(n) time such that G(Z) = ( ~Z; ~U) is (T; )-indistinguishable
from (Z;U), for T = T (n);  = (n). Then there is a (T   poly(n); `) pseudorandom
generator G0 : f0; 1gd ! f0; 1g` computable in poly(n) time.
Proof. Consider the following algorithm G`(z): If ` = 0 then output  (the empty string).
If `  0 then let (~z; ~u) = G(z) and output G` 1(~z)  ~u.
We claim that G`(Z) is pseudorandom, so we obtain the desired PRG G0 by composing
G` with algorithm that samples Z given d random bits. Clearly G0 runs in poly(n) time.
We show the pseudorandomness of G`(Z) by a hybrid argument.
Suppose for contradiction that G`(Z) is not (T 0; `)-pseudorandom, i.e. there exists a
T 0 time `-distinguisher D between G`(Z) and U`. For each 0  i  ` deﬁne a hybrid
distribution Hi = (Gi(Z); U(` i)). Thus H0 = U` and H` = G`(Z). Let I 2R [`]. Then
E [D(HI) D(HI 1)] = 1
`
X`
k=1
E [D(Hk) D(Hk 1)] = 1
`
E[D(G`(Z)) D(U`)] > :
We use this to break the pseudorandomness property of G. Denote G(Z) = ( ~Z; ~U). We
claim that D0(z; u) = D(GI 1(z)  u  U(` I)), where I 2R [`] and juj = , 0-distinguishes
(Z;U) from ( ~Z; ~U). Notice that given (~z; ~u) = G(z), we have (GI 1(~z); ~u) = GI(z) by
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deﬁnition of G`. Thus, D0( ~Z; ~U) = D(GI(Z)  U(` I)) = D(HI) whereas D0(Z;U) =
D(GI 1(Z)  U  U(` I)) = D(HI 1). It follows that
E[D0(Z;U) D0( ~Z; ~U)] = E[D(HI) D(HI 1)] > :
Moreover, D0 is computable in T 0 + poly(n) time. For an appropriate T 0 = T   poly(n),
this contradicts that (Z;U) and ( ~Z; ~U) are (T; ) indistinguishable. Therefore, G`(Z) is
(T   poly(n); `)-pseudorandom.
We now show how to construct a Z-seeded PRG G from any next-bit pseudoentropy
generator Gnb, as demonstrated in Figure 5.4. By applying iterative composition, this gives
rise to a seed-eﬃcient construction of PRG from a pseudoentropy generator Gnb which
should be compared to the original construction illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Theorem 5.20 (Next-bit pseudoentropy =) Z-seeded PRG). Let n be a security param-
eter. Let  = (n) 2 [1/poly(n); n], m = m(n),  = (n) 2 [n/2] be polynomial-time
computable functions. For every polynomial-time computable Gnb : f0; 1gn ! f0; 1gm such
that Gnb(Un) has (T; ) next-bit pseudoentropy at least n+ (for T = T (n) and  = (n)),
there exists distribution Z = Z(n) and generator G such that:
1. Z is samplable in polynomial time using
d = O
 
m2n log2
 
n


2
!
bits of randomness;
2. G is computable in polynomial time and G(Z) is (T   nO(1); nO(1)  ( + 2 )) indis-
tinguishable from (Z;U), U being uniformly random string of length 
(d /n).
Moreover, G is computable with O(d/n) (uniform and independent) oracle calls to Gnb.
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Gnb(Un)
H
(·)
H
(·)
H
(·)
Gnb(Un)
Gnb(Un)
Gnb(Un)
Gnb(Un)
Gnb(Un)
U˜
Gnb(U˜
(1))
Gnb(U˜
(2))
Gnb(U˜
(t))
U˜ (1)
U˜ (t)
. . .
. . .
(tn bits)
Figure 5.4: Construction of Z-seeded PRG G from any next-bit pseudoentropy generator
Gnb. The shaded area represents input Z. The bold boxes are the output G(Z) = ( ~Z; ~U).
The ith row is shifted by a random oﬀset J (i) 2 [n + m]. An arbitrary universal hash
function H (with a proper output length) is then applied to all bits in the same column,
producing pseudorandom bits ( ~U (1); : : : ; ~U (t); ~U) where each ~U (i) is of length n. We then
apply Gnb to each ~U (i). Together with unused bits of Z they form ~Z.
We ignore H, J (1); …, J (t) in the ﬁgure since they are the same in the input and output of
G.
Proof. Let t be a parameter to be ﬁxed later. Let J (1); : : : ; J (t) be t iid copies of J 2R [m],
and H 2R f0; 1gt. Consider
Z =

H  J (1) : : : J (t) Gnb(U (1))1;:::;J(1) 1 : : : Gnb(U (t))1;:::;J(t) 1 Gnb(U (t+1)) : : : Gnb(U (2t))

where U (i)’s are iid copies of Un. Z is clearly samplable in polynomial time using d =
t+ t  (logm+ 2n) = O(tn) bits of randomness.
We now deﬁne G. Interpret G’s input as
h  j(1) : : : j(t) Gnb(u(1))1;:::;j(1) 1 : : : Gnb(u(t))1;:::;j(t) 1 Gnb(u(t+1)) : : : Gnb(u(2t))
where h; j(i); u(i) are strings of length t, logm and n respectively. G is deﬁned as follows:
1. Entropy Equalization: For each i 2 [t] (that is, for each “row”), we set y(i) =
Gnb(u
(t+i))j(i);:::;m Gnb(u(i))1;:::;j(i) 1

;
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2. Apply a universal hash function h : f0; 1gt ! f0; 1gt0 where t0 will be chosen later so
that t0m > tn, on y(1)j      y(t)j , for each j 2 [m] (that is, for each “column”). Thus
m calls to h produce t0m bits in total:
~u(1) : : : ~u(t)  ~u = h(y(1)1 ; : : : ; y(t)1 )  h(y(1)2 ; : : : ; y(t)2 ) : : : h(y(1)m ; : : : ; y(t)m )
where ~u(1); : : : ; ~u(t) are n-bit strings, and ~u is the remaining t0m  tn bits.
3. Output
h  j(1) : : : j(t) Gnb(u(t+1))1;:::;j(1) 1 : : : Gnb(u(2t))1;:::;j(t) 1 Gnb(~u(1)) : : : Gnb(~u(t))  ~u:
We now prove that G(Z) is computationally indistinguishable from (Z  U) where U =
Ut0m tn (i.e. a t0m  tn bit random string). Suppose we run G(Z) to obtain
G(Z) =

H W Gnb( ~U (1)) : : : Gnb( ~U (t))  ~U

where ~U is of length t0m  tn, and
W =

J (1) : : : J (t) Gnb(U (t+1))1;:::;J(1) 1 : : : Gnb(U (2t))1;:::;J(t) 1

:
In the following, we will show that G(Z) =

H W Gnb( ~U (1)) : : : Gnb( ~U (t))  ~U

is com-
putationally indistinguishable from (Z  U) =

H W G(1)nb : : : G(t)nb  U

, where G(i)nb ’s are
iid copies of Gnb(Un). The proof is essentially the same 3-step analysis as in Haitner et. al,
with the tweak that the conditional pseudoentropy and conditional pseudo-min-entropy are
now additionally conditioned on W , and the ﬁnal indistinguishablility holds for W taking
any value.
In Step 1, we set Y (i) = Gnb(U (t+i))J(i);:::;m  Gnb(U (i))1;:::;J(i) 1. Recall that Gnb(Un)
has (T; ) next-bit pseudoentropy at least n + . Applying Lemma 5.16 (Entropy Equal-
ization) with ` = 2, X(1) = Gnb(U (t+i)) and X(2) = Gnb(U (i)), we obtain that every bit of
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Y (i) conditioned on previous bits of Y (i), Gnb(U (t+i))1;:::;J(i) 1 and J (i), has (T  O(m); 2)
conditional pseudoentropy at least ( + n)/m.
Recall that Y (1); : : : ; Y (t) are t independent rows. By Lemma 5.17 (t-fold parallel
repetition), Y (1)j ; : : : ; Y
(t)
j has (T   O(mt); t2  (2 + 2  + 2 ct)) conditional pseudo-min-
entropy at least  = t( + n)/m   O(pt log t), conditioned on W and all Y (1)k ; : : : ; Y (t)k
where k < j.
In Step 2, we apply hashing to each “column”. By Lemma 5.18, if we set t0 =   2,
then (H  ~U (1) : : : ~U (t)  ~U) and (H  Utn  U) are (T   O(mt)  mtO(1);mt2  (2 + 2  +
2 
(t)) +m  2 ) indistinguishable, for W taking any value. Thus the same can be said
about (H Gnb( ~U (1)) : : : Gnb( ~U (t))  ~U) and (H G(1)nb : : : G(t)nb  U). Thus we conclude that
G(Z) =

H W Gnb( ~U (1)) : : : Gnb( ~U (t))  ~U

is (T  O(mt) mtO(1);mt2  (2+ 2  + 2 
(t)) +m  2 ) indistinguishable from

H W G(1)nb : : : G(t)nb  U

= (Z  U) :
We are left to set the parameters. We need to guarantee




n
d

 t0m  tn =

t( + n)
m
 O(pt log t)  2

m  tn
where d = O(tn). Assuming   O(t), this can be simpliﬁed to
p
t
log t  O

m
p



which is guaranteed for an appropriate choice of
t = O
 
m2 log2
 
m


2
!
;
and consequently
d = O(tn) = O
 
m2n log2
 
m


2
!
= O
 
m2n log2
 
n


2
!
:
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So (Z;U) and G(Z) are (T   O(ts)   mtO(1);mt2  (2 + 2  + 2 
(t)) + m2 ) = (T  
nO(1); nO(1)  ( + 2 )) indistinguishable. Moreover, G makes O(d/n) uniformly random
oracle calls to Gnb.
Combining Lemma 5.19 and Theorem 5.20, we obtain a seed length eﬃcient construc-
tion of pseudorandom generators:
Corollary 5.21 (Next-bit pseudoentropy =) pseudorandomness). Let n be a security pa-
rameter. Let  = (n) 2 [1/poly(n); n], m = m(n),  = (n) 2 [n/2], ` = `(n) = poly(n)
be computable in time poly(n). For every polynomial time computable Gnb : f0; 1gn !
f0; 1gm such that Gnb(Un) has (T; ) next-bit pseudoentropy at least n +  (for T = T (n)
and  = (n)), there exists a polynomial-time computable (T   nO(1); nO(1)  ( + 2 ))
pseudorandom generator G : f0; 1gd ! f0; 1gd(`/n) with seed length
d = O
 
m2n log2
 
n


2
!
:
Moreover, G is computable with O(`d/n) (uniformly random) oracle calls to Gnb.
Proof. By Theorem 5.20, there is a Z-seeded PRG G0 where Z is samplable in polynomial
time from Ud, and G0(Z) is (T   nO(1); nO(1)  (+ 2 )) indistinguishable from (Z;U). By
Lemma 5.19 there exists a pseudorandom generator G with the above parameters.
In particular, from a one-way function f : f0; 1gn ! f0; 1gn and setting m = n,
 = logn,  = !(logn), ` = 2n/ we can construct a pseudorandom generator of seed
length any d = !(n3 logn). Like [HRV], the construction obtains (logn) bits of additive
stretch per invocation of the one-way function, which is optimal by [GGKT].
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Chapter 6
Impossibility of Black-Box
Construction of Succinct
Non-Interactive Argument from
Uniform Assumptions
A result of Gentry and Wichs [GW] shows that there is no black-box construction of
succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs) from any natural cryptographic assumption
(formally, they consider falsiﬁable cryptographic assumptions: ones that are deﬁned by a
polynomial-time security game). Their result relies on the (mild) assumption that there exist
hard subset membership problems, which is equivalent to the existence of subexponentially
hard one-way functions. One limitation is that they need to work in the non-uniform setting,
in part due to their use of the Min-Max Theorem in Lemma 3.1 of [GW].
In this chapter, we show how to obtain the analogous result in the uniform setting, as an
application of the Uniform Min-Max Theorem from Chapter 2. More precisely, we apply a
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low time complexity version of Lemma 3.1 of [GW] (Chapter 2, Theorem 2.18) proved using
the Uniform Min-Max Theorem. We show that, assuming that there exist subexponentially
hard one-way functions that are secure against uniform algorithms, there is no black-box
construction of SNARGs based on cryptographic assumptions where security is measured
against uniform algorithms (unless the assumption is already false).
A succinct non-interactive argument (SNARG) is a non-interactive argument system
where the proof size is bounded by a ﬁxed polynomial, for all instances and witnesses whose
size can be an arbitrarily large polynomial. Formally,
Deﬁnition 6.1 (SNARG). Let L be an NP language associated with relation R. We
say that a tuple (G;P; V ) of probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms is a succinct
non-interactive argument for R if the following properties hold:
 Completeness: For all (x;w) 2 R, if we choose (CRS;PRIV) G(1n); P (CRS; x; w),
then
Pr [V (PRIV; x;) = 0] = negl(n):
 Soundness: For every PPT algorithm (eﬃcient adversary)A, if we choose (CRS;PRIV) 
G(1n); (X;) A(1n;CRS), then
Pr [V (PRIV; X;) = 1 ^X /2 L] = negl(n):
 Succinctness: For all (x;w) 2 supp(X;W ) and crs 2 supp(CRS), the length of the
proof  = P (crs; x; w) is jj = poly(n)(jxj + jwj)o(1). We also consider a weaker
variant called slightly succinct, where we require the length of a proof to be jj =
poly(n)(jxj+ jwj) + o(jxj+ jwj) for some constant  < 1.1
1Earlier versions of [GW] contained a minor bug in the deﬁnition of slight succinctness. We use the
corrected deﬁnition from the current version of their paper.
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Our notion of a falsiﬁable cryptographic assumption is analogous to [GW], except that
the adversary A is a uniform algorithm instead of circuit:
Deﬁnition 6.2 (Falsiﬁable assumption). Given an interactive PPT algorithm Chal (the
challenger), the uniform falsiﬁable (cryptographic) assumption (associated with) Chal states
that for all (uniform) PPT algorithms H, the probability that Chal(1n) outputs a special
symbol win after interacting with H(1n) is at most negl(n) for all suﬃciently large n.
For any randomized (possibly ineﬃcient) function H, we let BreakH(n) denote the
above probability and say that H breaks the assumption if BreakH(n)  1/poly(n) for
inﬁnitely many n.
Remark. An alternative deﬁnition of falsiﬁable assumption allows specifying a constant ,
and says that the probability Chal(1n) outputs win is at most  + negl(n). However, it
turns out that setting  = 0, i.e. our deﬁnition above, is without loss of generality [HH].
We adopt the simpler deﬁnition because it is convenient for our proof.
Next we deﬁne black-box reductions:
Deﬁnition 6.3 (Adversary and reduction). For a randomized function A and a constant
c 2 N, we say (A; c) is a (G;P; V )-adversary if jA(1n; crs)j  nc and A violates the soundness
condition inﬁnitely often, i.e. if we choose (CRS;PRIV) G(1n); (X;) A(1n;CRS), then
Pr [V (PRIV; X;) = 1 ^X /2 L]  n c
for inﬁnitely many n. We say (A; c) is an a.e. (G;P; V )-adversary if A violates soundness
for all suﬃciently large n.
A uniform black-box reduction showing the soundness of (G;P; V ) based on a falsiﬁable
assumption Chal is a family of (uniform) probabilistic oracle algorithms fRedcg (one for
each c 2 N) such that for every (G;P; V )-adversary (A; c), RedAc (1n) breaks the assumption
and runs in time polyc(n) (i.e. a polynomial that depends on c).
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For a probabilistic oracle algorithm Red, we say a query (1m; crs) of Red(1n) has length
m. In general, Red(1n) may make queries of various lengths. We say Red is length-mapping
if for all n, all queries of Red(1n) are of the same length m = m(n) and m is computable in
time poly(n); denote this m by queryRed(n). Most reductions in cryptography set m = n
i.e. preserve length; that is, the security parameter of (G;P; V ) is equal to that of the
assumption.
Following [GW], our results assume the existence of hard subset membership problem.
Deﬁnition 6.4 (Uniformly hard subset membership problem). Let n be a security param-
eter, L be an NP language associated with relation R. We say ((X;W ); U) is a subset
membership problem for R if (X;W ) = (X;W )(n) is a poly(n)-time samplable joint distri-
bution whose support lies in R, and U = U(n) a poly(n)-time samplable distribution with
Pr[U /2 L]  n O(1).
A subset membership problem ((X;W ); U) is a subexponentially hard if X and U are
(2
(n
); 2 
(n))-indistinguishable for a constant  > 0. We say it is exponentially hard if
the above occurs and jxj+ jwj = O(n) for every (x;w) 2 supp(X;W ).
This is a relatively mild assumption; the existence of subexponentially hard subset
membership problems is equivalent to the existence of subexponentially hard one-way func-
tions.
Remark. Our deﬁnition of a hard subset membership problem is a variant of [GW] that is
needed in the uniform setting, but also can be used in the nonuniform setting of [GW]. In
[GW], they require that X is indistinguishable from a (not necessarily samplable) distribu-
tion U whose support is disjoint from L, whereas we require that U is samplable and allow
it to hit L with probability up to 1  nO(1).
We now state the uniform analogue of the main result of [GW]. Compared to [GW],
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our Theorem 6.5 makes the weaker assumption of subexponentially hard subset membership
problem with respect to uniform algorithms, with the conclusion that a uniform falsiﬁable
assumption cannot be broken also being weaker (unless the assumption is false).
Theorem 6.5 (Main theorem). Let L be an NP language associated with relation R that
has a subexponentially hard subset membership problem, and (G;P; V ) be an non-interactive
proof system for R that satisﬁes the completeness and succinctness properties. Then for
every uniform falsiﬁable assumption Chal, one of the following must hold:
 The assumption Chal is false, or
 There is no uniform black-box reduction showing the soundness of (G;P; V ) based on
Chal.
The same conclusion also holds if we assume an exponentially hard subset membership
problem, and (G;P; V ) is only slightly succinct.
The same conclusion also holds if we require the uniform black-box reduction to work
only for all (G;P; V )-adversary (A; c) where c is suﬃciently large.
To prove it in the nonuniform setting, the main idea of [GW] is showing that any
SNARG (G;P; V ) has an ineﬃcient adversary A that can be (eﬃciently) “simulated”
i.e. there exists an eﬃcient algorithm Sim (the simulator) such that RedA(1n)  RedSim(1n)
for all PPT oracle algorithms Red (cf. [GW] Lemma 4.1). Thus, if there were a black-box
reduction Red showing the soundness of (G;P; V ) based on a falsiﬁable assumption, then
RedA would break the falsiﬁable assumption (since A is an adversary) and so would RedSim
(since RedA(1n)  RedSim(1n)). In other words, the assumption would be false.
To prove it in the uniform setting, we use a similar approach with several necessary
tweaks. We show that there is an adversary simulator Sim, which is a PPT algorithm that
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with noticeable probability outputs a randomized circuit Bn that simulates some An, where
An is an (ineﬃcient) adversary on security parameter n:
Lemma 6.6 (Existence of adversary simulator). Let L be an NP language associated
with relation R that has a subexponentially hard subset membership problem ((X;W ); U),
and (G;P; V ) be a non-interactive proof system for R that satisﬁes the completeness and
succinctness properties. Let n be a security parameter, ((X;W ); U) = ((X;W ); U)(n),
(PRIV;CRS) = G(1n), and  = P (CRS; X;W ). Let ` = `(n)  n be a polynomial bound
on the running time of G(1n) as well as the proof size jj, and c be a constant such that
jXj+ jj  nc.
Let Red be any length-mapping PPT oracle algorithm where queryRed(k) = !(1). Then
there is a PPT algorithm Sim such that for all polynomials q(), for all suﬃciently large k,
and for n = queryRed(k), w.p. at least 1/poly(k), Sim(1k) outputs a randomized circuit Bn
such that there is a randomized function An satisfying:
 (An; c) is a (G;P; V )-adversary on the security parameter n;
 BreakRedAn (k)  BreakRedBn (k) < 1/q(k): (w.l.o.g. Bn only takes inputs (1n; ).)
The same conclusion also holds if we assume an exponentially hard subset membership
problem, and that (G;P; V ) is only slightly succinct.
Note that Lemma 6.6 is only stated for length-mapping reductions (unlike [GW]). We
remove this restriction by a general technique when we prove the main theorem in Section
6.2.
6.1 Proof of Existence of Adversary Simulator
The proof is set up as follows. Given a subexponentially hard subset membership
problem ((X;W ); U), we can w.l.o.g. assume that X and U are (2d`; 2 d`)-indistinguishable
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for a suﬃciently large constant d, where ` = `(n) is a bound on the length of the proof
output by P (crs; x; w) for (x;w) 2 supp(X;W ) and crs 2 supp(CRS). (If X and U are
only (2n ; 2 n)-indistinguishable for some  > 0, we simply re-index, replacing X(n) with
X((d`)1/)).) If ((X;W ); U) is exponentially hard, we can also ensure that X and U are
(2d`; 2 d`)-indistinguishable by re-indexing so that `  poly(n)  (jxj+ jwj)+ o(jxj+ jwj) =
O(jxj+ jwj)/d for all (x;w) 2 supp(X;W ) and crs 2 supp(CRS).
Overview of the Proof. Consider the joint distribution (CRS; X;) where CRS =
CRS(n) is the distribution of the common reference string, and  = (n) is the `-bit
proof produced by P for the instance/witness pair (X;W ). Using the fact that  is short
(by succinctness), and X and U are -indistinguishable for  = 2 O(`), we can apply Chap-
ter 2, Theorem 2.18 to conclude that, for every 2O(`)-time oracle algorithm D, there is a
poly(2`; 1/)-time randomized algorithm R that outputs a randomized circuit Fn such that
with probability at least 
(2/`) over Fn,
E[DOQ;Fn(Q)(CRS; X;)]  E[DOQ;Fn(Q)(CRS; U; Fn(CRS; U))] < 2 (?)
where Q can be any poly-time samplable distribution.
An adversary An can be deﬁned to be An(1n; crs) = (U;Fn(crs; U)) for any Fn where
(?) holds, for an appropriate choice of D. (Note that Fn depends on our choice of D.) If we
take D to be the veriﬁer V , then we can show that such An breaks soundness on security
parameter n. Indeed, V accepts (X;) with high probability, so by (?) it must also accept
(U;Fn(CRS; U)) = An(1n;CRS) with high probability. (Some extra work is needed to deal
with the fact that V can access its private coins PRIV in addition to CRS.)
Thus we only need to argue that, for an appropriate choice of D, such An is simulated
by some randomized circuit Bn generated by a PPT algorithm Sim; then combining the two
choices of D will yield the desired adversary An. Our choice of Bn is the randomized circuit
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such that Bn(1n;CRS) = (X;). If we appropriately construct D from the reduction Red
and challenger Chal, then using (?) we can show that
BreakRedAn (k)  BreakRedBn (k)  poly(k)  2 O(`);
where ` = `(n) for n = queryRed(k). (If BreakRedAn (k)  BreakRedBn (k) > poly(k)  2 O(`),
then we could use Red and Chal to construct a 2 O(`)-distinguisher between (CRS; Bn(1n;CRS)) =
(CRS; X;) and (CRS; An(1n;CRS)) = (CRS; U; Fn(CRS; U)), violating (?).)
This completes the proof provided that 2 O(`)  1/poly(k), which follows if Red does
not make queries that are too short. If instead 2 O(`) > 1/poly(k), then we construct a
simulator Bn diﬀerently — simply by letting Bn be such that Bn(1n; crs) = (U;Fn(crs; U)))
where Fn is the random output of R. Then with probability at least 
(2/`)  1/poly(k)
over Fn, (?) holds for Fn, hence we can deﬁne the adversary An from Fn (deﬁned to be
An(1
n; crs) = (U;Fn(crs; U)), as explained above) to obtain a perfect simulator Bn = An.
(Gentry and Wichs [GW] handle short queries using nonuniformity — by hardcoding the
answers to all short queries.)
Lemma 6.7 (Existence of adversary simulator). Let L be an NP language associated with
relation R that has a subset membership problem ((X;W ); U), and (G;P; V ) is a non-
interactive proof system for R that satisﬁes the completeness property. Let n be a security
parameter, ((X;W ); U) = ((X;W ); U)(n), (PRIV;CRS) = G(1n),  = P (CRS; X;W ). Let
` = `(n)  n be a polynomial bound on the running time of G(1n) as well as the proof size
jj, and c be a constant such that jXj+ jj  nc.
Suppose X and U are -indistinguishable for all t-time randomized algorithms, for
appropriate  = 2 O(`) and t = 2O(`). Let Red be any length-mapping PPT oracle algorithm
where queryRed(k) = !(1). Then there is a PPT algorithm Sim such that for all polynomials
q(), for all suﬃciently large k, and for n = queryRed(k), w.p. at least 1/poly(k), Sim(1k)
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outputs a randomized circuit Bn such that there is a randomized function An satisfying:
 (An; c) is a (G;P; V )-adversary on the security parameter n;
 BreakRedAn (k)  BreakRedBn (k) < 1/q(k): (w.l.o.g. Bn only takes inputs (1n; ).)
Proof. Let S be the PPT algorithm that on input (1n; crs) samples (x;w)  (X;W ) and
outputs (x; P (crs; x; w)), so that S(1n;CRS) = (X;). For technical convenience we assume
jCRSj = `/2. To construct Sim, we shall apply Theorem Chapter 2, 2.18 to the following
oracle algorithm D:
Claim 6.8. Let Q = (U`/2; U) (where U`/2 is uniform on f0; 1g`/2 and independent from U).
There is a t0 = 2O(`)  poly(1/)-time oracle algorithm D such that the following holds for
all polynomials q(), all suﬃciently large n, and all randomized functions Fn : supp(Q) !
f0; 1g` satisfying
E[DOQ;Fn(Q)(CRS; X;)]  E[DOQ;Fn(Q)(CRS; U; Fn(CRS; U))] < 0 = 2:
Deﬁne
An(1
n; crs) =
8>>><>>>:
(U;Fn(crs; U)); crs 2 supp(CRS)
S(1n; crs); crs /2 supp(CRS)
:
Then
 An break soundness of (G;P; V ) on security parameter n; and
 For all k  2` such that queryRed(k) = n,
BreakRedAn (k)  BreakRedS (k) < 1/q(k):
Proof of Claim. We will prove the contrapositive. Suppose that either
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Case 1. An does not break soundness of (G;P; V ) on security parameter n, or
Case 2. For some k  2` such that queryRed(k) = n,
BreakRedAn (k)  BreakRedS (k)  1/q(k):
We show how to construct a t0-time oracle algorithm D with
E[DOQ;Fn(Q)(CRS; X;)]  E[DOQ;Fn(Q)(CRS; U; Fn(CRS; U))]  0:
To do so, we will show how to constructD with distinguishing advantage at least 30, both in
Case 1 and in Case 2 where we assume k is known. This suﬃces, because then we can test the
distinguisher in Case 1 as well as the distinguisher in Case 2 for all choices of k = 1; : : : ; 2`,
and output the best performing one. (More speciﬁcally, we run these 1 + 2` distinguish-
ers on O((1/02) log(1/0)) independent samples of (CRS; X;) and (CRS; U; Fn(CRS; U))
as well as their coin tosses and oracle answers, and output the one with the highest av-
erage distinguishing advantage, and it follows from a Chernoﬀ bound that this yields an
0-distinguisher.)
Case 1. An does not break soundness on security parameter n. Recall that soundness
says Pr [V (PRIV; U;0) = 1 ^ U /2 L]  n c if we choose (CRS;PRIV)  G(1n); (U;0)  
An(1
n;CRS) (thus 0 = Fn(CRS; U)). By union bound,
Pr

V
 
PRIV; U;0

= 1
  V  PRIV; U;0 = 1 ^ U /2 L+ Pr[U 2 L] = 1  n O(1):
On the other hand, the completeness property says
Pr [V (PRIV; X;) = 1] = 1  negl(n):
Thus V is an n O(1)-distinguisher between (PRIV; X;) and (PRIV; U;0). Note that con-
ditioned on CRS = crs for any crs, PRIV is independent of (X;), and that PRIVjCRS=crs can
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be sampled in 2O(`) time given crs (by running G(1n; z) on all sequences z 2 f0; 1g` of coin
tosses). Thus from V we also get a 2O(`) time n O(1)-distinguisher D for (CRS; X;) and
(CRS; U;0). Speciﬁcally,D(crs; x; ) samples priv PRIVjCRS=crs and outputs V (priv; x; ),
so
E[D(CRS; X;)]  E[D(CRS; U; Fn(CRS; U))]
= E[D(CRS; X;)]  E[D(CRS; U;0)]
= Pr [V (PRIV; X;) = 1]  Pr V  PRIV; U;0 = 1
= n O(1)  30:
Case 2. For some k  2` such that queryRed(k) = n, we have
BreakRedAn (k)  BreakRedS (k)  1/q(k):
Assuming k is given, we use the hybrid argument to construct a distinguisher D be-
tween (CRS; X;) = (CRS; S(1n;CRS)) and (CRS; U; Fn(CRS; U)) = (CRS; An(1n;CRS)).
Suppose Red(1k) runs in time p(k) for some polynomial p. Let Hi be the stateful oracle
that behaves like An for the ﬁrst i queries and S for all rest of the queries, so that Hq = An
and H0 = S. By the hybrid argument, E

RedHI+1(1k)
   E RedHI (1k)  1/p(k)q(k) for
a randomly chosen I 2R f1; : : : ; p(k)g. This immediately gives us a distinguisher D0 for
(Z;CRS0; S(1n;CRS0)) and (Z;CRS0; An(1n;CRS0)) where Z is the internal state of the in-
teraction (RedHI (1k);Chal(1k)) after I 2R f1; : : : ; p(k)g queries, and CRS0 is the I-th query
(which is determined by Z). Speciﬁcally: D0(z; crs; x; ) sets the internal state of Red(1k)
and Chal(1k) to z, runs the interaction (RedS(1k);Chal(1k)) starting from state z using
(x; ) as the answer to the I-th query (1n; crs), and ﬁnally outputs 0 or 1 depending on
163
Chapter 6: Impossibility of Black-Box Construction of Succinct Non-Interactive Argument
from Uniform Assumptions
whether Chal outputs win. Thus
E

D0(Z;CRS0; S(1n;CRS0))
  E D0(Z;CRS0; An(1n;CRS0))
 E
h
RedHI 1(1k)
i
  E
h
RedHI (1k)
i
 1
p(k)q(k)
= 2 O(`):
To obtain a desired distinguisher D00 for (CRS; An(1n;CRS)) and (CRS; S(1n;CRS)), we
simply let D00 sample (z; crs0) (Z;CRS0) and output
D00(crs; x; ) =
8>>><>>>:
D0(z;crs;x;)
2`Pr[CRS=crs] ; (crs = crs0)
0; (crs 6= crs0)
:
Note that D00 is [0; 1]-bounded since CRS is sampled by G using ` coin tosses (so Pr[CRS =
crs]  2 ` for all crs 2 supp(CRS)). We are dividing by Pr[CRS = crs] in order to “uni-
formize” CRS, so that
E[D00(CRS; A(1n;CRS))]
=
X
crs2supp(CRS)
Pr[CRS = crs]  E

D0(Z;CRS0; An(1n;CRS0))
2`  Pr[CRS = crs]  I
 
CRS0 = crs

= E

D0(Z;CRS0; An(1n;CRS0))  I
 
CRS0 2 supp(CRS)  2 `
(where I() is the indicator function), and similarly for S. Thus D00 has distinguishing
advantage
E[D00(CRS; S(1n;CRS))]  E[D00(CRS; An(1n;CRS))]
= E

D0(Z;CRS0; S(1n;CRS0))  I  CRS0 2 supp(CRS)  2 `
  E

D0(Z;CRS0; An(1n;CRS0))  I
 
CRS0 2 supp(CRS)  2 `
=
 
E[D0(Z;CRS0; S(1n;CRS0))]  E[D0(Z;CRS0; An(1n;CRS0))]
  2 `
 2 O(`)  2 ` = 40;
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where the second equality holds because S(1n;CRS0) and An(1n;CRS0) are identical when-
ever CRS0 /2 supp(CRS).
To conclude Case 2, it remains to show that D00 can be implemented in time 2O(`) 
poly(1/). First, Pr[CRS = crs] can be computed in time 2O(`) by enumerating coin tosses
of G(1n). A query (1n; crs) to S can be answered in poly(n) time. A query (1n; crs) to An
with crs 2 CRS can be answered by sampling (Q;Fn(Q)) = (U`/2; U; Fn(U`/2; U)) for up
to O(2`  log(1/(  p(k)))) times until U`/2 = crs (recall that we assume jcrsj = `/2 in the
setup of Lemma 6.6). Thus we can sample (z; crs)  (Z;CRS0) and run D0(z; crs; x; ) in
p(k) max  poly(p(k)); 2O(`) = 2O(`) time. It follows from a union bound that
E[DOQ;Fn(Q)(CRS; X;)]  E[DOQ;Fn(Q)(CRS; U; Fn(CRS; U))]  30:
Given Claim 6.8, we now apply Chapter 2, Theorem 2.18 to the oracle algorithm D we
constructed in Claim 6.8. Since X and U are -indistinguishable, Theorem 2.18 yields a
t00 = poly(2`; t0; 1/)-time randomized algorithm R(1n) that w.p. at least 
(2/`) outputs a
randomized circuit Fn satisfying
E[DOQ;Fn(Q)(CRS; X;)]  E[DOQ;Fn(Q)(CRS; U; Fn(CRS; U))] < 2: (6.1)
We deﬁne the simulator Sim(1k) to be the following algorithm:
1. Let n = queryRed(k);
2. If `(n)  log k, then output a circuit Bn where Bn(1n; crs) runs S(1n; crs);
3. Else, `(n) < log k. We run R(1n) to obtain a randomized circuit F 0n, and output the
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randomized circuit Bn where
Bn(1
n; crs) =
8>>><>>>:
(U;F 0n(crs; U)); crs 2 supp(CRS)
S(1n; crs); crs /2 supp(CRS)
:
Note that Sim is a PPT algorithm since it runs in time 2O(`(n)) = poly(k) if `(n) < log k,
and in time poly(k) if `(n)  log k. To prove that Sim is indeed an adversary simulator, we
deﬁne the adversary An (which depends on the coins of Sim) to be
An(1
n; crs) =
8>>><>>>:
(U;F n(crs; U)); crs 2 supp(CRS)
S(1n; crs); crs /2 supp(CRS)
where F n is deﬁned as follows:
 If `(n)  log k, we let F n be any randomized circuit such that Eq. 6.1 holds for
Fn = F

n ;
 If `(n) < log k, we let F n be F 0n generated by R in Step 3 of Sim, so that Eq. 6.1 holds
for Fn = F n w.p. at least 
((n)2/`(n)) = 2 O(`(n))  1/poly(k) over the coins of R
(hence coins of Sim).
We now apply Claim 6.8 to Fn = F n . Note that Claim 6.8 holds “for all suﬃciently
large n”, but since queryRed(k) = !(1) it must also hold for all suﬃciently large k and
n = queryRed(k). Thus Claim 6.8 implies that for all polynomials q(), for all suﬃciently
large k and n = queryRed(k), w.p. at least 1/poly(k) over Bn, An satisﬁes
1. (An; c) is a (G;P; V )-adversary on the security parameter n; and
2. If `(n)  log k, then BreakRedAn (k)  BreakRedS (k) < 1/q(k):
To conclude the proof it remains to show that
BreakRedAn (k)  BreakRedBn (k) < 1/q(k): (6.2)
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Indeed, if `(n)  log k, then Bn runs S, so Eq. 6.2 follows from Item 2 above. If `(n) < log k,
then Eq. 6.2 holds because An = Bn (since F n = F 0n) thus BreakRedAn (k) = BreakRedBn (k).
6.2 Proof of Main Theorem
The next two lemmas show that we can “convert” a generic black-box reduction into
a length-mapping reduction, which in addition does not make very short queries. To do
so, we ﬁrst convert a generic black-box reduction into one that does not make very short
queries (Lemma 6.9), by guessing “optimal” oracle answers for these very short queries. We
then convert it to a length-mapping reduction (Lemma 6.10) by a “sparsiﬁcation” trick, due
to Chung, Mahmoody, and Pass [CMP]. As a consequence of “sparsiﬁcation” the resulting
length-mapping reduction no longer works with an arbitrary SNARG adversary. However,
it still suﬃces for proving the main theorem using Lemma 6.6.
Lemma 6.9. Let c 2 N be a constant. Suppose there is a PPT oracle algorithm Red with
the property that for every randomized function A where (A; c) is a (G;P; V )-adversary,
RedA breaks the falsiﬁable assumption. Then there is another PPT oracle algorithm dRed
satisfying the same property, and in addition every query of dRed is of length at least
s = s(n) = (log logn)
(1).
Proof. Suppose G(1m) outputs a crs of length md and let s = s(n) = (log logn)1/(d+1). We
deﬁne dRed(1n) as follows:
1. For each m < s, select a random function Bm : f0; 1gmd ! f0; 1gmc ;
2. Run Red, using Bm(crs) to answer every query (1m; crs) where m < s.
To see that dRed satisﬁes the same property as Red, consider any (G;P; V )-adversary (A; c).
By averaging the coins of A, for each m < s we can ﬁx some (deterministic) function
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Am : f0; 1gmd ! f0; 1gmc and deﬁne
bA(1m; crs) =
8>>><>>>:
Am(crs); m < s
A(1m; crs) m  s
;
such that Red bA breaks the falsiﬁable assumption. Note that fBm : m < sg can be encoded
as an s  (sc)sd = O(logn) bit string. Thus w.p. at least 1/poly(n), dRedA(1n) sets Bm = Am
for all m < s and behaves identically to Red bA. Therefore dRedA also breaks the falsiﬁable
assumption.
Lemma 6.10 (Chung, Mahmoody, and Pass [CMP]). Let c 2 N be a constant. Suppose
there is a PPT oracle algorithm Red with the property that for every randomized function
A where (A; c) is a (G;P; V )-adversary, RedA breaks the falsiﬁable assumption, and every
query of Red is of length at least s(n) = (log logn)
(1). Then there is a length-mapping
PPT oracle algorithm dRed where querydRed(n)  s(n), such that for inﬁnitely many n
and m = querydRed(n), for every randomized function Am where (Am; c) is a (G;P; V )-
adversary on security parameter m (of SNARG), dRedAm(1n) breaks the assumption on
security parameter n (of the assumption).
Proof. We construct dRed from Red as follows. Fix a sparse sequence h1; h2; : : : where h1 = 1
and hm+1 = 222
hm for m  1. Note that the interval [s(n);poly(n)] contains at most one
element of the sequence h1; h2; : : : , for some nc and all n  nc. Let dRedA(1n) run RedA(1n),
where a query (1m; crs) is answered as follows:
1. If n < nc or m /2 fh1; h2; : : : g, then answer the query with a special symbol ?;
2. Otherwise, answer the query using oracle A.
dRed is length-mapping, because every query of RedA(1n) has length in the interval
[s(n);poly(n)] (since Red runs in time poly(n)), and for all n  nc, at most one of h1; h2; : : :
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lies in that interval.
Suppose for contradiction that the dRed we construct does not satisfy the desired proper-
ties. That is, for all suﬃciently large n and m = querydRed(n), there exists some randomized
function Am where (Am; c) is a (G;P; V )-adversary on security parameterm, but dRedAm(1n)
does not break the assumption on security parameter n.
Let A be any randomized function such that A(1m; crs) = Am(1m; crs) where m =
querydRed(n) and for all suﬃciently large n. Thus (A; c) is an a.e. (G;P; V )-adversary. LetbA be a “sparsiﬁcation” of A: bA(1m; crs) := A(1m; crs) whenever m 2 fh1; h2; : : : g andbA(1m; crs) := ? for all other m. Thus ( bA; c) is a (G;P; V )-adversary.
Since ( bA; c) is a (G;P; V )-adversary Red bA breaks the falsiﬁable assumption. On the
other hand, dRedA(1n) behaves like dRedAm for all suﬃciently large n, hence does not break
the assumption. This yields a contradiction, because by construction dRedA(1n) = Red bA(1n)
for all n  nc.
Finally, we use Lemma 6.6 to deduce Theorem 6.5. Note that the length-mapping
reduction we obtain from Lemma 6.10 is slightly weaker, as it requires that the adversary
break soundness on a ﬁxed inﬁnite sequence of security parameters (rather than any in-
ﬁnite sequence of security parameters). However, it suﬃces because Lemma 6.6 provides
adversaries that break soundness on almost all security parameters.
Proof of Theorem 6.5 (Main Theorem). Suppose there is a generic uniform black-box re-
duction showing the soundness of (G;P; V ) based on a uniform falsiﬁable assumption. We
will show that the falsiﬁable assumption is already false, by constructing a PPT algorithm
that breaks it.
Fix c to be the constant given by Lemma 6.6. By Lemma 6.9 and Lemma 6.10, there is
a length-mapping PPT oracle algorithm Red where queryRed(k) = !(1), and for inﬁnitely
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many k, for n = queryRed(k), and for every randomized function An where (An; c) is a
(G;P; V )-adversary on security parameter n, RedAn(1k) breaks the assumption on security
parameter k.
We now apply Lemma 6.6 to Red to obtain a PPT algorithm Sim such that for all
polynomials q(), all suﬃciently large k and n = queryRed(k), w.p. at least 1/poly(k),
Sim(1k) outputs a randomized circuit Bn such that there is a randomized function An
satisfying:
1. (An; c) is a (G;P; V )-adversary on the security parameter n;
2. BreakRedAn (k)  BreakRedBn (k) < 1/q(k):
By the previous discussion, for inﬁnitely many k, Item 1 implies that RedAn(1k) breaks
the assumption on security parameter k. Thus by Item 2, for inﬁnitely many k, RedBn(1k)
also breaks the assumption on security parameter k. Hence we obtain a PPT algorithm
breaking the assumption for inﬁnitely many k: ﬁrst generate the circuit Bn by running
Sim(1k), then run RedBn(1k).
170
Chapter 7
Pseudoentropy and Algorithmic
Prediction Markets
In economics, prediction markets are speculative markets designed to elicit people’s
beliefs. Prediction markets based on market scoring rules, introduced by Hanson [Han],
have several important advantages. In particular, the automated market maker is able to
elicit true beliefs from experts, by paying a worst-case cost proportional to the distribution’s
entropy.
In this chapter, we describe an application of the characterization of pseudoentropy
(Chapter 4) in the context of such prediction markets generalized to a more algorithmic
setting.
7.1 Introduction
Consider an unknown distribution B on some outcome space 
; for example, the dis-
tribution of the winner of a horse race. An eﬀective way to elicit experts’ beliefs about
B is asking them to wager. A prediction market is a mechanism where for every possible
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outcome ! 2 
, traders (the experts) can buy and sell shares of security (i.e. bet) on !. At
last, when the true outcome ! is drawn from B and revealed, each trader is rewarded $i
for holding i shares of security on !.
The de facto standard prediction markets with automated market makers are ones
based on market scoring rules (MSR), introduced by Hanson [Han]. In Hanson’s MSR-based
prediction markets, there is an automated market maker who will accept any transaction,
and all transactions happen between market maker and the trader(s). In the transaction,
the price of buying or selling one share of security on ! 2 
 is determined by the market
scoring rule, and depends on the current number of outstanding shares of each security.
These MSR-based prediction markets have several desirable properties, including inﬁnite
liquidity (traders can always trade), truth revelation (any risk-neutral trader’s transaction
reveals his belief about B), and bounded worst-case loss (market maker does not pay too
much to elicit such truthful information even when B is adversarially chosen), assuming
a good scoring rule. In practice, MSR-based prediction markets are used by a number of
companies including Microsoft.
In reality, B is often jointly distributed with a set of random variables in a Bayes net,
which we collectively encode as an n-bit binary string X. The standard prediction markets
can only be used to elicit beliefs about (i) the marginal distribution of B (i.e. without
involving X), or (ii) the conditional distribution BjX=x for the speciﬁc x that has been
observed, by revealing x to traders in advance.
In light of this, we consider an extension called algorithmic prediction markets that
are capable of eliciting experts’ beliefs about the distribution BjX=x for every x 2 f0; 1gn
(but without explicitly running a separate prediction market on BjX=x for each x). More
concretely, we require a trader to present his transaction as a polynomial-sized Boolean
circuit that on input x outputs a transaction as if he is trading in the prediction market for
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BjX=x. We show that such algorithmic prediction markets can be executely eﬃciently, and
are “best eﬀort” truth revealing when proper market scoring rules are used.
It is necessary to assume a polynomial-sized outcome space 
 in order to eﬃciently
execute a prediction market. This is because the market maker needs 
(j
j) time and space
simply to maintain how much has been wagered on each security.1 With a polynomial-sized

, a trader in standard prediction market can always trade eﬃciently according to his
beliefs, which can be an arbitrary distribution on 
. However, this is no longer true for
algorithmic prediction markets, because the mapping from x to the trader’s belief about
BjX=x can be computationally hard.
Assuming logarithmic scoring rules, Hanson shows that the market maker’s worst-case
loss is characterized by Hsh(B). For algorithmic prediction markets, we show that the
worst-case loss is characterized by the pseudoentropy of B given X. This is proved using
our characterization of conditional pseudoentropy from Chapter 4.
7.2 Algorithmic Prediction Markets
Notations. We use boldface lower-case letters to denote vectors in Rq. If p is a probability
vector, we (abusing notation) let p also denote the corresponding probability distribution
on f1; : : : ; qg.
7.2.1 Strictly Proper Scoring Rule
Consider outcome space 
 = f1; : : : ; qg. LetH : fdistributions on 
g ! R be a strictly
concave, diﬀerentiable function. Let p be a probability vector of a distribution on 
. The
1One workaround is to restrict the possible securities available to the traders to a small set of predicates;
such prediction markets are known as combinatorial prediction markets, and their complexity has been
studied by Chen et al. [CGP, CFL+].
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strictly proper scoring rule associated with H is the following function SH :
SH(p; !) =  H(p) + hrH(p);pi   @
@p!
H(p)
where rH(p) denotes the gradient vector, and p! denotes the element of p indexed by
! 2 
. If H is set to bHsh where Hsh is the Shannon entropy function and b > 0, then SH
is called a logarithmic scoring rule.
The key property of a strictly proper scoring rule is that, as a utility function, SH can be
used to elicit true beliefs. Consider the setting where an expert is asked to report his belief
about the distribution B, and is then rewarded SH(p; !) dollars, where p is the distribution
reported by the expert and ! is the outcome drawn from B. Thus, an expert who reports
p while believing the actual distribution to be r is expecting a utility of E!r [SH(p; !)]. A
strictly proper scoring rule SH guarantees that this quantity is maximized by setting p = r
(thus an expert will always report his true belief r):
Proposition 7.1. E!r [SH(r; !)] E!r [SH(p; !)] = DH(rjjp)  0, where equality holds
iﬀ p = r.
Proof. By deﬁnition,
E
!r
[SH(p; !)] =  H(p) + hrH(p);pi  
X
!2

r!  @
@p!
H(p) =  H(p) + hrH(p);p  ri :
Thus
E
!r
[SH(r; !)]  E
!r
[SH(p; !)] = H(p) H(r)  hrH(p);p  ri = DH(rjjp)  0
where we use nonnegativity of Bregman divergence (Proposition 1.8).
7.2.2 Prediction Markets Based on Market Scoring Rules
Given an unknown target distribution B on 
 = f1; : : : ; qg, the prediction market
based on market scoring rule SH works as follows. A security is oﬀered for each ! 2 
, and
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every share of security ! pays oﬀ $1 if ! happens, $0 otherwise. The market starts with a
vector m of initial total outstanding shares (that is, m! is the total share of security ! held
by all traders initially). There is a centralized market maker who, at any time, accepts to
buy or sell any security with any trader, at a price determined below. The trader can query
the market maker about the cost of a hypothetical transaction, as well as the instantaneous
price of any ! 2 
 (see below). Finally, an outcome ! is drawn from X and the market
maker pays $1 to each trader holding one share of security !.
Consider a transaction that changes the vector of total outstanding shares from p to
q. The cost of the transaction to a trader is deﬁned to be
C(q)  C(p)
for some nonnegative cost function C, whose gradient rC(q) is called the vector of instan-
taneous prices at q. The function C is chosen so that (i) the gradient rC(q) is a probability
vector; (ii) the trader’s net proﬁt C(p)  C(q) + p!   q! equals
SH(rC(q); !)  SH(rC(p); !):
Such cost function C can be deﬁned for all proper scoring rules H [Han]. For example, with
the logarithmic scoring rule H = bHsh, the cost function C is deﬁned to be
C(p) = b  ln
X
!2

exp(p!/b);
and given current outstanding shares p, the instantaneous price of ! equals
(rC(p))! =
exp(p!/b)P
!02
 exp(p!0/b)
:
Loss and Utility. From a transaction that changes total outstanding shares from p to
q, the trader who believes the target distribution is r expects a net utility of
E
!r
[C(p)  C(q) + p!   q!] = E
!r
[SH(rC(q); !)]  E
!r
[SH(rC(p); !)] :
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By Proposition 7.1, a risk-neutral trader always wants to make a transaction such that
rC(q) = r. Therefore, such prediction markets can elicit true beliefs from risk-neutral
traders. Note that traders do not necessarily know the actual distribution B (that is, hold
belief r = B), and their beliefs may converge over time by observing the beliefs of other
traders. However, traders’s ﬁnal transactions will still reﬂect their true beliefs. It is up to
the market maker how to combine their beliefs to extract knowledge.
Let s denote the vector of outstanding shares after all transactions. Assuming a loga-
rithmic scoring rule H = bHsh, Proposition 7.1 says that the market maker’s loss equals
E
!B
[SH(rC(s); !)]  E
!B
[SH(rC(m); !)] = b  (KL(BjjrC(m)) KL(BjjrC(s))) :
By setting rC(m) to be the uniform distribution (e.g. with zero initial outstanding shares),
the market maker’s loss at any time is at most b KL(BjjU
) = b  (log j
j  Hsh(B)).
7.2.3 Algorithmic Prediction Markets
Let (X;B) be a joint distribution on f0; 1gn
, ￿ = f1; : : : ; qg for q = poly(n). We are
interested in learning from experts an “eﬃcient rule” describing how B is distributed given
X. For example, the formula that determines the distribution of an athlete’s performance
from a number of n binary factors.
A algorithmic prediction market works by running 2n MSR-based prediction markets
simultaneously; for each x 2 f0; 1gn, we run a market for the unknown target distribution
BjX=x, which we shall call the xth market. These 2n markets are run in parallel, and use the
same set of traders (experts) and proper scoring rule SH . At the end, an outcome (x; !)
is drawn from (X;B), and the market maker pays $1 to each trader holding one share of
security ! in the xth market.
As a trader simultaneously trades in all markets, it is infeasible to explicitly submit all
2n transactions to the market maker. Instead, the market maker speciﬁes two polynomials
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p(n) and t(n) which are announced to the traders in advance. A trader’s transaction is a
(deterministic) p(n)-sized Boolean circuit A such that A(x) outputs his transaction in the
xth market, represented as a vector t indexed by 
. The initial outstanding shares in the
xth market is zero (for simplicity), and no more than t(n) total transactions are allowed.
Similar to the standard setting, the trader can query the market maker about the cost of a
hypothetical transaction in the xth market, as well as instantaneous price of any ! 2 
 in
the xth market.
Note that we do not actually commit all 2n transactions fA(x) : x 2 f0; 1gng (e.g. phys-
ical exchange of cash and shares); the market maker merely keeps tracks of all transaction
history as a list of circuits A1; A2; : : : ; As, s  t(n). It is only after x is ﬁnally drawn from
X that the market maker physically commits the polynomially many transactions A1(x),
A2(x
), …, As(x).
Eﬃciency. Such algorithmic prediction markets can be eﬃciently implemented as long
as for each x, the xth market can be eﬃciently implemented, e.g. when logarithmic scoring
rules are used. Speciﬁcally, for every x 2 f0; 1gn, the instantaneous price rC() and the
cost function C() in the xth market can be computed from the vector of total outstanding
shares in the xth market, which in turn can be computed by combining the (polynomially
long) transaction history A1(x), A2(x), … so far.
Deﬁnition 7.2 (Worst-Case Loss for Algorithmic Prediction Markets). In an algorithmic
prediction market, the market maker has a worst-case loss of at most k if all polynomials
p(n) and for all sequences of p(n)-sized circuits A1; : : : ; Ap(n), the transactions A1; : : : ; Ap(n)
incur a total loss of at most k   1/p(n) to the market maker.
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7.3 Characterizing Worst-Case Loss and Expected Utility
Consider an algorithmic prediction market with logarithmic scoring rule (i.e. H =
 bHsh). We give a characterization of the market maker’s worst-case loss in terms of
the pseudoentropy of B given X. Recall that in a standard prediction markets using the
logarithmic scoring rule, the market maker’s worst-case loss is characterized in terms of the
entropy of B. Thus our result can be viewed as a computational generalization.
Theorem 7.3. Let n be a security parameter, 
 = 
(n) with j
j = poly(n), and (X;B) =
(X;B)(n) be a polynomial-time samplable joint distribution on f0; 1gn  
. Consider the
algorithmic prediction market on (X;B) with logarithmic scoring rule SH where H =  bHsh.
Then the market maker’s has a worst-case loss of at most b  (log j
j   k) if and only if B
has pseudoentropy at least k given X.
Proof. Let 0 (the all zero vector) and qx be the vectors of initial and ﬁnal total outstanding
shares in the xth market after transactions A1; : : : ; As. It follows from Proposition 7.1 that
the expected loss at this point equals
E
(x;!)(X;B)
[SH(rC(qx); !)]  E
(x;!)(X;B)
[SH(rC(0); !)]
= b  E
xX
[KL(BjX=x k rC(0)) KL(BjX=xjjrC(qx))]
= b   KL(X;BjjX;U
) KL(X;BjjX;rC(qX))
= b   log j
j  Hsh(BjX) KL(X;BjjX;rC(qX)) :
By Chapter 4, Theorem 4.38, it suﬃces to show the following are equivalent:
1. There exists a polynomial p(n) and a sequence of transactions A1, …, Ap(n) as p(n)-
sized circuits such that KL(X;BjjX;rC(qX))  k  Hsh(BjX)  1/p(n);
2. There exists a polynomial-sized circuit P such that KL(X;BjjX;P )  k Hsh(BjX) 
1/nO(1).
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First suppose that Item 1 holds. Recall that the ﬁnal outstanding shares qx equals A1(x)+
   + Ap(n)(x). Thus Item 2 holds for the polynomial-sized circuit P that computes qx by
running A1(x); : : : ; Ap(n)(x), and outputs the pmf of rC(qx). Since
(rC(p))! =
exp(p!/b)P
!02
 exp(p!0/b)
;
rC(qx) can be eﬃciently approximated using standard numerical techniques (e.g. Newton’s
method) such that
KL(X;BjjX;P )  k  Hsh(BjX)  1/nO(1)
(see Lemma A.6 for details; the same approximation is done in the proof of Chapter 4,
Theorem 4.50).
Now suppose Item 2 holds. To show Item 1, we simply let there be a single transaction
A1, which is a polynomial-sized circuit that outputs the vector (rC) 1(P jX=x) where
(rC) 1 denotes the inverse of the gradient of C. It can be checked that (rC) 1 can
be approximated eﬃciently, so that KL(X;BjjX;rC(qX))  KL(X;BjjX;P ) + n!(1) 
k  Hsh(BjX)  1/p(n).
“Best eﬀort” truth-revealing. In an algorithmic prediction market, if the trader’s
belief (X;B0) is such that (x; !) ! Pr[X = xjB0 = !] can be computed by a polynomial-
sized circuit, then he can and will be truth-revealing by making a transaction such that
(X;rC(pX)) = (X;B0). On the other hand, if the trader’s belief B0 has pseudoentropy no-
ticeably more than Hsh(B0jX) givenX, then he is incentivized to minimize KL(X;B0jjX;rC(pX))
(subject to being computationally bounded). We call the later behavior “best-eﬀort” truth-
revealing.
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Conclusion
In this work we developed several tools, such as the Uniform Min-Max Theorem and
the Regularity Theorems, and provided a wide range of applications in cryptography and
complexity theory. In addition, we developed techniques relating Bregman divergence to
indistinguishability in pseudorandomness theory; using this (and other) techniques we show
how to characterize diﬀerent notions of computational entropies, which in turn have many
applications in cryptography and complexity theory such as simplifying and improving
the construction of pseudorandom generators. We hope that our tools and techniques
would oﬀer readers more insights into the applications we demonstrated, help further our
understanding of fundamental problems in the areas of cryptography and complexity, and
will be extended to more applications in broader contexts.
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Appendix A
Missing Lemmas and Proofs
Lemma A.1 (Multiplicative weight update decreases KL). Let A;B be distributions on
[N ], f : [N ]! [0; 1] be a function, and 0    1. Then the distribution A0 deﬁned to be
Pr[A0 = x] / ef(x) Pr[A = x]
satisﬁes KL(B k A0)  KL(B k A)  (log e) (E[f(B)]  E[f(A)]  ).
Proof. By deﬁnition,
KL(B k A) KL(B k A0) =
X
x
Pr[B = x]

log Pr[B = x]Pr[A = x]   log
Pr[B = x]
Pr[A0 = x]

=
X
x
Pr[B = x] log Pr[A
0 = x]
Pr[A = x]
=
X
x
Pr[B = x]
 
log e
f(x)P
y e
f(y) Pr[A = y]
!
= (log e)
 
E[f(B)]  ln
 X
y
ef(y) Pr[A = y]
!!
Applying the inequalities 1+ z  ez, ez  1+ z+ z2 for 0  z  1, and using 0  f(x)  1,
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we have
KL(B k A) KL(B k A0)  (log e)
 
E[f(B)]  ln
 X
y
 
1 + f(y) + 2

Pr[A = y]
!!
= (log e)
 
E[f(B)]  ln  1 + E[f(A)] + 2
 (log e)  E[f(B)]   E[f(A)] + 2
= (log e) (E[f(B)]  E[f(A)]  )
For the following lemma, recall from Chapter 3 that a measure M : X ! [0; 1] is -
dense if its density (M) = Px2X M(x)/ jX j is at least . We denote by Mm; the set of
all -dense measures deﬁned on f0; 1gm.
Lemma A.2 (Sampling from a high density measure). Let n be a security parameter,
 = (n),  = (n). Then for k = O((1/) log(1/)), there is a randomized algorithm that,
given k and oracle access to a measure M 2 Mn;, w.p. at least 1    outputs a random
sample of M . The algorithm runs in O(k(s+ n)) time and makes k oracle queries, where
s is a bound on the bit length of M(x).
Proof. Use rejection sampling. Select a random z 2R f0; 1gn and output z w.p. M(z).
Repeat up to k = O((1/) log(1/)) times until some z is outputted. Thus with all but
(1  Ez [M(z)])k = (1  )k   probability we output some z  M .
Lemma A.3 (Approximating KL projection on high min-entropy distributions). Let C be
the set of distributions over f0; 1gn with min-entropy at least n   log(1/). Then there is
a probabilistic algorithm which, given any n,  > 0,  > 0,  > 0, achieves the following in
poly(n; 1/; 1/; log(1/)) time. Given oracle access to a measure N with N 2 C (where
C denotes the -neighborhood of C; see Deﬁnition 2.11), the algorithm w.p. at least 1   
computes a measure M where M is an 2-approximate KL projection of N on C.
188
Appendix A: Missing Lemmas and Proofs
Speciﬁcally, M(x) = min(1; c N(x)) for some constant c 2 [1; 1 + e] as a multiple of

(2).
This follows immediately from Lemma 2.3 of Barak et al. [BHK], where they show how
to approximate the KL projection on the set of high density measures (rather than high min-
entropy distributions), which is equivalent to KL projection on high density distributions.
Proof. For measures M and N , we deﬁne the KL divergence from M to N to be
KL (MkN) =
X
x

M(x) logM(x)
N(x)
 M(x) +N(x)

:
Note that
KL (MkN ) = KL (MkN)jM j + 1 
jN j
jM j + log
jN j
jM j :
Barak et al. [BHK] show how to compute gM, a   (2n)-approximate KL projection
of N on the set of high density measures M. Let M be the KL projection of N on M,
with jMj = 2m (w.l.o.g. the KL projection is always on the boundary; see Lemma A.4).
Thus by the above equality, M is the (exact) KL projection of N on C. Furthermore, for
every M 2M,
KL
 
MkgM KL (MkM)
=
KL

MkgM KL (MkM)
jM j  
0@
gM
jM j  
jMj
jM j
1A+
0@log
gM
jM j   log
jMj
jM j
1A

KL

MkgM KL (MkM)
jM j
where the inequality holds because
gM  jMj. Thus gM is a -approximate KL pro-
jection of N on C. The parameters follow from Lemma 2.3 of [BHK].
Lemma A.4. The KL projection of any measure N on any convex set M 63 N must be on
the boundary of M.
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Proof. Follows since the KL projection minimizes the convex function KL( k N).
For the following lemmas, refer to Chapter 4, Section 4.3 for the deﬁnition of eW .
Lemma A.5. For every function W : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! R0, Hsh(ekW jX) is monotone
decreasing in k for k 2 [0;+1).
Proof. Consider any k2  k1  0. Applying Lemma 4.43 Item 1 twice:
Hsh(ek2W jX) Hsh(ek1W jX)  k2  E
h
W (X; ek1W ) W (X; ek2W )
i
= KL(X; ek1W jjX; ek2W )  0;
Hsh(ek1W jX) Hsh(ek2W jX)  k1  E
h
W (X; ek2W ) W (X; ek1W )
i
= KL(X; ek2W jjX; ek1W )  0;
where we use nonnegativity of KL divergence. Scaling the inequalities by k1 and k2 resp.
and taking the sum yields
(k2   k1)

Hsh(ek1W jX) Hsh(ek2W jX)

 0;
i.e. Hsh(ek1W jX)  Hsh(ek2W jX).
Lemma A.6 (Approximations).
1. There is a time poly(t; n; `; ; log(1/)) deterministic algorithm that, given a size t
deterministic circuit ~W : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! [0; ],  > 0, and  > 0, outputs
a deterministic circuit P : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! [1; e] satisfying the following. For
all functions W where 8x; a,
W (x; a)  ~W (x; a)   and for all functions W 0 :
f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! [0; 0]:
E W 0(X;P )  E W 0(X; eW ) = 0 O();
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KL(X;BjjX;P ) KL(X;BjjX; eW ) = O();Hsh(P jX) Hsh(eW jX) =  Hsh(eW jX) + 1 O():
2. There is a poly(t; n; 2`; ; 1/; log(1/)) time randomized algorithm that given a size
t deterministic circuit W : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! [0; ],  > 0,  > 0, and  > 0, with
probability at least 1    (over its coins) estimates Hsh(eW jX) within O() additive
error.
3. There is a poly(t; n; 2`; ; 1/; log(1/)) time randomized oracle algorithm such that
the following holds for all joint distributions (X;B) on f0; 1gnf0; 1g`. Given oracle
access to OX;B, a size t deterministic circuit W : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g` ! [0; ],  > 0,
 > 0, and  > 0, the algorithm w.p. at least 1    (over its coins) estimates both
E[W (X;B)]   E[W (X; eW )] and KL(X;BjjX; eW ) + Hsh(BjX) within O() additive
error.
Proof. For Item 1, we construct a circuit P such that for all x; a,
e ~W (x;a)   P (x; a)  .
To do so, we approximate e ~W (x;a) 2 [1; exp()] to precision  using Newton’s method in
time poly(n; `; t; ; log(1/)).
We now prove the required bounds. First we claim P (x; a)/2W (x;a) 2 e O(); eO(),
because
jlogP (x; a) D(x; a)j

 ~W (x; a) W (x; a)+ logP (x; a)  ~W (x; a)
  +
log
 
1  e
~W (x;a)   P (x; a)
e ~W (x;a)
!
  +
log1 
e ~W (x;a)

  + jlog (1 )j = O();
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where we use e ~W (x;a)  1 in the last inequality. With this, we can bound the following
quantities:
P (ajx)  eW (ajx) =
 P (x; a)Pb P (x; b)   e
W (x;a)P
b e
W (x;b)


 eW (x;a)  eO()P
b e
W (x;b)  eO()  
eW (x;a)P
b e
W (x;b)
 (A.1)
 e
W (x;a)P
b e
W (x;b)

eO()   1

= eW (ajx) O()
and log 1P (ajx)   log 1eW (ajx)
 (A.2)
 jlogP (x; a) W (x; a)j+
log
 X
b
P (x; b)
!
  log
 X
b
eW (x;b)
!
 O() +
log
P
b e
W (x;b)  eO()P
b e
W (x;b)
 = O():
Using (A.1) and (A.2), we show the required bounds in turn:
E W 0(X;P )  E W 0(X; eW )  E
xX
"
0
X
a
P (ajx)  eW (ajx)#
 E
xX
"
0
 X
a
eW (ajx)
!
O()
#
= 0 O();
where the last inequality follows from (A.1).
KL(X;BjjX;P ) KL(X;BjjX; eW )
=
 ExX
"X
a
B(ajx) log B(ajx)
P (ajx)
#
  E
xX
"X
a
B(ajx) log B(ajx)eW (ajx)
#
 E
xX
"X
a
B(ajx)
log 1P (ajx)   log 1eW (ajx)

#
;
 O()
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where the last inequality follows from (A.2).
Hsh(P jX) Hsh(eW jX)
=
 ExX
"X
a
P (ajx) log 1
P (ajx)
#
  E
xX
"X
a
eW (ajx) log 1eW (ajx)
#
 E
xX
"X
a
P (ajx) log 1P (ajx)   eW (ajx) log 1eW (ajx)

#
= E
xX
"X
a
P (ajx)log 1P (ajx)   log 1eW (ajx)

+ log 1eW (ajx)
 
P (ajx)  eW (ajx)

#
 E
xX
"X
a

P (ajx) O() + log 1eW (ajx)  e
W (ajx) O()
#
  Hsh(eW jX) + 1 O();
where the second last inequality follows from (A.1) and (A.2).
For Item 2 and Item 3, ﬁrst note that we only need to estimate Hsh(eW jX) and
E[W (X;B)]  E[W (X; eW )] within O() error, since by Lemma 4.43 Item 1,
KL(X;BjjX; eW ) +Hsh(BjX) = Hsh(eW jX) 
 
E[W (X;B)]  E[W (X; eW )]

:
By Item 1 (where we set  = O(/`)), it suﬃces to estimate Hsh(P jX) and E[W (X;B)] 
E[W (X;P )] withinO() error. Recall P (ajx) can be computed in time poly(t; n; 2`; ; log(1/)).
Consider Hsh(P jX) = ExX [Hsh(P jX=x)]. For each x we can compute the value
Hsh(P jX=x) =  
P
aP (ajx) logP (ajx) within  error in time poly(t; n; 2`; ; log(1/)),
by approximating logP (ajx) to precision  using Taylor series. We can then estimate
ExX [Hsh(P jX=x)], where Hsh(P jX=x) 2 [0; `], from O(log(1/)(`/)2) random samples
of x. By a Chernoﬀ bound, w.p. at least 1   the estimate is within O() error.
Similarly, we can estimate E [W (X;B)]   E [W (X;P )], where W (x; a) 2 [0; ], from
O
 
log(1/)(/)2

random samples of (X;B;P ). Note that (X;B) can be sampled using
OX;B, and P can be sampled given X in time poly(t; n; 2`; ; log(1/)). By a Chernoﬀ
bound, w.p. at least 1   the estimate is within O() error.
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Lemma A.7. For any functionsW1;W2 : f0; 1gnf0; 1g` ! R0 and any joint distribution
(X;B) on f0; 1gn  f0; 1g`, we have
Hsh(eW1 jX) Hsh(eW2 jX) =  Hsh(eW2 jX) + 1 Omax
x;a
jW1(x; a) W2(x; a)j

;
KL(X;BjjX; eW1) KL(X;BjjX; eW2) = Omax
x;a
jW1(x; a) W2(x; a)j

:
Proof. Setting ~W =W1, W =W2 and  = maxx;a jW1(x; a) W2(x; a)j in Lemma A.6, we
obtain
Hsh(eW1 jX) Hsh(eW2 jX)
 Hsh(P jX) Hsh(eW1 jX)+ Hsh(P jX) Hsh(eW2 jX)
=
 
Hsh(eW2 jX) + 1
 Omax
x;a
jW1(x; a) W2(x; a)j

:
Setting ~W =W1, W =W2 and  = maxx;a jW1(x; a) W2(x; a)j in Lemma A.6, we obtain
KL(X;BjjX; eW1) KL(X;BjjX; eW2)
 KL(X;BjjX;P ) KL(X;BjjX; eW1)+ KL(X;BjjX;P ) KL(X;BjjX; eW2)
= O () = O

max
x;a
jW1(x; a) W2(x; a)j

:
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